I like Chrome's approach much better; it doesn't force you to statically configure DNS server - it is a PITA, especially when roamining and you want to resolve hostnames available only in local networks.
Not really.
If you're not blackholing traffic at the dns-layer via DoH, set Firefox's trr.mode to 2. Per documentation, at the cost of additional latency incurred, system-level / network-level resolvers should pick up the slack, provided they've been set as appropriate via DHCP or otherwise.
Ref: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Trusted_Recursive_Resolver#network....
You have leaking internal hostnames there.
To be fair, it is difficult to make all parties satisfied there. I think that a bit more honesty during discussion would help.
For example, take your average John Doe who uses Firefox. Not particularly technically competent. A new version of Firefox comes out, and all the Archive.is domains break. Who does he blame for that, and how does he solve the problem?
What's happening behind the scenes is that Firefox switched his DNS address on him without warning. And Cloudflare (the DNS endpoint used by Firefox by default) returns incorrect IP addresses for the Archive.is domains (because the admin of these domains returns fake addresses to Cloudflare from their authoritative DNS server).
Most people are using DNS provided by their ISP, so they haven't seen this problem before. I know about the problem, and my resolver (Unbound) is set to use Cloudflare over TLS for most requests, but sends Archive.is domains to Google's DNS instead. This solves the problem for me. Firefox switching to Cloudflare by default not only breaks sites like this for the average user, it even breaks my workaround that fixes the problem.
(I can't currently reproduce the problem, so maybe Archive.is caved and started sending working IP addresses. But it's the sort of problem that can happen when you start messing around with DNS. Your users will blame you if a site doesn't load in your browser, but works in other ones.)
Why?
Well, this explains why Archive.is never works...
So basically whether Mozilla is doing the right thing or not here is entirely dependent on who the archive.is operators decide to target?
What about all the services that will be fixed for users after Mozilla makes this change, due to poorly operated DNS from the provider?
By default Firefox will fall back to the network resolver if DoH can't get the results, so the only way that a situation like this could happen is if someone purposely sabotages the DoH results like with archive.is.
Furthermore, what you are saying could basically be used to rationalize putting any kind of potentially breaking change behind an off-by-default configurable. Do you think the web would be the sophisticated application platform it is today if browser vendors actually had that philosophy? Would that actually be better for John Doe, to make them have to learn about the technical aspects of every new web technology before they are able to take advantage of them?
Yes, are explaining to our colleagues what IP address, subnet, route, or interface are.
--Someone with a decent understanding of networking
> network.trr.excluded-domains
> Comma separated list of domain names to be resolved using the native resolver instead of TRR. Users may add domains they wish to exclude from TRR to this pref. This pref can be used to make /etc/hosts works with DNS over HTTPS in Firefox. Setting network.trr.excluded-domains to include host names from /etc/hosts will make them fall back to platform DNS, which will use the rules in /etc/hosts.
So, rather than using the hosts file, network admins & devs now have to specify 'special sauce' in FF too?
I'm not buying DoH for this reason alone, because it throws out a lot of legacy (albeit always regarded as hokey) for no good reason. If FFox is doing it's own DNS stuff is MUST (at least) do hosts file resolution, imho. Otherwise it leaks names, which kinda defeats one of the main the purposes of DoH: which is to maintain critical privacy in places where it's being abused.
Breaking DNS is madness IMHO. Its just more sites that dont work on FF.
Broken is not more secure, its just broken.
Apart from the wait.
Spaff hostnames to cloudflare, fail, then try harder.
Users expect
hosts: files,dns
Admins expect dns to work.
FireFox should not be fscking with network config.
If they do, they should try not to break users first.
Firefox is borken. Security is not improved. My DNS requests never leave the LAN.
If I, or my company, or ISP has anything special in hosts or DNS, e.g. load balancing, name mapping, breaking facebook.com, things like that get bypassed.
DoH over HTTPS is slower than a lookup to /etc/hosts, and probably slower than a lookup to a locally cached DNS resolver.
Security is not improved by FireFox bypassing my network admins DNS rules.
Most DNS queries do not go over the Internet, unless you have DoH or have set special DNS servers. My ISP provides IP access to the Internet and DNS, like almost all ISPs. It not to do with local caching (which does add security), if I query foo.com that query goes to my ISP, not via the Internet, my ISP knows I asked for foo.com and then then the routes my IP packets there.
My ISP has to lookup DNS on the Internet to resolve them if it is not in caches but that lookup is not associated to me.
When I connect to a corporate network all my DNS goes over VPN if any information is required from the Internet again that is not associated to me.
Cloudflare might be running a more secure DNS resolver at the other end than my ISP, but it might not, its rules have to apply to the whole world so they cannot be tuned for me and my security preferences.
After DoH, all DNS goes over the Internet, even quires that eventually are resolved locally. Cloudflare now know I'm going to foo.com and so does my ISP, or VPN provider, I don't see how security has improved. Its just sending information to a commercial partner of Mozilla's in addition to my ISP. Some informationits getting that before my ISP did not get.
Plus HTTPS is not infallible.
DoH is more secure than DNS in plain text over the Internet, but that is very rarely the case.
DNS is also not a significant risk to browser users. I have never had a DNS response faked, to any HTTPS site it would not work, so why bother.
There isn't much risk, its not more secure, and it breaks stuff.
So in other words: privilege escalation.
These are separate features and should be decoupled accordingly.