This is easier said than done, if it is possible at all.
Having recently taken a dive into the U.S.' involvement in Vietnam, this argument rings eerily similar the one that got us into and led to our escalation in Vietnam.
If it were truly an existential threat the US would remove the Taliban very quickly (that doesn't imply a safe orderly society would result).
But Afghanistan, like Vietnam is an optional and non-essential conflict at this point with unclear definitions of victory. Maybe "victory" is packing up and going home at this point.
The US' mistake was not capitalizing on Russia's failure, choosing instead to make exactly the same mistake.
In case of Afghanistan, it is not just "maybe". Packing up and go home - is a clear win for the US in Afghanistan.
No, no, no. The Taliban were broadly distributed throughout Southern Afghanistan, and they had a cross border sanctuary in Pakistan.
For its own reasons (Kashmir and the regional rivalry with India), Pakistan didn’t want to alienate the Taliban, and their military and ISI thus had extensive relations with the Taliban.
The US did not have enough leverage to get Pakistan to shut down the Taliban on its side of the border, and likewise did not want the destabilization of a nuclear state with borders on China and India that would accompany violations of Pakistani sovereignty inherent in large scale bombing.
I guess it depends on your definition of "remove". I don't doubt that a Taliban government could be very quickly overthrown by the US military. Probably within weeks. Now, the Taliban as an irregular militia is a completely different manner.
I remember watching a Vice documentary on Afghanistan called "This is what winning looks like". The line that struck me was a US Marine saying something like "the average Taliban fighter fights within 15 yards of their home". If that's anything close to true, no wonder the Taliban have been so hard to defeat.
The Soviet Union deployed over 115k for several years. The amount of fortune spent was a serious accelerator for the decline of the USSR.
Afghanistan is a large, dispersed, and landlocked country. With huge amounts of weapons from many sides. Decades of war. Little trust between population groups.
With what, nukes? Or by sending 5 million soldiers using $400/gallon gasoline https://www.cbsnews.com/news/real-cost-of-gas-at-afghan-base... ? Like them or not, the Taliban are in their country and quite a few Afghani think like them. Let them be, with a major caveat--do not let anyone there attack us or our partners. I think they are rational enough to do that since USA did cause them a lot of problems.
They are so many problems in the world, USA cannot fix them. Not even make a dent.
[1] https://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484979294/chart-how-the-u-s-t...
Re Obama: there clearly was a lot wrong with the Afghanistan policy. But I'm not sure I really buy the "low troop level" argument. Even at peak deployment levels (pretty darn high) under Obama the military operations weren't going particularly well. And that wasn't sustainable.
1. Of course the military would ask for this, and complain after the fact.
2. It's easy for generals to make promises, but I have zero confidence that they would have actually delivered any results.
With Pakistan providing huge financial and logistical support to the Taliban, it would never be eliminated. Geopolitical experts understand that so long as Pakistan has the India problem, Afghanistan will have the Taliban as a buffer state.
Pakistan is between Afghanistan and India. https://www.atlapedia.com/online/maps/political/Afghan_etc.h... I'm confused as to how it would be a buffer. Can you explain?
I think there's pretty good evidence that the ISI has (does?) financed/organized training camps for anti India groups (like Lashkar-e-Taiba) in Afghanistan.
1) Fear of Indian sponsored proxies and being squeezed from both sides. An India friendly Afghanistan presents an existential danger to Pakistan's interests. Pakistan does not want to be encircled by hostile powers.
2) An unstable Afghanistan means possible anti-Pakistan elements taking root. Better to sponsor known "pakistan friendly" elements like the Taliban instead of unknowns.
3) Defense in depth. Pakistani military and political doctrine would use Afghanistan as a redoubt. Most of Pakistan is extremely flat until you get to the Hindu Kush/Pamir mountains. The idea would be, let India steamroll the flat lands, retreat into the mountains and cross the durand line, coordinate the response from Afghanistan.
This hasn't been true as much recently because the Taliban and other groups became extremely powerful in Pakistan, especially in Pashtun tribal areas, and the Pakistani military was forced to intervene. However, the Pakistani military has never been able to completely corral their intelligence services, which is one reason why there isn't as much cooperation between the US and Pakistan anymore (they were once close allies), with US/India ties becoming closer and closer instead.
https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/the-bush-wars-ellis-on-ame...
https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/the-bush-wars-ellis-on-pop...
I am extremely skeptical that any feasible amount of troops on the ground could have achieved such a goal.
> work with the locals after the initial invasion
1) Isn't it an ongoing meme in the US military that ANA troops are useless and that the government is corrupt to an unimaginable level?
2) Didn't we also originally burn their opium fields, only to allow it to become once again one of there chief economic exports since it was so vital to the local economies?
3) Is it true we had a formal policy of allowing elder tribal leaders to systematically rape young boys in order to be more accommodating to their local customs? Including trading viagra for tips on insurgent activity?
I realize some of these questions are pretty sensitive and may be uncomfortable to answer. It just seems like it needs to be brought up whenever we talk about the Afghan war (while it's usually swept under the rug...).
We then saw this play out to devastating effect with the de-Baathication agenda in Iraq.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/...
This is of course true but you can play this fallacy out forever. The right thing to do in the 80s was not to meddle. Then after that we should have cut our losses and stopped meddling. And now 40 years later we are cleaning up failed clean up attempts on failed clean up attempts.
At every point in this chain, the correct move is to admit you can't be world police and stop meddling.
So much contained in this one sentence. People need to go look at what backing an insurgency against a repressive but modernising government does and ask questions.
(Anyone remember the Living Daylights where James Bond teams up with the Oxford-educated Afghan head of the local islamists to beat the Russians together?)
Iran, the oil backed coup of the 1950s led to Pahlavi, hatred and fear which in turn led to Kohmeni in Paris. Simply letting the Iranians nationalise the oil industry would probably have been better long-term.
1953 to 2020, US oil interests stuffing up peace...
A few counter examples: Greece, [South] Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia.
Chile is another well known example, though IMO U.S. involvement is wildly exaggerated. AFAIU, it was conservatives in the Chilean Congress that engineered and pushed for the coup. The prospect of American support (e.g. a wink from the CIA) simply made it a marginally easier sell among the people whose heads might roll if it failed.
None of which is a defense of the Domino Theory or a comment on the merits of intervention. The take away from all of this, IMO, is to avoid grand strategic theories and goals--context matters.
Both of those countries would have had systemic corruption and massive structural issues either way, just as they had before. U.S. intervention doesn't really figure into it. Anyhow, the goal was to stop the spread of communism, not lift people out of poverty.
The genocide of "communists" (i.e. Chinese and other outgroups) in Indonesia was absolutely abhorrent and a gross moral failure on the part of the U.S. But from the perspective of American geopolitical interests intervention wasn't a failure. It almost certainly wasn't even necessary, either, but that's beside the point.
Non-intervention has its own problems, too, as exemplified by Cambodia, Rwanda, and Syria[1]. Intervention vs non-intervention is a false dichotomy. To reiterate, context matters.
[1] I've said before on HN that I think Obama's refusal to directly intervene in Syria showed exceptional leadership, notwithstanding his about-face; indeed, because of his about-face. But that doesn't absolve the U.S. of its sins for having created the conflagration in the Middle East that resulted in the Syrian conflict. What Obama finally accepted, but everybody else refused to admit (including his own advisors), was that the U.S. was politically incapable of making the necessary commitments. Had the U.S. been capable--i.e. if the context were different--then greater intervention would have been the correct thing. What makes his decision so profound to me was that he accepted that reality at a moment when denial was easiest--when everybody felt it was the morally righteous thing to do (and arguably was), everybody wanted it, and when after it inevitably led to more bloodshed nobody would have ever blamed him, neither contemporaneously nor in the future.
>At that point you can't just ignore them and hope they stop; they'd been escalating violence for years.
If you can't ignore the problem, then drastically escalate the violence on your own?
Off topic, but the whole concept of "world police" is just spin. A police force is one that enforces equally laws established by others. You cannot be at the same time the one who establishes the rules and who decides when and where to use force against those who break them. This is just arbitary use of violence.
USA has certainly done a good job of pretending to be the good guy, whilst simultaneously arming bad guys and killing to support Capitalist and tyrannical goals.
In hindsight, withdrawing from Iraq left a void that ISIS filled.
I mean, if you drill a hole in the bottom of a bathtub and then stand there with your thumb in it to hold the water in, you don't blame the fact that it drained on your getting tired and pulling out your hand.
We didn’t make ISIS... we just armed them very well (via Iraqi “security”).
When the US invaded Iraq, there were a decent amount of protests against it, and generally, Americans grew to see it as a mistake. What's different here is this connection gets a lot less attention, and it was arguably worse for the region.
Found the two Afghanistan books by Steve Coll interesting. Certainly not flattering of any group involved.
Did Mattis also disagree with bombing weddings and assassnating "males of fighting age"?