The attack will calculate suffixes for these two documents such that both documents have the same hash result.
This means the attacker can then show some people a document about Donald, and others the one about Steve and if they rely on the same hash to validate that they're the same document they'd be fooled.
Digital certificates are the most prominent way computers deliberately depend on this assumption which a collision attack makes untrustworthy.
Consider the Web PKI ("SSL Certificates"). Suppose you have a web site pmf.example it is of course pretty easy to get yourself a certificate to make https://pmf.example/ work, today for free but even many years ago it was pretty affordable from several commercial vendors.
The way those certificates work is they use a digital signature based on a hash algorithm, the CA uses its private key to sign the hash, and that's how computers can immediately tell a real certificate from a bogus one and be sure this is really news.ycombinator.com and not say, your ISP's advertising front end injecting a "special offer". The CA will refuse to give you a certificate for google.com or news.ycombinator.com because those aren't yours.
But using a chosen prefix attack you can create two documents with the same hash. One of them might be a fairly ordinary looking certificate for pmf.example that you're entitled to, the other says you're google.com
You get a CA to sign the first certificate, then you simply snip off their signature and attach it to the second one, since their hashes are the same the signature matches. You now have a valid certificate for google.com. Not theory, practice, this was really done with an earlier broken hash, MD5.
e.g. https://hackaday.com/2008/12/30/25c3-hackers-completely-brea...
A similar trick, probably done by or on behalf of the US and/or Israeli governments makes Flame work by colliding MD5 for code signing. That uses a collision nobody publicly knew about, which is a weird and expensive thing to do but of course governments have lots of money.
In particular he works on/with the PoC||GTFO team and is responsible for the MD5 collision cover art in a past issue:
https://github.com/angea/pocorgtfo
For SHA-1 (and others) you might find more at his github project:
https://github.com/corkami/collisions
hth,
adric