1. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/748.pdf 2. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.11605.pdf 3. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/775.pdf 4. https://users.encs.concordia.ca/~clark/papers/2019_wtsc_fron... 5. http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/patrick.mccorry/minerbribery.p...
This one isn't an attack per se, it is mostly an exploration of arbitrage bots in decentralized exchanges running on Ethereum smart contracts. However, they point out that miners can trivially capture the value of the arbitrage transactions by front-running, and that this "free money" is like a bonus block subsidy that falls outside of the PoW consensus models:
6. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.05234.pdf
This one actually operates through transaction fees only, so it doesn't depend on smart contract functionality. However, it is waaaaay more expensive (for the attacker) than the others: