Security is often a whole company exercise that needs to be prioritized by management, putting blame on some individual programmers seems to show a lack of understanding of how infosec works.
If the attitude of these engineers is "we don't emphasize security unless management tells us to" maybe they don't deserve to be hired elsewhere?
Management are not omniscient; they depend on their staff.
Are you, as an engineer, going to organize a pentest for the software? Even if you encourage management to do so, it's still up to management to actually book the deal.
Are you, as an engineer, going to sit back and watch the project you built (containing very personal information in this case) get compromised? Even if you know management isn't paying proper attention?
See, that's the problem with every developer in Silicon Valley calling themselves an "engineer"; they want the title without the obligations that a professional engineer has. "Not my problem" would cost you your designation.
How does this work? Do you rip off your glasses, strike a manly pose and run for the data center, stopping only to force the infra team to give you the credentials?
More seriously...
Organize your own IR tiger team outside of management channels? Congrats, you're unemployed tomorrow, together with anyone silly enough to buy in.
Start making rogue code changes you think are appropriate? That would run in to "want[ing] the title without the obligations". Oh, and also probably end up with you unemployed.
So, really, what are you proposing?
This gave me a good laugh, thank you
All engineers make mistakes and misjudgements, even the ones working in long-established fields, as we can see from the 737MAX saga. It's management's job to design a organizational structure that puts enough safeguards in place that mistakes get captured before the product rolls out. That's what management literally means.
I'm glad I'm not the only one who feels like this.
I nearly got fired by digging my heels in on a privacy/infosec flawed design... until CTO/CIO layer gleaned what I was freaking out about and the energy (angry, "wtf", etc) suddenly pivoted to the original architect and engineers who cooked up some half-baked stuff.
You don't want your name attached to bad stuff in life. You only have one reputation. Don't mis-spend your social (political) capital by letting dummies bully you into ignoring tangible security issues.
And when it is done, I will endeavor to hit it as absolutely hard as I can to break it. I will advocate for regular penetration tests and audits, and I will throw an absolute goddamned fit when they don't happen. (My current company retains very little personal information and we still put ourselves through a pretty rigorous security audit at least once a year. A measure of "do thou likewise" is fair.)
The fun part is I don't even call myself an "engineer", because I'm not and I can't be with the tools and practices I have at my disposal. I'm a software developer, just like about 99.9% of this industry. I just happen to care a little, and I just happen to try to do better.
Those who don't accept this are like doctors who don't accept that washing their hands is the important part, not the care and emotional sensitivity that goes into treating a patient.
I've seen a trading application go from "typing ' will result inn SQL injection" to "basically bulletproof" due to this process.
Devs can become remarkably competent when their smugness is wiped away by finding some crucial vulnerabilities they overlooked.
I know it's tempting to believe that the design part matters, but it's also tempting to believe that a doctor's emotional support matters just as much as washing your hands.
Do a stint in the pentest industry. It's eye-opening. (Look into my eyes. I've seen things. Terrible... things...)
* The breach included PII from a property they had already sold, but held onto for some reason.
* SHA1. A good choice if you want to slightly inconvenience somebody with a GPU, while also increasing the odds of your hashes getting uploaded in full to one of many distributed cracking projects.
* No effective user input validation. The exploit was one step in sophistication beyond those ancient IIS ../../hue.txt attacks.
* No attempt at anything resembling principles of least privilege, exec whatever wherever.
So, everyone failed - executives to DBAs. Screw pentests, start by implementing best practices that have been around for 40 years.
It’s probably very different now but affiliate shaving, spamming, cpc fraud were all ubiquitous in the late 90s/early 2000s.
Yes, we had to deal with all of that as well. Also built a lot of automated tools to deal with those sorts of things. My favorite one, I named 'the cockblocker'. ;-) This sort of experience you just can't get elsewhere and has been extremely valuable for me.