Forcing consent before selling browser histories violates our free speech
theregister.co.uk
theregister.co.uk
For that matter, laws against slander? Free speech violation. Laws against false accusation? Free speech violation. Laws against false advertising? Free speech violation. Laws against filing false tax returns? Free speech violation. Laws against perjury? Free speech violation.
So, if free speech is your only lens through which you view the legal system, there are a lot of free speech violations that are currently (and correctly) encoded into law. Privacy violations are one major area. So this violates the ISPs free speech, in order to protect their customers' privacy? Sounds perfectly fine (and normal) to me...
Also, I wasn't just talking about ISPs and Internet firms. How is it OK for banks to sell data about their customers?
ISPs are different because of the lack of competition. If you don't like Google you can use Duck Duck Go. If you don't like WhatsApp you can use Signal. If you don't like Windows 10 you can use Ubuntu (or, if you want to argue Windows is still a monopoly, Microsoft should move to the "monopolists" column and be subject to the stricter rules).
In particular, in those cases the competitors actually do have meaningfully more respect for privacy. In markets where every reasonably available provider snoops and the market has high barriers to entry, that's a different situation.
Also, if competitors do respect privacy, why would statutory protection be burdensome?
The issue is that "privacy" itself becomes ambiguous in many contexts.
For an ISP this is easy, because they can forward your traffic without ever storing any of it. They have no legitimate reason to keep it and they only want to in order to invade your privacy, so there is nothing good lost by prohibiting that.
By contrast, how do you make Waze work without user location data? How do you make recommendations based on viewing history without keeping viewing history? How do you ship a physical product to a customer without having their mailing address? In these cases it's not just a simple matter of not collecting the data.
So the problem is the complexity of the rules. "ISPs shouldn't store any user internet traffic or metadata" is simple and reasonable, and is necessary because without it the one or two local ISPs would all do the opposite and no one would have a choice.
Applying a much more complicated set of rules to companies that do have legitimate reasons to collect some data or use it for various things customers actually want has both higher costs from an administrative perspective and lower benefits because viable privacy-respecting competitors actually exist in real life for the people who don't consent.
Anyway, it's my impression that ISPs already log some traffic metadata, given that I read about requests from police etc. And of course there are capabilities under CALEA.
And it's understandable that they'd like to earn some money from it, just as Google etc (and my bloody credit providers) do.
Selling and shipping stuff obviously requires information about customers, such as names, mailing addresses, phone numbers, and credit card numbers. But why should they get to monetize that information, in ways that don't benefit me? That's arguably as clear a distinction as ISPs being unable to monetize by traffic metadata.
I agree that it's more complicated for services that require browsing and location history. But I suspect that much more processing could be done locally. And where that was unworkable, information could be firewalled from other business units.
And even about ISPs without meaningful competition, customers can always use VPN services. That's become quite common in many places.
My ISP gets nothing from me except which VPN service I use, and throughput vs time. And that VPN service gets nothing from me except which VPN services I use through it. And so on until the last VPN service, unless I'm using Tor.
Also, the availability of privacy-respecting alternatives doesn't protect people who are too clueless to use them.
Fraud isn't a huge regulatory framework. The main reason for that is that you need intent to defraud, which can be ambiguous around the edges but it's pretty damn hard to do it by accident. The analogous thing for privacy would be prohibiting the sale of private data -- and that's probably a good idea. Because it's pretty hard to do that by accident and most honest businesses don't do it at all, so you're not putting a huge compliance burden on millions of unsuspecting businesses, only the few that actually sell data.
But there are still some nasty things you can do with private data without actually selling it. That's not as easy.
> Anyway, it's my impression that ISPs already log some traffic metadata, given that I read about requests from police etc. And of course there are capabilities under CALEA.
Whether they do it or not, there's no technical necessity to do it in order to deliver internet packets. There could be a law outright prohibiting it and it wouldn't make them any worse at being an ISP.
And if there is some interesting thing the user wants that could be done by logging internet traffic, let it be done at the endpoints by some independent company which doesn't have so much leverage over the user.
> Selling and shipping stuff obviously requires information about customers, such as names, mailing addresses, phone numbers, and credit card numbers. But why should they get to monetize that information, in ways that don't benefit me?
The problem is how to distinguish what benefits you. That turns out to be a very complicated question, and governments manage complexity very inefficiently. So it's usually better to leave most of that to individual choices -- as long as the choices are available, i.e. there is adequate competition.
> I agree that it's more complicated for services that require browsing and location history. But I suspect that much more processing could be done locally. And where that was unworkable, information could be firewalled from other business units.
Right, so it's technically possible but in order to get there you have to do a detailed analysis and everybody will have different opinions about the relative trade offs.
That's hard to make a regulation out of -- either you hard-code detailed information which then quickly becomes outdated and which nobody really agreed was right to begin with, or you try to be flexible which means nobody really knows how to comply with it and huge companies with lawyers have enough ambiguity to argue their way out of anything.
Either it needs to be much simpler than that, or you need exemptions for everybody but megacorps in which case you can use the inflexible detailed long-form regulations without worrying about the compliance costs bankrupting anybody, since it only applies to entities capable of absorbing the cost. An example of which is applying it only to large ISPs.
> And even about ISPs without meaningful competition, customers can always use VPN services. That's become quite common in many places.
I think this would be a better argument if a majority of people actually used them. As it is you essentially have a knowledge barrier which prevents them from serving as viable competition.
> Also, the availability of privacy-respecting alternatives doesn't protect people who are too clueless to use them.
And maybe that's the real answer. Don't go to the government for regulations at all, instead go to them for money, DARPA style, to get the things that use local processing and aren't dependent on advertising to fund development into a state that the majority of people are actually using them.
I'd settle for sale being illegal.
> But there are still some nasty things you can do with private data without actually selling it. That's not as easy.
True. But as you say, that quickly gets complicated.
> And maybe that's the real answer. Don't go to the government for regulations at all, instead go to them for money, DARPA style, to get the things that use local processing and aren't dependent on advertising to fund development into a state that the majority of people are actually using them.
That would be very cool.
This is very much not the case both ways. Yes, you could use DuckDuckGo instead of Google. But by the same logic you can always use some local DSL provider for your ISP. That is still a thing in most places. Of course, you will get 1.5Mbps instead of 50Mbps via Comcast, but it is not like DDG provides the same range of service as Google either.
1. [Opinion] As someone who uses DDG for 95%+ of my queries, the sacrifice is orders of magnitude less than using the local DSL provider in your example.
2. [Fact] Switching ISPs has a much higher cost. Switching back to Google for a few minutes if DDG isn't getting the job done is three keystrokes: " !g".
The question isn't whether a viable competitor exists, it's whether a viable competitor that respects privacy exists.
I'm in a Detroit suburb, but I guess I'm an outlier.
The argument is also a bit of a red herring, because even with vibrant DSL competition, the same argument could be made by the monopoly ILEC against a privacy-respecting CLEC.
This is not true. Sure, you can stop searching with Google. But Google, being a surveillance company, collects data from many sources besides search. They have gotten most websites to implement their bugs (Analytics and Recaptcha), and buy troves of data from other surveillance companies (Experian, LexisNexis, etc), so it is impossible to just "stop" being abused by them.
I personally believe that the best way is to fix the longstanding security problems in web browsers that leak all of this personal information in the first place. But as long as we're talking about legalistic approaches, then it seems eminently reasonable to condemn all surveillance companies for unilaterally snooping (including the faux consent of purported "contracts"), the same way that if I leave my curtains open and someone snaps a picture of me naked, they're not free to openly sell it.
So choose alternatives to the other things too and/or install a browser plugin that blocks their tracking bugs.
> and buy troves of data from other surveillance companies (Experian, LexisNexis, etc)
The perpetrators in that case are the other surveillance companies. But now we're getting into the real trouble here -- there are places you can get a loan without credit reporting, but you won't get the same interest rate, because the lower interest rate from the places that use credit reporting is a direct result of the way in which credit reporting affects likelihood to repay the loan. So what do you expect to happen to loan interest rates if you make it illegal to set the interest rate based on whether the user consents to credit reporting?
It's problems like that which make privacy regulations hard, and justify applying them primarily to companies that lack effective competition.
It's only appropriate to say this in the context of what one can possibly try doing, not as a justification based on failing to have done this. The amount of websites deploying surveillance is the sheer majority of all websites, especially for many specific sectors.
> and/or install a browser plugin that blocks their tracking bugs
I did say that I have the highest hope in technical solutions, but once again this eventual hope is not a justification for writing off legalistic approaches.
> So what do you expect to happen to loan interest rates if you make it illegal to set the interest rate based on whether the user consents to credit reporting?
For one, secured interest rates wouldn't changed appreciably because there is collateral to foreclose. Even so, any increase would make asset prices drop such that more people would be able to own things rather than renting them from banks. Surveillance and financialization are both centralizing forces, and I am generally opposed to both.
As for the general idea of legitimate interests for consumer surveillance, these records should ultimately be under the control of the surveillance subjects ourselves rather than unaccountable hostile parties. At the very least, a surveillance subject should be able to request a copy of all records, request that they be deleted, and request that they be reinstated from a signed export (and ideally only processed for a very narrow purpose).
The difference is small, but it eliminates the tangles of who is doing what in the verbs "forcing" and "violates".