I'm trying to think of a way that would not have us go in circles ad infinitum. So I'll try one last time to convince you that this is a misrepresentation.
My assumptions are indeed, given the body of data we have gathered so far, that what lies ahead will fit into what we already know - as opposed to being something extraordinary that invalidates most of our current understanding.
Whenever there are unknowns in our scientific understanding (and I'm sure we'll have more than enough of those for aeons to come), it has so far not been fruitful to offer magical external influences as the explanation. It has so far always turned out that natural forces were at work, forces we can reason about rationally. From my perspective, there is nothing unusualy going on with minds in particular that would warrant a different approach.
Our current understanding may be narrow by your standards, but it doesn't follow that people just get to make up whatever lies outside and then insist on those doubting them being unscientific.
> "based on our current understanding of the mind, our metaphorical model X is the best model we have created, but it is merely the best answer up until now, not the ultimate solution."
That we can agree on. What we don't seem to agree on is the amount of credibility we should assign to claims that lie far outside of our physical expectations. Just because there are unknowns doesn't make it reasonable to assign extraordinary values to those unknowns.
> The onus is not on me, as I am not making broad unscientific claims
If you make a claim, especially one that falls widely outside of extrapolated scientific understanding, the burden of proof does indeed fall on you. By contrast I am making the claim that whatever gaps we have in our theory about minds will eventually turn out to be an extension of what we already know, as opposed to some revolutionary but as of yet unseen aspect of the universe. My claim is small, yours is quite large and also seems vague to me.