So, you're describing the opposite...right?
What the "corporate veil" generally protects are investors -- only the actual amount invested is at risk, rather than more, or all, of an investor's assets.
The veil can also be used to shield specific executives, another common complaint.
But a third mode is when a sacrificial scapegoat, often relatively low on the hierarchy, is identified and blamed for problems. That shows up in government as well as the "one bad apple" excuse, which both fails to address true accountability and justice, and massacres the metaphore, which is "one bad apple spoils the barrel".
A lone actor should not be able to behave in such a manner, and is quite probably not acting alone. The oversight, detection, and cross-checks which should be required to be in place clearly aren't. That would include the individual's business unit and management chain, as well as the company as a whole.
Note that I didn't use the term "corporate veil", and I'm not entirely certain it applies here (see one definition: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/corporate-veil....), though in the sense of shielding the larger part of the corporation and individuals within it, the argument could be made.
Understanding business as a sort of "risk shedding engine" may help. The corporate veil is one mechanism for this, but another is the creation (or post-incident assignment of) what's effectively an ablative heat shield -- some component of the corporate structure, often a single individual, up to and including a CEO, though business units, subsidiaries, contractors, or largely-controlled corporate charities and trade organisations are also used -- which can be shed or discarded as needed.
So the "turnaround CEO", the management consultant organisation, the "rogue employee" (anywhere from the front line to the executive suite), the subsidiary, the spin-off, the "charity" or "trade organisation", all fit this bill.
For CEOs, see Albert "Chainsaw Al" John Dulap (obituary: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/05/obituaries/al-dunlap-dead...), or Martin "Pharma Bro" Skrelli. An argument could be made that many major politicians operate in this mode -- the argument might be made for a Boris Johnson, Mitchell McConnell, Fritz "The Senator from Disney" Hollings, who serve as the public exposure of their respective interest groups. "Trade organisations", particularly with an enforcement arm, such as the MPAA, RIAA, and BSA, largely represent firms in the cinema, music recording, and software industries, respectively. Various "think tanks" such as those in the Atlas Network (https://www.atlasnetwork.org/partners) allow specific interests, usually business, industrial, and generally the wealthy, to engage in activities at a slight distance. Many of the Atlas partner organisations are strongly associated with the Kochs, Scaifes, Bradley, Searle, Walton, DeVos, and others. (See: https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Atlas_Network https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=State_Policy_Net..., and related articles.)
In this case, Facebook are avoiding corporate liability, legal risk, and goodwill erosion by blaming a "rogue employee". That strikes me as an incomplete fault analysis, and one that's overtly and obviously self-serving to Facebook, its management, and shareholdes. Most of which are synonymous with Mark Zuckerberg.
1. I'm still working through my thoughts on this.
2. The key point is not "corporate veil" but "legal and operational concept of corporate structure as a risk externalisation engine".
Under that second, the "corporate veil" is a part, but not all, of the externalisation mechanism. And would make the short response to your reframing: "No".
More subtly, it's not essentially necessary for the externalisation to be a deliberate strategy -- a conspiracy -- though that probably is often the case. There are emergent phenomena a and behaviours, and given that risk externalisation is, in both the short and medium terms, generally, profitable (that is, it decreases costs and increases revenues), there's a natural self-selection among firms, managers, and behaviours toward such structures and behaviours, and those who follow them, consciously or not.
If you're looking at specific legal or risk concepts, you'll probably want to examine the notions of moral and morale hazard, attractive nuisance, negligence, malfeasance, and the like. The notions of willful ignorance and motivated reasoning as well.
These issues get less play than they should, and comprise a major weakness to the market-capitalist model. Though of course they're also present in other organisational models of central control. Organisational models which are immune or resistant to centralisation and concentrations of power, ownership, and/or control would probably fare better, though these are difficult to arrive at and sustain.
The reason this challenges the general notions of markets includes both generally understood principles, and possibly some that are novel, or at least less considered:
- Moral and morale hazard -- changes in behaviours based on a changed individual risk profile. For a discussion see: https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032615/what-differe...
- The correspondence between wealth and power, best captured in Smith's uncharacteristically suscinct quip in Wealth of Nations: "Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power."
- The dual problems of principle-agent and regulatory capture. Though often viewed independently, I see these as largely the private- and public-sector variants of the same underlying behaviour: individuals acting for personal gain rather than institutional benefit. Corruption generally.
- Classic informational asymmetries: At a given point in time, two (or more) agents having unequal amounts of information concerning a transaction or state of offairs. Akerloff, "The Market for Lemons".
- Temporal informational asymmetries: The development of fuller understanding, particularly as concerns unforseen consequences, emergent phenomena, or latent (as opposed to manifest) properties or aspects, over time, to all agent (though also often with an imbalance between agents). Robert K. Merton, etc.
- The risk-immunity of size. If an organisation has both resources and cost or operational structures to survive negative circumstances, then in a period of contraction, less-capable organisations will fail whilst the larger survive. Size does not always correspond to the capacity to absorb risks, but often does.
- Motivated asset inflation or value assurance. The tendency of those holding some valuable or income-generating property or system, to seek to further appreciate its value in ways that reduce social wealth growth. Bernhard J. Stern's "Resistances to the Adoption of Technological Innovations" (1937), and NIMBYism, are key examples.
- Various blame- and liability-shifting practices, including as described above. NDAs, non-competes, anti-poaching practices, and the like, would be others.
- Practices generally seen as immoral, unethical, or illegal: coercion, product bundling and tying, exclusive dealing, product dumping, and the like.
Sorry that's not a short answer, though I feel it's more accurate.