Iowa Democrats Should Have Known Better Than to Use an App
fivethirtyeight.com
fivethirtyeight.com
The paper ballots required attendees to fill in the full name of their preferred candidate (plus a second choice), as well as their own name and address. Considering the fact that people cannot be counted on to fill in a circle or punch a hole in a piece of paper with 100% accuracy, how likely is it that multiple lines of text can be written on a card correctly and legibly?. If they actually fall back on the paper ballots, I predict all hope of a clear result will be lost.
EDIT: the CTO actually has a lot of experience, I didn't see her first two positions at SRI and Google because linkedin folded it.
Kind of slow-playing her 8yrs at the Googster with this description, aren't we?
I also think U-dub is nothing to scoff at for CS schools, if you value that sort of thing.
All this being said, her experience doesn't exactly scream "Lead architect and only senior engineer on project building critical democracy-infrastructure software to enable the base mechanisms of our entire nation."
1. https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-02-04...
"IT Services and Support"
The real issue with that approach would probably be a requirement to have a computer on site.
(Or you need a country where those third party observers are already powerless, but that's beside the point).
If you're the secretary of state for a given state of the union, and you're in charge of the voter rolls, and you're running for office, then you are fully empowered to just remove anyone from the voter rolls who has a name you don't like, or who has a race you don't like, or who has a political affiliation you don't like.
And you can stymie all attempts to uncover your malfeasance by just shoving all those requests in the drawer, where they get mysteriously lost.
1) Large scale elections come around every 2 years. It's hard to test things at scale in the interim.
2) Security is good at banks because these are large wealthy companies and their life depends on it. A bank that gets hacked loses money and loses trust, so they pay top dollar for security (I have a friend in the software security space who says that 90%+ of his company's revenue comes from banks).
3) Spacecraft and cars don't need to authenticate who their users are. For voting, this is the critical--and hardest--issue to solve. Banks seem to do a pretty decent job at this, but again, they put a lot of money into it.
4) There's a perception that with more complex voting systems, someone can mess up the results intentionally at a large scale. Yes, with paper ballots this can and does happen, but a large scale conspiracy is pretty hard to pull off.
Point 4 is the really the most important one. If people don't trust the election system (regardless of whether their mistrust is well founded), then the whole system falls apart. People trust paper ballots. Let's stick with those.
The rest seem to look only at regulations that were written ten or twenty years ago, come up with specific concrete solutions that are required to be blindly applied across the board in all cases, and then are totally incapable of dealing with the situation when trying to make the mandatory 8" floppy drive work with the latest and greatest iPad that doesn't have even a single hard wired connection at all.
They have all the money, so they can afford to buy off anyone who would expose their security weaknesses to the world.
This emperor definitely has no clothes, and pays people to poke out the eyeballs of anyone who might say differently.
Granted, the rover failure was solved, but any of these issues occurring during an election of almost any size throws democratic systems into chaos. While I agree that putting more effort and expertise into voting software can make them more resilient to problems like the one in Iowa, I don't think it's obvious at first glance that deepening reliance on software is actually the best way to handle this problem, since it is actually possible to do them in a semi-analog manner (as opposed to flight-control systems or automated banking).
[1] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/u-regulators-review-2018-fata...
[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/investigat...
[3] https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/305205-mars-rover-is-fro...
[4] https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/russian-national...
Our government's legitimacy is based on trust in our elections. I may not like who wins all the time, but I more or less feel that the wins are legitimate in the US. But if you erode this basic trust, then the government can't function.
And not only do these properties have to be guaranteed, it is also an absolute must that the vast majority of citizens can verify that that is the case, both because of the amount of power that is controlled by elections (the entire taxes of a country, control of the military, ...), so there is a significant risk that someone could be able to corrupt any group of experts that isn't a significant proportion of the population, but also for rasons of political stability: Even if the election system is in fact counting correctly, it's a major political risk if people suspect that things are rigged and have no way to really find out.
My analogy is breaking down. But certainly agreed.
There's no reason you couldn't write extremely reliable election software by applying that level of extreme rigor, but it seems like the vendors aren't doing so.
What was the value add of introducing an app? Knowing results sooner? Certainly not simplicity or reliability.
I'm reminded of an xkcd comic (I think) where the fight to eradicate some disease is essentially making stead,y predictable progress, and a room full of developers is ready to chuck the whole process in favor of app-ification. This is that.
Every state should have a primary on the same day instead of giving states like Iowa and New Hampshire outsized influence on the media narrative.