> In alignment with this new paradigm, policymakers simplified the Federal Acquisition Regulation in 1994 and 1995, exempting “commercial items” from a large portion of the rules (as well as expanding the definition of what is a commercial item to include goods that could be seen as specialized military goods). Congress also encouraged federal agencies to purchase commercial items “to the maximum extent practicable.” These changes fueled high rates of commercial purchases, which, coupled with consolidation in the defense industry, contributed to the Defense Department’s increased use of commercial technology and the negotiation of single-source contracts.
> Ultimately, the power dynamics shifted between the Defense Department and commercial industry, forcing the department to accept warranties, contracts or prices that it could previously avoid — all thanks to changes in research and development funding, regulations and a lack of competition.
Either way I'm glad it's become an issue for the military. Makes me more hopeful it'll be adopted since it can be framed with some good ol' flag waving jingoistic military worship along side the other issues like e-Waste and consumer rights.
I know from my interactions with the DOD supply chain that few, if any, people think about the warranty implications of COTS hardware beyond making sure there is support from the manufacturer. This isn't too bad when the COTS hardware is a smallish component of a larger system that a unit can replace from spares if there is a failure (which is where the COTS movement started). It's a much bigger deal when the entire larger system is itself a COTS bundle, as is the case in this article.
There is usually very little in a contract language for what happens when they get blown off, so the person with the broken Humvee (as an example) has to contact the appropriate government entity (contracting officer) to contact the company rep. So the company gets a slap on the hand. The government can threaten to end the contract, but that is a nuclear option.
The biggest (realistic) stick the government can have is to threaten to not renew a contract, but when you talk about a Humvee (to continue the example), that sadly is totally unrealistic. So the contractor knows they have a monopoly and have no incentive to work harder.
I'll tell you a story on a very large program I was on. We did developmental testing for a very large platform (Billions of dollars). We had a prime (Company A) who gave specifications for a form factor to Company B. For months, we told Company A that the Line Replaceable unit (LRU) that goes into the platform would not fit, and it took us eight months for Company A to admit there was even a problem. We only got them to admit there was a problem because we literally had a general officer come out to the test site and try to fit in the LRU himself.
What ended up being the issue? Company A gave the wrong size specifications to Company B. Guess what happened? The government had to pay to retrofit the design so the LRU would fit. We simply had no stick to make them pay for their mistake. The company said if they had to pay for it, they wouldn't have enough money for the rest of testing. And also guess what? no one in the government wants to be in charge of a failed program.
When you made a lemon, surely it's then cheaper to replace with a current product than it is to go to court; and being a military supplier would be a high status indication so don't companies (any making products that aren't adjective crap) should still want to make money through creating good products?