Startup Growth and Venture Returns
angel.co
angel.co
Doesn't that mean the conclusions of this are based upon only companies that did a follow-on round, not companies that raised money in general? Of course there are seasoning effects, but throwing out all the companies that can't raise to conclude "Our model shows that at the seed stage investors would increase their expected return by broadly indexing into every credible deal".
If that was the case, the conclusion should be "our model shows that seed investments that receive follow on investment should be indexed to", but that isn't know at the time of the previous round. The discussion seems to ignore the huge bias of censoring as well, but I might be missing something and I didn't get through every word.
I did this as a way to compare tech and biotech seed investing (I work in biotech). Outlier returns in biotech are lower than in tech, so managing risk across a portfolio is more important than just getting in on big winners (i.e. Consistent base hits and home runs, not just going for one or two grand slams)
Interestingly, biotech VC has outperformed tech VC over the last decade. This is despite lower returns on an individual- investment basis. This suggests that concentrated portfolios with low loss rates can perform better than portfolios than power law portfolios [1]
So if you are a biotech investor, you probably shouldn't follow the tech investing playbook
[0] https://www.baybridgebio.com/blog/anatomy_of_a_decacorn.html
[1] https://www.baybridgebio.com/blog/anatomy_of_a_top_vc.html
The exit environment has been good lately. The M&A market will be strong for the foreseeable future bc big pharma relies on startups for new drugs when existing drugs go off patent. The IPO market has been good, but that could change for a number of reasons, including rising interest rates
> That’s one of the results we found when we analyzed the thousands of deals syndicated by AngelList over the past seven years to test assumptions about the nature of venture capital returns. ...
That period includes the loosest Fed monetary policy on record. It's remarkable for both Quantitative Easing and in some industrialized regions negative nominal interest rates, two things that few economists were talking about before 2008.
At some point it will be clear to everyone that the last 12 years have been a mirage conjured by utterly unsustainable economic policies.
As the saying goes, if the wind is strong enough even turkeys can fly.
In other words, if I believe there's a huge bubble in the private valuations of unicorns likewise proven by companies like Wag or WeWork, will it A: Affect my 401K and mutual funds I have in Vanguard and B: Is there anything I can do to short it?
Absolutely do not: become a VC, work for a startup, or place your capital into some kind of ‘growth’ fund indexed to tech. Don’t buy real estate in urban areas and don’t borrow.
This is both much higher rate of success and somewhat lower return than I would have expected. I guess the takeaway is that many companies (that reach seed round anyway) have middling success?
You can think of the AngelList investment data as being split into three roughly equal-sized groups: markdowns, markups, and no valuation updates.
The reported IRRs are actually relatively high and the return multiples (which are compounded IRRs) are relatively low. That's because there are lots of one- and two-year-old companies in the dataset and---as we show---IRRs and investment durations are negatively correlated.
The argument in favor of the current system is that investments are risky and non-millionaires can't be trusted to make good financial decisions for themselves, and it takes such a huge amount of skill to be a decent investor anyway that the average person isn't really missing out on anything.
This type of finding seems like a pretty strong refute of this idea. It turns out that at least in the current landscape, the average tech seed investment deal is more valuable than other investments available to people.
There's also this wonderful disclaimer:
>Summary statistics from the AngelList dataset of 684 nonnegative investments that we consider in this paper.
Given that 90% of startups fail, they are are looking at the top 10% investments. I am pretty certain if you hand-pick the 10% top-performing public stocks, you will also get great numbers. The problem is, this only works in retrospective.
The paper should have compared brodly indexing among all startups vs hand picking possible winners. This is practical and avoid any survivorship bias.
The fraction of money-losing investments in a population will affect, for instance, whether we would expect the typical investor making five investments at random to make or lose money. But regardless of whether losers are 10%, 50%, or 90% of the investment pool, if the winners are drawing from an unbounded mean power law then broadly indexing raises an investor's expected return.