For me, I look at encryption as a mitigation for surveillance. Anything that increases the marginal cost to monitor an individual makes broad surveillance less economic.
Signal will always have the edge for surveillance due to the relative difficulty of hiding a back door. Whatsapp will always be suspect in that they could easily be forwarding everyone’s messages to third parties.
Plus, why would you hire a team of people to kidnap a citizen and beat them when you can assign a ticket to a government blackhat at the NSA who will run the commands against your devices and take what they need without you ever knowing.
Even then, there is substantial risk of whistleblowing for illegal data collection against citizens (Snowden et al) so they would instead in a clandestine manner ask a fellow member of the Five Eyes to perform the surveillance "legally".
Our society has known about Five Eye roundabout spy agreements for a long time and has largely shrugged, so the risk of public political blowback doing this would be minimal.
However, if we're playing poker and I learn your tell, it's in my best interest that you are naive to that fact. While not the best analogy, I would think that the same concept would apply to state actors.
Some despotic regimes do have large kidnap-and-murder programs (ex Rwanda) but if you just want to keep tabs on exiled dissidents and learn exactly who they're talking with back home, NSO Group has a product for you.
I don't really worry about the spy agencies themselves -- I am not of any interest to them.
However, I worry a lot about the likes of NSO and the tools they produce. They are likely to end up being used, in one form or another, by criminals and corporations.
Sanctions on selling exploits seems easier to achieve though since there is less of a conflict with economic interests
Indeed. I think I covered that in "criminal" category, but perhaps I should have been more explicit.