Slick Wraps Data Breach

https://files.catbox.moe/fxn9r2.pdf

Some comments:

The beginning of the document says "Inspecting the file and testing my findings with initial hand‑crafted POST requests, I discovered that this script allows clients to specify a custom filename which is susceptible to path traversal. To make matters worse, the script does not protect against overwriting existing files": Great, you have path traversal and upload on an old-school PHP platform. You've already won! Report it and move to a bug bounty that actually pays.

Next, "Using this vulnerability, I uploaded a custom .htaccess file (with Options +Indexes ) into the /media directory": This is going too far.

Next, "Further leveraging the insecure upload script, I managed to deploy a custom index.php into an exiting /media subfolder": This is going to far.

Next, "To expedite further testing, I uploaded a copy of the p0wny‑shell. (Note that I slightly modified the file to circumvent common anti‑malware signatures.)": This is going to far.

"Knowing SlickWraps' website was powered by Magento 1.8, I located and decrypted the local configuration file. In here, I found MySQL and Redis credentials, and thus had full access to their entire database... Investigating the complete 17 GB MySQL dump gave me access to the following": Ah, so you knowingly breached real customer data. I think even you know you've gone way too far by now.

I could continue to the next steps in the exploitation chain, but won't. Per their initial Medium writeup, they didn't report it to Slick Wraps until they had walked past a not-so-thin line half a dozen times and extracted the full database content.

This behavior isn't even remotely grey-hat.