Just because the space in NP hard doesn't mean that your problem is automatically NP hard. Lots of human consumable or generated data is full of patterns that can be exploited to useful purpose, even when purely random inputs are intractable.
What proof are you talking about?
The point is that the input to your compression is not an arbitrary M-bit string, but some very structured thing which could have a smaller representation. Similarly, when encountering what appears to be an NP-hard problem in the wild, you might still be able to find an efficient solution by exploiting the structure of your input (NP-hardness only applies when considering all inputs).
(And conversely, I see no reason to believe that "Claude Shannon proved that generalized compression algorithms can't exist". I assume that result predates Shannon.)
The Shannon coding limit defines the bounds on what subset of n can fit into a channel of capacity m, without excluding any of the others.
By drawing a fence around the possible, he fences out the impossible.
comp.compression has several longstanding bets that one particular high entropy input can not be represented by any decoder smaller than the difference in the input and output size, but I lack their confidence in the infallibility of their entropy source. It is possible someone will win that particular bet, but there will come a time where another similar bet will never be collected.
> At the end of the day, a polynomial-time algorithm for 3-SAT either exists or it doesn't!
Nevertheless, I don't see how the answer to P!=NP could depend on the choice of axioms for set theory. Programs, their inputs and the state of a machine after executing n steps can all be encoded as integers, so P!=NP can be expressed as a statement about integers, and we know what the integers are: we don't need any dodgy set theory axioms for that.
If that's wrong, someone please explain how.
There are lots of interesting unsolved questions about integers (Goldbach's conjecture, ...) but people don't usually suggest that the answer to those questions might depend on the Axiom of Choice. Or do they?
Also, I am talking about this specific problem.
"impossibility to prove" is different from "proven impossible" because hiding behind the loose English are different models of logics. That's what Godel theorems at e about.
Gödel's statement, which essentially says "I am unprovable" is an example of a true, unprovable statement.