The infosec definition of trust is not really the same as the colloquial meaning of trust.

The infosec "trust" is not something earned or even verified, but an assumption that something is not malicious. Imagine a fortress: inside of the walls is called "trusted", outside of the walls is "untrusted". So a trusted CA merely means a certificate inside your fortress' walls that an attacker can't modify.

The trust that browsers place in the TLS chain of trust is basically just the assertion that the holder of the TLS key is the one who owns the domain.

This doesn't imply anything about the contents that can be transferred over the TLS connection. Could be malware. The other side could leak your private data like crazy. That's outside the scope of the TLS chain of trust.

Relatively few companies can sign TLS certificates, and you have the security of the domain name as well. In order for an attacker to steal a TLS session they need to compromise both the certificate system and the dns lookup.

Yes, but only because every other known solution is worse in practice.