Elite violence and elite numeracy in Europe from 500 to 1900 CE: A co-evolution
voxeu.org
voxeu.org
This is not even wrong and assumes that old institutions were built on some deep strategic policy considerations. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth did have "nomadic invasions" even in the 17th century, but its main institutions were built on republican ideology, and more authoritarian/centralist arguments at the time were based mainly on internal affairs, not external threats. On the other hand, which Early Modern countries had institutions aimed primarily at "economic development"? It's probably debatable in the cases of the Netherlands and England.
Also they neglect to mention that many of these countries were not even independent for a long time. Modern populist Poland and Hungary, incidentally, both have had continuously own elites and statehood traditions since around 900-1000 AD (in contrast to some other Eastern European countries). But in Hungary in 16th-middle 19th century, Poland in the 19th century their own elites had to take the back seat or struggle with the foreign empires. So they weren't the ones creating dominant institutions.
And these, I would say, were the real formative years. If we are to play "find historical roots", the current Polish government (and probably the Hungarian one) is the direct descendant of romantic nationalist tendencies of the 19th century. It's basically LARP'ing a fight for independence which appeals to the intellectual core of these political camps. But admittedly it's hard to build nice charts out of it.
IIRC Spain was the first major European country to see serious state centralization (large moves toward the modern nation-state) plus a major state focus on policy aimed at economic development across their entire controlled territory (well, the core of it, anyway—Spain proper, not sure how far that control extended to farther-flung territories). England and others followed.
In this sense there were not many countries ran mostly, primarily to build wealth on a large scale, and not only for the purposes of the social circle controlling the government -- with some wider ideology (which I believe was more the case for Spain than for France) or not. In fact this is, to mind, in that period, equivalent to the dominance of a merchant class.
I think that's one of the key differences between how a monarch of France and a monarch of Spain, say, would have approached economic development, around the time Spain was starting to get serious about the whole nation-state thing. I think there may actually have been different incentives and motivations driving less-effective patterns of economic development in less-centralized or less-internally-secure states, caused, more or less, by differences in effective state power.
I'm not sure how politically stable and internally secure Eastern states were then, but my guess would be less so than what Spain was beginning to achieve.
Not to mention that ithe reliability of inputs is completely ignored. If one would try to honestly estimate the error bars for all that, it should be obvious that the data for most of the places can’t be used for any such analysis and even less to draw any conclusions, especially not to support current policies.
It’s something produced with an agenda and it shows.
"Interestingly, the rate of regicide is closely linked to the homicide rate from among the general population, potentially allowing for wider conclusions than simply an analysis of elites"
I tend to agree with your comment, any time I read about violence in general populations I immediately think about lead and it's effects on people who are exposed to it and wonder how many other things in our modern environment cause similar effects. Eg. Mass production and use of Alcohol, Crack Cocaine, Crystal Meth, Fentanyl, High Fructose Corn Syrup etc.
I warmly endorse this book to everyone who is even sligthly interested of history or economics.
This is far from a new idea BTW, and largely drove the abolition of these institutions in the 19th century (it largely came from the top, not as a result of great rebellions).
Here is a nice and short explanation from Paul Krugman:
"my old teacher Evsey Domar wrote a classic paper arguing that serfdom and slavery often were the response of ruling classes to labor shortage. Thus Russia imposed strict restrictions on the mobility of peasants from the late 16th century onward, precisely because the availability of rich new farmland on the expanding frontier would otherwise have increased their bargaining power against landlords. (The frontier expansion itself was probably the result of the growing effectiveness of firearms, which turned the military balance against the steppe nomads; so gunpowder, which contributed to the rise of the bourgeoisie in the West, created serfdom in the East). And, of course, slavery - which, along with serfdom, had died out in the West during the labor-abundant high Middle Ages - was reintroduced in the land-abundant conditions of the New World." http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/Serfdom.htm
Darren Asemoglu's and Robinson's "Why nations fail" in turn go on in length about effects of repressive economic and political institutions to economic growth.
Forms of serfdom and slavery were (re)introduced around the same time in the Muscovite state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Hungary, Wallachia, Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire and even the Cossack Hetmanate which had roots in anti-serfdom rebellion had a form of serfdom.
(Yes, I know, the US south fits the serfdom/slavery pattern...)
The settling of the US west parallels the cossack settlements - these guys were free to take land and paid few taxes, but were expected to defend themselves.
Normally the goverments of Poland and Russia tried to reduce the cossacks to serfdom (which triggered wars like the great rebellion of Bohdan Khmelnytsky) or at the very least turn them into a warrior class that enforces the serfdom institution (like what happened with the Russian cossacks after the defeat of the big cossack-peasant uprisings there).
I think the North of the US started colonizing the West late, when the North was already pretty urbanized, densely populated and industrial, which made the free-soil type settlement possible.
The South of course was still fully agricultural, which insentivised a different type of settlement driven by soil erosion by inefficient slave-based agriculture.
From my own experience Polish people are not EU sceptic, and the ruling party is not sceptic at all. The problem has far more deeper roots and is related to transformation process in which post-communist stayed in power even though the Communism collapsed. But this requires another article by people who know more than me.
N.b., for those interested in a brief introduction to Polish history, Adam Zamoyski's "Poland: A History" is worth a read.
It notices the various "golden horde" invasions, but skims entirely over the huge impact of the 20th century - wars, occupation, pogroms, Communism.