This is why I just use AlgoVPN. I know where my traffic is going and can install it on any cloud instance I want. At the moment I'm running it on my laptop, phone, and my RPI cluster.
If your threat model includes your ISP, but does not extend to nation-state level adversaries, then a good private VPN should be a decent enough solution, although a public VPN might be easier and still adequate.
Source: I personally pissed off the Director of the NSA in November of 1992 (see http://www.shub-internet.org/brad/cacm92nov.html ). At the time, my clearance was Top Secret/SCI, and I had been read onto multiple compartments — including the ones for ECHELON, KEYHOLE, etc.... So far as I know, I am still on their shit list, albeit not as high as Snowden or Binney.
So the best bet is staying off the shit lists of the NSA and other global adversaries.
However, I have used personal VPNs tunneled through Tor. But I was very careful to be anonymous about the VPS I used. And it was just to get around blocking of Tor exits.
And since you're not, I suppose, reselling your traffic to other users, the liability for problematic traffic will land on you.
And yes, Tor provides far more anonymity than any VPN service ever could.
However, some Tor relays are malicious. And we have no way of verifying which ones are or aren't, except by trusting the Tor Project. It's true that there's lots more independent oversight, however. But that CMU exploit of the "relay early" bug is a red flag. Because the Tor Project didn't detect the malicious relays for at least weeks.
Anyway, I use nested VPN chains to access the Tor network. So if I get pwned through a malicious entry guard, at least they'll only learn the final VPN exit address.
Tor might have its vulnerabilities as well, like all software. Not to forget that pretty much anyone can run an entry guard today and at least associate your IP with usage of Tor..
Also the bandwidth rates all big cloud providers are charging are just extortionate