The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design
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I’m a bit skeptical of the whole program because philosophy is one of the last bastions of resistance to the overall informationalization of life, and one of the few disciplines that’s managed to remain somewhat free of a reduction to the concept of information; I don’t want it to be messed with. That said this sounds like quite the work. The reviewer has some interesting criticisms though.
For those who aren't really aware of what's going on, right now the bedrock of science is mathematics, and the hardest science is physics, and both are fully information-theoretic. "it from bit" theories are not just common, but fully compatible with our ways of looking at the world.
In order to transcend information theory, one would have to abandon mathematics, and probably abandon logic as well. This more or less closes the door to a lot of the gibbering low-quality metaphysical pandering that is common in philosophical foundations. Another way of putting it is that, just like with empiricism and science, we have realized in mathematics a way to move forward, and that movement forward is creating pseudologic, in the same way that empiricism highlights pseudoscience. Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent.
As a final note, who are we to deny that life is informational? We're made of DNA and RNA, of proteins and cellular messages, of neuronal configurations and connectomes, and your entire reply is that it's uncomfortable to imagine.
Can't unpack this.
> For those who aren't really aware of what's going on, right now the bedrock of science is mathematics, and the hardest science is physics, and both are fully information-theoretic. "it from bit" theories are not just common, but fully compatible with our ways of looking at the world.
Never know what is meant by bedrock (or foundation) in these cases and I can never understand the reductive desire to swap philosophy out for science and to single out physics as the go-to science.
Is is incorrect to call Floridi's work an "it from bit" theory, if that's what you're doing. See my longer response elsewhere here.
> In order to transcend information theory, one would have to abandon mathematics, and probably abandon logic as well. This more or less closes the door to a lot of the gibbering low-quality metaphysical pandering that is common in philosophical foundations. Another way of putting it is that, just like with empiricism and science, we have realized in mathematics a way to move forward, and that movement forward is creating pseudologic, in the same way that empiricism highlights pseudoscience. Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent.
Information theory and the Philosophy of Information are distintc though tangential subjects.
>> Mathematics is logic is metaphysics is mathematics, and deities really cannot be omnipotent.
??? False equivalences and then an odd non-sequitur.
> As a final note, who are we to deny that life is informational? We're made of DNA and RNA, of proteins and cellular messages, of neuronal configurations and connectomes, and your entire reply is that it's uncomfortable to imagine.
Nobody would deny that. Life is order from chaos (struggling against the tyranny of entropy), that order is information-bearing, we are information processing beings, as are our digital offspring.
To say that information theory is a hard science, then, is actually to tell a slight lie, because mathematics is harder than the sciences: Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses.
I can't quite read Floridi's work (I'm not paying for books when there is a digital commons in need of enrichment), but after reading a few abstracts and a few passages, I've got a gist. You're right that Floridi isn't it-from-bit, and that's something of a problem, since it-from-bit reasoning is so solid and useful in quantum mechanics and computer science.
Floridi's definitions are contrasted with others at Wikipedia. [0] Shannon's definitions are empty, but he at least gave us some maths and a strong connection to thermodynamics and computer science. My main problem with Floridi's definition is that it doesn't give a strong clear way to tell what lack of information is like. For example, it is well-known physics folklore that electrons are hard to tell apart. To be pedantic, there does not exist any information which would allow an observer to distinguish electrons, beyond their basic identifying information (momenta and spin). How would Floridi explain the physical idea that such information cannot exist?
Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory.
You may need the assistance of an old lemma which reminds us that mathematical abstracta cannot possibly be physical.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_information#Defi...
So everything you've written here is more or less irrelevant to the main topic of this entire post :- The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design
That being said, I'll correct a few of your conceptual errors.
Information theory is a formal science, not a hard science.
Information theory is a subfield of mathematics directly, not a subfield of computer science (I would have thought).
> because mathematics is harder than the sciences
Nonsensical
> Without maths, it is not possible to express scientific models nor hypotheses.
So what?
> I can't quite read Floridi's work […] I've got a gist.
Respectfully, I'm not sure do, and I'm even less sure why you feel the need to comment.
> Mathematics is logic: The entirety of mathematics can be extracted from topos theory, and topos theory can subsume the entirety of formal logic. Logic is metaphysics: [1] has a sketch. Metaphysics is mathematics: The rules that govern which theories are possible are determined by study of the possible signatures of theories, leading to model theory and doctrine theory.
Pointlessly reductive, and probably nonsensical.
You think that, because I haven't read what you've read, your understanding exceeds mine. But I also think the same way; I think that you don't grok some important mathematical concepts. So which of us is right?
It sounds like your mind is still pretty small. Let's try one single exercise from one of my "pointlessly reductive" points: Since every formal logic can be expressed in the language of category/topos theory, and topos theory can express the plumbing of modern mathematics, and since the formalization of logic is itself mathematical, we have that logic is mathematics; that is, that any logical expression corresponds to a categorical expression and is fully mathematical. Making sense yet? At some point, philosophers need to study maths sincerely; the stereotype that they know nothing but Bayes is painfully on display today.
You skipped entirely over my question about electrons and information. Moreover, you admit that science needs maths. I'm going to take these as a complete concession. Thanks for playing Orange Site.
Finally, as a bonus, here's a metric for hardness in the sciences. A theory is harder when it predicts more. But theories always predict infinitely many things, and really we want to know how accurate a prediction is. And a theory is harder when it is smaller; that's Occam's Razor. So we'll take the sum of (the squares of) inaccuracies over all predictions, and scale it by opposite of (the logarithm of) the size of the theory. Of course, we'll have to use bits to measure both the accuracy of predictions and the size of the theory. This may remind you of certain equations in thermodynamics or statistics.
This reply made me laugh. You get 10 points for self-awareness, and a free beer if we ever meet.
Because ego (under the guise of Philosophy), I feel the need to point out that if Mathematics is just a language (an idea we both seem to be agreeing with) then you can't ignore the fact that it falls under the Chomsky Hierarchy.
So whether Mathematicians need to study Formal Language Theory, or Formal Language Theorists need to study Mathematics is really just a stand-off between finitists and infinitists Philosophers. And even more precisely than that - it's a stand-off between people who believe in Time and feasibility (computer scientists) and people who don't care about such details (Mathematicians).
Obviously (because I am a finitist, and therefore all infinitists are wrong - according to my ego errr.. I mean Philosophy ) I shall post a paper that agrees with me.
"Confessions of an Apostate Mathematician" by Edward Nelson https://web.math.princeton.edu/~nelson/papers/rome.pdf
FLT is closer to Computer Science than Mathematics for one simple reason - Time. The concept of Time doesn't exist in the Mathematical universe, while computer scientists obsess with time-complexity.
By beginning to treat the concept (e.g something in our heads) of Information as physical [1] (e.g outside of our heads) we are committing a Reification fallacy [2].
In a way good Philosophers understand the Dao (but don't say it).
The Dao that can be spoken is not the eternal Dao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name
This is something I am keenly interested in - I'm going to dig into reification, but any other recommendations/links specifically related to the limits and dangers of language (&/or the related pitfalls inherent in human communication, and therefore perception) would be appreciated.
With regards to danger this 5 minute video [1] by Stephen Fry conveys a powerful idea.
I think all of Western Philosophy in the last 120 or so years has concerned itself with the "linguistic turn" [2]. If you follow the breadcrumbs from Wittgenstein, Frege, Russell, Dumett, Chomsky, Quine etc. at a high-level you may begin to observe a common thread, patterns and concepts between Logic and Language which have been crystalized in Programming Language Theory [3].
At the risk of being a little too radical (with some intent of shock value) my view is that Truth is constructed not discovered [4]. This is also an argument Richard Rorty makes in "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity" [5]. Ultimately, language is a tool [6]. The responsible use of any tool (be it language or a gun) is a moral concern and an individual responsibility.
For unpacking the question "What is communication?" there's no better starting point than Shannon's "The Mathematical theory of Communication" [7]
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohrtFuxUzZE
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivist_epistemology
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency,_Irony,_and_Solida...
[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDiENpmpY78&t=1s
[7] https://www.amazon.com/Mathematical-Theory-Communication-Cla...
> Truth is constructed not discovered.
This is pretty interesting if you think about it, especially from multiple universe or counterfactual perspectives. It's probably mostly true even just here, but not so easy to see.
They are just linguistic/conceptual distinctions - useful models, but that is all they are - models. The map is not the territory [2]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map%E2%80%93territory_relation
Obviously, this is a complex topic, but I don't find the points you bring sufficient to imply anything about the mind being non-physical -- let alone what that would even mean, if it could be precisely defined in a scientific way.
It's all just words - Philosophical language games [1]. Physical and non-physical are just words that we, humans made up. They are concepts - useful distinctions. Nothing more.
There is no methodical way - no experiment you can perform that can confirm OR falsify the claim "Existence is physical". It's not a scientific claim - it's a philosophical one. It's not even wrong. It can't be wrong because it's an axiom.
People who axiomatically assume that existence is "physical" (whatever that means) are called physicalists [2].
>if it could be precisely defined in a scientific way.
Big IF. Does the absence of a scientific definition make it non-physical until a definition is produced?
Even if it could be precisely defined then all you have produced is a definition of the mind in the language of Mathematics. A Mathematical model. Are Mathematical models "physical"?
In 2019 some people even say that the Turing Machine is a model of the human mind. Are Mathematical models physical? If the mind is indeed a Turing Machine, does that mean the mind is physical?
Myself, I am not a physicalist. I am not a non-physicalist either.
I am a Model-dependent realist [3]. But more than that - I am a Linguistic Determinist [4]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_game_(philosophy)
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
That's where he lays out his research programme on his own website. Start with Information: A Very Short Introduction
“I don’t want it to be messed with” – I think that's a sentiment that's shared by most philosophers. However, Pandora's digital box has been opened and no discipline is immune to the infernal (excuse my impish hyperbole!) machinery springing forth :)
There's no easier way to say this without triggering people who haven't yet reasoned their way to these positions so I am just going to say it.
The concept of a Monad[2] in digital philosophy corresponds to the concept of God in Christian philosophy.
See Computational Trinitarianism for more [3]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_philosophy
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monad_(philosophy)
[3] https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/computational+trinitarianism
(1) Floridi's multi-annual research project concerning information: http://www.philosophyofinformation.net/research/
The Logic of Information (vol. 3) follows Ethics of Information (vol. 2) follows Philosophy of Information (vol. 1), with one volume forthcoming The Politics of Information – what the entire research project is attempting to do is posit information as a basic term, an axiomatic or core concept in philosophy (like truth is, or beauty, or reason, etc.) and to add subject areas with information as their focus to the pantheon of philosophical subject areas …
This is not the same research project as
(2) which is readily apparent by perusing the list of researchers. Digital Philosophy flows from Digital Physics which posits that the structure of reality is discrete, essentially reducible to zeroes and ones; digital philosophy (in this sense) is the philosophical attitude that this view of reality is correct – confusingly there is another use of the term digital philosophy that is a sort of cognate of digital humanities and digital science insofar as those meta/mega-fields are related.
I am not sure (even though it is asserted there by Wikipedia) that digital philosophy (in the first sense) is a re-interpretation of
(3) Monadist metaphysics. NB: Monadist metaphysics is an example of a Monist metaphysics and shouldn't be conflated, any metaphysics which posits a supreme singular entity, another example is object-oriented ontology, or theologically the
(4) singular supreme being of the Abrahamic religions. Thing is, yes they're related – don't conflate, smudge, equate, or treat them as identical – they're not.
Lastly computational trinitarianism is a clever moniker for
(5) the idea that logic, category theory, and type theory are three sides of the same coin. the monads of category theory and type theory are not the monads of Leibnizean Monadism. Don't confuse these ideas.
---
What have we learnt from all this? Things that have similar names are not necessarily similar. Philosophy is hard. The review of Floridi's work linked here is an okay jumping off point but there is nothing like reading the work for itself. I have read most of Floridi's 4th Revolution, his Very Short Introduction and most of his Philosophy of Information. I'd probably read them in the order he intended them to be read if I were you. Whether h has re-conceptualised much of philosophy is debatable but given we live in the information age he certainly is striking close to the bone in my opinion.
Along the same lines - things that have different names (and even entirely different vocabularies) are not necessarily different. There is a 1:1 correspondence between Logic, Type Theory and Category Theory - they are "the same" (up to isomorphism).
The science of abstraction hinges on the very concepts of "similarity" and "difference" - any two things are "the same" if you remove enough details.
At the highest level of abstraction all Philosophy is the same. It's all confluent and equifinal - all roads lead to Rome.
Recursion/self-knowledge - a theory of "self".
Obviously
> There is a 1:1 correspondence between Logic, Type Theory and Category Theory - they are "the same" (up to isomorphism).
I know.
> At the highest level of abstraction all Philosophy is the same. It's all confluent and equifinal - all roads lead to Rome.
That's sounds swell but I'd venture that it's a pretty vacuous statement.
> Recursion/self-knowledge - a theory of "self".
Let us part ways here, I wish you well on your journey.
It's not vacuous - it's abstract.
>Let us part ways here, I wish you well on your journey.
Godspeed.
Abstractions that remove details do so to address part of a whole. You are missing a lot of the whole. There is more to a self than computing perspectives can describe. Throughout history people have used the most current technology as a metaphor for the mind, piston driven minds for ex.
That philosophy had errors, as yours does too.
It highlights the fact that in order to develop a theory of "self" you have to observe yourself and confirm/reject some hypotheses as new information becomes available.
That's self-referential application of the scientific method.
>That philosophy had errors, as yours does too.
Standard Philosophical response: You don't know what an "error" is to be making such assertions.
Standard Scientific response: All models are wrong - some are useful.
There is more to "self" than any language can describe (Gödel told us so) but any description/reference of "self" is (by definition) recursive and reflective. Like Metaprogramming [1] or something.
Do I contradict myself?
Very well, then I contradict myself,
I am large, I contain multitudes.
--Walt Whitman
Yes Vervaeke and other cognitive scientists cover this. But that is fundamentally different to recursion which has it's own form. Recursion is all knowing of it's internals, doesn't change or grow and has a limited or program-breaking number of executions. A mind may or may not have a recursive function, but it is not fundamentally recursive nor does recursion capture all there is to be a self, nor all the processes to discover all parts of a self. Which you have agreed with but to cover the ground for the sake of it, the next two paragraphs.
To say 'self' and 'recursion' is the same is false, and to describe all philosophies as the same because they have the same errors is not correct. There are different ways to be wrong. We know the basics in many religions differ and work for others, we know there is a difference between opinions on gods, overarching stories. This is why we can rank Fiction books apart.
Not all philosophies are the same, some are more true than others, to say otherwise is to eliminate all difference that can ever be and therefore all of reality, collapsing into nihilism. You can't claim all philosophy is equifinal and confluent without destroying the mode of thought itself.
Now the meat, what you are trying to describe is a metaphysical structure that incorporates all philosophies in a similar structure. Vervaeke is further down this path than you and I suggest his discussions with Pageau. A metaphysical structure for bringing philosophy together has a better chance of success as it is predicated on a mode of being that is innocent of having to perform a useful task in the world. You can believe whatever your mind and social sphere is capable of believing and attempt to realize that belief in a political setting. Only then do you have the option to break that belief down into a philosophy and find out how flawed it was to begin with and how to actually implement it.
Programming is just a tool, and trying to work a philosophy from it's function is a regression for the sake of productivity, the human application of that generated philosophy can be very useful, but it can't describe a metaphysical position as reality will tear it apart. So there is a self, we don't know all of it, and yes recursion is a small tool to be used in exploring that, but I reject the totality of your argument excepting that portion. The attempt to provide a veil for our thoughts with a technocratic philosophy is predictable on HN but insufficient for life.
Did you miss my original comment where I said that the very notion of "sameness" and "difference" is the foundation of abstraction and therefore entirely subjective?
To you 'self' and 'recursion' are different. To me - they are 'the same'.
You aren't going to convince me that what I am saying is false, because I am not susceptible to persuasion by argument.
I know how to think for myself and make up my own mind - give me the information I require. Spare me the arguments.
>You can't claim all philosophy is equifinal and confluent without destroying the mode of thought itself.
I am claiming it. And yet here we are - still thinking, talking, doing what we were doing before I claimed it. No destruction took place.
I guess your hypothesis is wrong?
>I reject the totality of your argument.
That's fine with me, because I wasn't really arguing.
Idiots argue. Humans communicate.
>I know how to think for myself and make up my own mind - give me the information I require. Spare me the arguments.
I assume you think that of others too and not that you are a unique snowflake for having these qualities. Then why talk? You are pointless to 'communicate' with. One way streets lead nowhere.
It's a philosophical argument, like the ancient greeks shared... Were they idiots?
You are claiming a metaphysical position, not a philosophical one. So yes the category of philosophy is destroyed, particularly emphasized by the fact you won't open your mind to discussion or change.
Your ad-hominem has been noted.
>Then why talk?
Why not?
> You are pointless to 'communicate' with.
In the words of Wittgenstein "Languages are used to obtain certain ends within communities. Two people participating in two different language-games cannot be said to communicate in any relevant way."
So what language game are you playing and what is the common purpose for which you and I need to be communicating?
Until you reveal your intentions communication is indeed impossible.
>You are claiming a metaphysical position, not a philosophical one.
Logic is Metaphysics. I'd like to see you do Philosophy without logic.
> So yes the category of philosophy is destroyed.
Category theory is Mathematics. Mathematics is logic.
Your claim of "destruction" is contradicted for a second time. Is there anything I can say to convince you that you are wrong?
>particularly emphasized by the fact you won't open your mind to discussion or change.
This is a lie.
I will change my mind upon the presentation of the information required to change it. It's called a Bayesian update.
If Philosophy is the pursuit of Truth, why are you telling lies about me?
But the question that bothers me most: Why are you trying to change my mind?
I am not a fan of proselytism. It's not my job to change your mind - it's yours.
>It's a philosophical argument, like the ancient greeks shared... Were they idiots?
Maybe. If they were only arguing for the sake of arguing, then indeed - they were idiots.
You brought your character in as a substantive point to argue. I was not avoiding anything. If you wish not to defend your opinion on arguments without your character, be my guest.
>Why not?
If you wish to talk to an empty wall do so, but I am free in my rights to challenge the use and social value of communicating with a closed book.
>So what language game are you playing and what is the common purpose for which you and I need to be communicating?
Less than half of the purpose of communicating here can be described and it is too lengthy and mundane to be bothered with. The other half of the purpose of communicating here is yet to be discovered. How does the purpose of the argument assist the conversation with someone who does not wish to share arguments?
>Until you reveal your intentions communication is indeed impossible.
So what have we been doing then? I mean really?
I misspoke on the metaphysical assertion, what I mean is a problem of belief. There is more to a self than philosophy can describe. You can have a philosophical position that all philosophies become equifinal, presumably, I do not really care but limiting your analysis of the idea of the 'self' to just what a philosophy, logic and categories, ect can argue is a limited perspective. When Christianity left as the guiding belief structure, the modern 'self' has been left as a ground-up built belief that an internal describable entity exists. Modern psychotherapy and individualistic work very perilously hangs on that entity as a healing or generative function and it can be argued very easily that it is not recursion or logic or a category. It remains elusive and it is possible to break people's internal representation of their 'self', their belief it exists or their belief in it's structure.
It was not a lie that 'you will not change your mind', there was no intent to deceive. That is the most information I had at the time with which to make a judgement. This is the second time you have made a dishonest interpretation of my text, it's disappointing to see.
>But the question that bothers me most: Why are you trying to change my mind?
Who can say that I am or not? Are you me, am I you? For you to perceive the text that I write there is some representation of my actions and self inside your perceptions and self. The difference between internal and external is a fundamental sociological problem, I seek not to answer it.
>I am not a fan of proselytism. It's not my job to change your mind - it's yours.
So you take no responsibility for spamming this thread with your proselytizing? The simple act of posting your opinion is proselytizing because you cannot control (in your view particularly) another's mind, for that word to have any meaning at all in this context.
I seek the opportunity to make the arguments I believe are interesting and valid, someone who is closed off to that is a door I cannot open and explore.
Also stop editing I've been trying to finish this for a while.
>Maybe. If they were only arguing for the sake of arguing, then indeed - they were idiots.
Big if.
I was not aware I was under attack, so I felt no need to defend myself.
If you are attacking - let me know.
> How does the purpose of the argument assist the conversation with someone who does not wish to share arguments?
If you tell me what it is that you are trying to achieve by arguing it helps me help you get what you want.
There may be a better way for you to get what you want. A way that doesn't require arguing.
If all you want to do is argue - then I am not interested.
>When Christianity left as the guiding belief structure, the modern 'self' has been left as a ground-up built belief that an internal describable entity exists. It remains elusive and it is possible to break people's internal representation of their 'self', their belief it exists or their belief in it's structure.
If that is true and the "self" does not exist, then why do you keep using this meaningless word "I" ?
> Who can say that I am or not?
You can!
>So you take no responsibility for spamming this thread with your proselytizing?
I take responsibility for expressing myself using my words. I take no responsibility for changing your mind - that responsibility is yours entirely.
If my words haven't changed your mind then I am not proselytizing.
So...Do you think am I proselytizing or not?
I think you're using the word poorly as a way to describe behaviour you don't like.
>If that is true and the "self" does not exist, then why do you keep using this meaningless word "I" ?
'I' existed before the modern conception of self.
>There may be a better way for you to get what you want. A way that doesn't require arguing.
Argument
In logic and philosophy, an argument is a series of statements, called the premises or premisses, intended to determine the degree of truth of another statement, the conclusion.
I'm going to stop. This isn't going anywhere. The meat of your content is to just ask back at me what I'm giving you. I don't want to spend time on that marginal value anymore, 6-8 comments is enough.
You keep misunderstanding. Intentionally, I imagine (par for the Philosophical course).
The meat of my content it: What do you want?
You aren't going to change her mind by Philosophising her, trying to explain the fallacy to her; or throwing evidence at her, but you may be able to reach her on a human level if you learn to talk to her in her language.
The need to believe in a greater power (than the self) is rooted in a fear of the unknown - she can't cope with uncertainty. Most humans can't - don't holt it against them.
The majority of my close friends over the years have been naturalists, and if I was being uncharitable, I could say all of them are naturalists because of a fear and loathing of having something outside themselves set limits to their moral freedom or life choices. While some naturalists probably do, I don't say all of them or even most of them do because people are people everywhere. And generally speaking, many people follow arguments where they lead, given whatever epistemic tools they have available to them.
This kind of reasoning acts as if it can remove all else for the sake of a single revealed hidden feeling that guides belief.
I think there are many factors that go into belief, emotions can have multiple outcomes and similarities between feelings and observed beliefs do not prove each other.
In non-axiomatic systems (such as reality) all you have is inductive reasoning, and all inductive theories are Underdetermined.
This is what I mean by self-reference being inescapable...
You are welcome to perform deduction in practice, but you have no absolute truths to start deducing with. Everything that you consider to be an "absolute truth" has been arrived at by induction.
If you are to succeed at changing your aunt's mind the strategy you've chosen (evidence, reason, arguments, intellectual assault on her wrongness) probably won't work.
In that regards Philosophers are completely irrational - they do the same thing over and over expecting a different result.
Persuasion is a multi-faceted skill.
But the staging is interesting. Let us hear more.
Thoughts on this for those with a philosophy background? Is philosophy so focused...?
Philosophy contains within itself the History of Ideas. Just as we can talk about regular history using grand sweeping narratives broken into epochs we can also talk about currents of thought that sweep through philosophy and rough granular eras.
So yes, yes you can: you had the Ancients (Aristotle and the like) and they had certain ideas about the world – then there was the rise of scholasticism (religious/theological supremacy) – then came the Renaissance (and humanism), then the Modern Era (with Descartes) all of which had shifts in focus – then the Enlightenment – the contemporary philosophy with its emphasis on representation, Frege's and Wittgenstein's linguistic turn …
None of this does justice to the History of Ideas but you gotta start somewhere – it's not a coincidence that the great epoch in Western Civilisation correspond to similar eras in philosophy.
Hope that helps.