That reveals, I think, the actual error in Excite's strategy: not realizing that "internet search" was the real prize deserving all the attention. That mis-prioritization is what led to accepting the merger with @Home just a little before these Google discussions. That's also why they mainly evaluated Google on some static set of then-common queries. That's why they were satisfied with their existing search results – which by my recollection, were for a while the clearly "most relevant" of then-extant options. Their tech stack & team had been quite good, and certainly seemed "good enough" as just one small part of the particular larger game they thought they were playing.
Had Excite accepted Page's requirement, the tech/team switchover might've been rocky, and I suspect at best Excite would've remained relevant in search for only a little while longer. But the same distractions & headwinds that bankrupted Excite@Home by the end of 2001 likely would've felled the company even with the addition of Google's nascent potential. Google's best talent, including Page & Brin, wouldn't have stayed around for long. (And in the actual history of an independent Google, it still raised tens-of-millions in additional venture investment to give them the time/resources to perfect their model – runway that might not have been available inside Excite.)
It was the earlier choice to emphasize the "last mile" cable-internet business and monthly subscription revenues, via the merger with @Home, that sealed Excite's fate. It nudged them away from buying Google, sure, but also put them on a path where even buying Google couldn't have saved them.