It's also shocking to me that the MAX may be rectified when depending only on one angle-of-attack sensor (the one that caused the two prior crashes). They should mandate that at minimum 2 redundant sensor must exist, at minimum. Really it should be 3 sensors for flight critical input, as has been the case for all modern airplanes.
Do you have a source for this? Last I read, there were 3 main categories of fixes, the first being to read both sensors.[1]
[1] https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-mcas-fixes-20...
Fixing the wiring issue would mean fixing it on every single 737 in service, not just the 737 MAX. Many of those airplanes have been flying for decades with no incidents. Tearing them apart to rewire them might make things worse overall, not better, since any repair always has the risk of introducing some other problem.
And?
F.e., NHTSA has called the ongoing recall of airbags made by the major automotive parts supplier Takata "the largest and most complex safety recall in U.S. history.” Over 41.6 million vehicles have been recalled due to the faulty airbags.
Different makes, models, years - but faulty part is faulty part and millions of cars were recalled and fixed.
Replacing a faulty airbag on a car is a lot less complicated and risky than replacing many feet of wiring on an airplane.
No it wouldn't as 737 was certified before the new regulation. It is in the article:
> That earlier 737 NG model didn’t have to meet the current wiring-separation standards because they came into force long after that jet was certified.
Just like with cars - you can drive a car from 70ties without airbags or crumple zones but you cannot buy a new car without airbags as it won't be able to pass the latest regulations.
Imo in this case the main issue is not the safety (seeing how the older planes aren't falling out of the sky) but setting a precedent where the certification authority has missed an issue which is not according to regulation - do the manufacturer gets a free pass or it is their responsibility to make the item according to regulation in the first place and it doesn't matter if it was missed during the certification process.
I know the previous 737 models were grandfathered. What I am questioning is the argument that, even though we accept this wiring flaw on all grandfathered 737s, it must be fixed on the 737 MAX just because Boeing made a different mistake (MCAS) on the 737 MAX. (If they hadn't made the MCAS mistake, the FAA wouldn't be reviewing the certification of the MAX and wouldn't have found the wiring issue.)
> setting a precedent where the certification authority has missed an issue which is not according to regulation
Is this the first time the FAA has missed a certification issue? I don't know, but I doubt it.
If the FAA has missed certification issues before, has the manufacturer always been forced to rework all affected aircraft when the missed issue is discovered? Again, I don't know, but I doubt it.
In any case, these certainly seem like relevant questions to ask before coming to a conclusion.
They also require a computer that has the inputs for it.
Why they didn't go with three is probably a good question. Airbus did.