People don’t take issue with DoH, they take issue with an advertising supported browser like Mozilla’s unicast (and now bicast) centralization of DNS traffic that was previously distributed.
We invented DNSCrypt. There’s also DNS over TLS. Lots of ways to encrypt DNS without centralization.
They make this about DoH when really the primary issues are with how they went about it.
Nothing prevents Google or Cloudflare to run DoH on the same IPs as their user-facing services. Unless you are willing to block Search, for example, you might be SOL without TLS-terminating proxy.
Just increase the cost/difficulty of a thing makes that thing less common. In this case that "thing" is ISPs selling highly accurate web histories to anyone who will pay. Please make that harder/more expensive, every cent of cost to the ISP is welcomed.
DoH is a protocol. It has better security than unencrypted DNS. (So do several others, like DNSCurve, DNSCrypt, or routing your DNS queries over a VPN.)
The objection people have is not that it's encrypted, it's that Mozilla implemented it in the browser instead of the OS and thereby ignores the DNS you configured in your OS. And even that is fine as a setting you can enable, but it's problematic as the default. Both because it's administratively burdensome to change a setting in every application on every device if you want to use your own, and because of the second order effect of that, which is that hardly anybody will change it and then DNS becomes centralized to whatever is the default in the browsers.
Just use a DNSSEC capable resolver in combination with a VPN. All other options today are effectively theater.
Between the recursive and authoritative DNS the VPN wouldn't exist, but if the attacker is there then DNSSEC is in trouble again because it still doesn't encrypt (no confidentiality). What can be used on that path is DNSCurve, because it does encrypt even where there isn't a VPN.
The majority of domains also aren't DNSSEC signed anyway, so it doesn't even authenticate them.
Currently there is no way to get a fully encrypted chain (the root servers would need to support DoT or something similar and they don't nor are there any plans for them to do so afaik).
So the best (form a privacy and trust PoV) you can achieve is as I've outlined: VPN together with a DNSSEC resolver (with verification enabled). Over time you can hope for DoT to gain wider adoption so more and more of the upstream resolver chain is encrypted.
Confidentiality and authentication are two different things, but the things that provide confidentiality here also provide authentication. DNSSEC only provides authentication, so then you need something else to provide confidentiality at every point in the path. At which point you would also have authentication at every point in the path, so what does that leave for DNSSEC to do?
> DoH is only designed for last mile so useless in encrypting the resolver chain between you and the root servers.
This is true. DoH isn't the one to use between recursive and authoritative DNS servers.
> Currently there is no way to get a fully encrypted chain (the root servers would need to support DoT or something similar and they don't nor are there any plans for them to do so afaik).
DoT has a similar drawback as DoH between recursive and authoritative servers. The session establishment is expensive (more round trips, higher latency). That's not so bad for the link between the client and the recursive DNS, because you create a session once and use it for all your queries. It stinks between recursive and authoritative servers because the recursive server would need a new session for each authoritative server -- and a single recursive query can often require contacting three or more authoritative servers.
Fortunately DNSCurve has lower latency and can be used between any pair of recursive and authoritative servers that support it.
The root not supporting DNSCurve is an issue, but it has an obvious long-term solution (have the root start supporting DNSCurve), and in the meantime the recursive resolver could validate only the root with DNSSEC. The lack of privacy is much less impactful for TLD queries -- a query for your-local-oncologist.com tells an observer much more than a query for .com. Then if DNSCurve is used for the rest of the chain after the root, you have one authentication or the other for the full chain and privacy for all but the TLD query. You also then don't need any large DNSSEC records in the authoritative servers that support DNSCurve, which would otherwise be a DDoS vector.
> So the best (form a privacy and trust PoV) you can achieve is as I've outlined: VPN together with a DNSSEC resolver (with verification enabled).
I still don't see what that's even supposed to be adding over the VPN right now. The VPN handles the link between the client and the recursive resolver. You can only get authentication between recursive and authoritative servers for domains whose authoritative servers support some authentication, but hardly any of them support any authentication right now, and if you're going to add one it makes more sense for it to be DNSCurve than DNSSEC because it provides confidentiality in addition to authentication and isn't a DDoS vector.
To be honest my main gripe is with DoH. For non-last-mile privacy/trust, there are indeed many suitable ways to tackle it.
Explain that to me?
There are 40 publicly available servers listed on https://github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS from large and small players.
Ummm so what’s the downside then? Are those services arcane and hard to use and utterly forbidding blackest black magic, like almost all crypto stuff?
If you’re thinking browser users will just do this then that then this and x and y and z to “get dns crypto going”, then I’ll take Mozilla’s “it just works” approach.
It’s a much much better approach for the browsers to implement it rather than wait for everyone’s operating system to implement secure dns because that’ll happen .... well I can’t imagine any time in the future you could say everyone’s OS is using crypto DNS, whereas if browsers implement it for themselves, instant massive adoption.
I think you have some reading to do.
Nowhere do “people just run a local resolver”. Grandma and aunty Beryl certainly don’t, nor does any other ordinary person. If you want secure DNS you have to build it in to the browser.
Only systems people think that this is the sort of thing that ordinary people do.
If Grandma has a grandchild that knows how to set up a PiHole, it's a different story. But that's certainly not the majority of Grandmas or the majority of wifi routers.
How many people do you know that running local resolvers? How would this even work on Windows?
The world doesn’t need another encrypted dns solution that only works on Linux