Judge Orders Navy to Release USS Thresher Disaster Documents
news.usni.org
news.usni.org
I'm convinced that the loss of the Thresher, as tragic as it was, saved a lot of lives.
As for the documents, you need to know that Rickover classified almost everything about the nuclear program. I suspect that kind of thinking still exists and is responsible for the slow release of the document.
Brass Nuts on a 600 pound steam system. What were they thinking.
> By mid October, the Iwo Jima had been operating in the Persian Gulf for approximately two months and had developed some leaks and other repair needs in the ship's 600 psi steam propulsion plant.
> The ship was granted permission to dock in Manama, Bahrain (a country on a group of islands in the Persian Gulf, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and conduct repairs. A variety of maintenance items were planned, including overhauling the main steam valve that supplies steam to one of the ship's turbine-driven electrical generators. This valve, incidentally, could also be considered a boiler-boundary stop valve. The overhaul of this large, rising-stem, bolted-bonnet gate valve was contracted to a local ship repair company, under the supervision of U.S. Government inspectors.
The mechanic conducting the repairs didn't know the requirements:
> Ultimately, what was found was that a series of mistakes and misunderstandings led to this accident.
> First, the mechanic wanted to replace the fasteners, but he did not have any. He also did not speak English very well. Allegedly, the mechanic asked one of the boiler room personnel for new nuts and bolts, and was given permission to look through the boiler room's spare parts bins. He selected parts that he thought would work.
And an inspection that might have caused the problem got lost in the shuffle:
> Secondly, with the case of the authorized inspection agency, it must be taken into consideration that there was a massive build-up of troops and ships in the Persian Gulf. It was assumed that the office was not staffed for the increased workload. Consequently, many inspections were not being conducted.
> And finally, the boiler room supervisor thought that one of his subordinates had conducted an inspection. Sadly, it was never concluded that an inspection had been made. If someone had conducted an inspection, possibly he was not familiar with fastener markings, nor the job specifications.
> The end result was that incorrect fasteners were chosen, and controlled inspections and testing were not fully accomplished.
Really, what surprises me the most about this is that the Navy apparently doesn't repair its own ships!
I see it every day. I do critical alignment work that involves very tight tolerances on the order of single digit arcseconds and single thousandths of an inch. Do you think when MARMC or SWRMC comes out to check the work item that they're verifying the alignment? That takes specialized equipment and knowledge.
If they reduce 25% of the checkpoints, but alert the shipyard of which checkpoints they are discarding don't you think that could cause some perverse incentives? They'd be better off sending out a list of checkpoints and then performing 50% of them without telling the shipyard.
Also of course the Navy doesn't repair all of it's own ships :) US Navy, including MSC, and the CG have the majority of their repair work done at General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Colanna's, and a whole slew of smaller shipyards around the country.
I can think of two systems with obvious benefits:
1. The Navy repairs its own ships. The big benefits here are that you don't have to let anyone else access -- or see -- the ships, and you can perform repairs in the field to the extent that's possible. (For replacing nuts, it's certainly possible.) This requires two types of training: knowledge of the ship's specifications, and skill in performing repairs.
2. The manufacturer repairs the ships. This makes it a lot more difficult to receive repair, but it has similar secrecy benefits, and the manufacturer is well positioned to know how to repair the ship and what is or isn't important. You don't need to train anybody in anything as long as you have perfect, total confidence in the manufacturer.
The Navy here picked the option of having the ship repaired in random foreign shipyards where nobody knew the specs. That's a compromise that advantages ease of getting repairs -- but you lose out on the idea that the person performing repairs knows what constitutes good working order and what doesn't. I struggle to see the advantages; you get more ease of repair and more reliability by doing it yourself.
When the ship comes into a commercial yard for availability it is stripped down of confidential equipment. All of the radar/sonar/fire control/damage control equipment comes off. The work done in the yard is primarily mechanical. Deck inserts, foundation repair, lube oil system, oily waste, etc. I will install the foundation for a SPQ-9b antenna, but I will never see the antenna. At the end of the availability the combat systems engineers from MARMC/SWRMC will come out, install the equipment, record all "installed" alignment information, and program the systems.
The major new shipbuilders are rarely in the business of ship repair. They're too busy building new ships. General Dynamics is probably one of the few in the new build and repair business. When the ships come into a commercial shipyard the work items are all specced out by the planning yard. That's typically Huntington Ingalls in Mississippi or Bath Ironworks.
The days of foreign shipyards is all but over as far as I know. They brought the USS Cole all the way back to the USA on the Blue Marlin. In fact, she went to Pascagoula, but I don't know if it was to Huntington Ingalls or VT Halter. I'd imagine HI.
What a fascinating first-hand account. Thanks for the link.
It's an interesting book, so far.
The real reason, per his telling, was actually very close to the official reason: the welds on the coolant intake failed. The coverup, however, was this: the welds had actually been made using a new, then-highly-classified technique (some variation of electron-beam welding, I think), which the grunts doing weld inspection didn't have clearance to know about. So they were told to skip the inspection on those particular welds. Which yielded predictable results
I've spent the last 25 years wondering whether I'd accidentally stumbled across something classified, or was just being bullshitted by a drunk at a party. I look forward to finding out!
stuff like fabrication still in use would likely be redacted anyway but we'll hopefully see
Not saying there's anything more to the USS Thresher itself, just commenting that a clearance doesn't automatically entitle you to all the information about everything.
That part seems odd from the article. If they were not classified, seems the FOIA request would have had an easier time getting them released... or they would have been released already. The Navy generates enough paperwork that it's not reasonable to expect all unclassified documents to be released... but these seem to have been a little more closely guarded than that. They are releasing them in batches after they are reviewed too - which is usually part of a declassification process.
I'd wager they are being unclassified as part of the release here.
> The requested documents – more than 50 years old – should be unclassified and releasable by now under federal declassification rules
...
> “The plaintiff believes this document review is overly complex,” Eatinger said during the hearing. “When we filed this case, the records were in an automatic 50-year review project. We were told it would be complete in May 2019.”
these are (or should be) formerly classified documents. The Navy seems to be dragging its feet with the mandatory declassification review. As Eatinger said, it is well past time that the review should have completed and de- or re-classified as appropriate.
They don't just get access to things unilaterally, nor do they share.
Someone with, say, Top Secret clearance, who works in a relatively small area, will have access to a small quantity of Top Secret materials. For the most part, across the wide breadth of possible materials, they will have a similar level of knowledge as civilians and uncleared service members. They'll only have an edge in their particular area.
http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/
The analysis of the loss of K-129 is especially interesting in that he posits that the SOSUS data shows that it had a "dead mans" capability to launch its missles.
See
http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/acoustic_detctions...
[0]https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...
[1]https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...
[2]https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...
[3]https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESH...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)#Alterna...
Pretty legit theory considering the mysterious lack of evidence of very loud leaking onboard.
PS - Technically it doesn't matter which version of the story is true. The safety improvements that resulted from the accident would have been the same in both cases (since the reactor was still scram-ed, with possible steam restriction, and ballast tanks still faulty).
http://www.oldsaltblog.com/2013/04/four-ballads-of-the-uss-t...