Is Crispr the Next Antibiotic?
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
A less-explored idea is the one I first got from the title: would oversuse of CRISPR lead to "superbugs" issues like we had with antibiotics? This sounds like something interesting to work on, even before starting their large-scale use.
I guess a lot could go wrong if viruses started to become resistant to bacteria's immune system mechanisms.
An extreme outcome might be like the fictional movie "I Am Legend", which was a horrible title for the movie. Someone gets desperate to cure a late stage cancer in a loved one and ends up creating a pathogen that can manage to spread to other people and wipe out a portion or all of the population.
Or perhaps someone starts selling kits that "make your muscles bigger", but in 0.7% of the population, that kit also makes the persons heart become oversized.
Is it safe to assume that these scenarios are too difficult to accomplish? I am asking because people will do what people can do and we will see online crispr kits before long.
not satire :)
Well, we can install layers of access control like cell membranes which apply access control. We can cordon off the nuclear power plants (like mitochondria) with a "dumb" API that produces energy in return for nutrients and avoids "smart contracts".
In the medieval sense, we can dig a moat and install a drawbridge. Bridges adds latency, but at least you can retract them during wartime. But the enemy is pretty clever, so they carry long ladders across the desert that can span the moat.
So you add a winding cave before the moat so the ladders don't fit. But then they wisen up and pay spies behind your lines to lower the bridge, which is analogous to hijacking your immune system, or they invent a folding ladder, and so on.
But none of this helps you if your enemy can consume you at a macro scale by swallowing you whole. So complex species tend to grow larger or add multiple layers of specialised topology (organs) with disposable individuals - not to mention growing their societies.
I suspect there exists a "Shannon Information Theory of Survival" that can guarantee a defensible strategy as long as you can inject sufficient variance into the environment (high pressure, low pressure, vacuum, hot, cold, acidic, etc.) so that it would be more costly for an attacker to usurp you than to forge an alliance.
Is it? It seems like analogies can often point into the right direction to look at.
Of course analogies are not sufficient and you do need to do the actual empirical work, but it also seems a bit unwise to discard their ability to detect similarities. The only reason you can make a good analogy is because there is an underlying shared abstraction .
The key is that you can't really stop the bacteria from coming in. You have to actually feed them so that they don't get desperate enough to blow a hole through your defenses. But what you feed them is a complex mix of polysaccharides that take take a long time to chew through. https://www.nature.com/articles/nature23292
Your variance hypothesis is basically correct. The goblet cells of the epithelium express ~20 enzymes that decorate the protein backbone of mucus with six O-linked sugars in such a way that the composition is never the same, because of all the different types of linkage combinations possible, which means that no one bacteria can sweep through and gain permanent access. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4982847/
Cooperative Metabolic Adaptations in the Host Can Favor Asymptomatic Infection and Select for Attenuated Virulence in an Enteric Pathogen https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30100182
Similarly, we don't want to be too defensive. It's expensive, and the more complex our immune systems become, the greater the chance of autoimmune disorders. The more energy we spend protecting ourselves, and not growing. Therefore we will never develop perfect immune systems, and pathogens will never be perfect killers.
The arms race analogy does a poor job of illustrating that in actuality, host-pathogen interactions are something of a dynamic equilibrium at this point.
> with disposable individuals
And this is also something interesting: if an individual is too resistant, you risk propagating a disease to a large portion of the population. If each individual is too weak, you risk taking down the whole population. There are probably some evolutive pressure at play: a population with a rampant disease (a parasite, for instance) might be less competitive than another one that sheds its infected members.
Could happen, but might also be evolutionarily difficult.
For the first of the reports mentioned here the authors used bacterial conjugation [1] as the delivery method. They note that:
"In culture conditions that enhance cell-to-cell contact, conjugation rates approach 100% with the cis-acting plasmid."
So, I guess what is less clear is if this would me the case in a real bacterial infection. And would this generalize to a broad spectrum of pathogenic bacteria?
The delivery mechanism in the second, anti-viral, paper is less clear to me. Perhaps someone else can comment.
In general, I still like the idea of using bacteriophages. But finding broad spectrum bacteriophages seems problematic. Using DNA sequencing as a diagnostic to target therapies seems like in interesting idea (once DNA sequencing becomes cheap enough and easily available).
If the patient isn't too sick, you could even get to in situ programming of endogenous lymphocytes and myeloid cells a la Matthias Stephan's nanoparticle loaded with DNA or mRNA. https://stephanlab-fhcrc.squarespace.com/research-projects
Bacteria have more genetic stability but are even harder to spread because most people are already colonized and disruption of that homeostasis is often difficult, and symptomatic.
None of that even addresses how you'd engineer something to be benign to everyone but one person.
There's other problems with bioterrorism as well. If you make something lethal, it tends not to spread well because it kills the host too quickly. That's why way more people get the cold than Ebola. Pathogens tend to reach equilibrium within a generation inside a population. The narrower and more specific the group it infects, the harder it is for it to transmit.
I'm sure that's easier said than done, but it seems plausible that genetic engineering could progress to the point where targeted bioweapons become a real concern.
All we have is the binaries. There's no high-level language they can "decompile" into, because the binaries were not compiled from anything. They were literally "grown" from previous binaries by randomness and time. There was no mind guiding the changes so the only way to deduce some design lines is by looking at the system constraints. Nothing makes "sense" besides that.
That's how you get, for example, the perception of time subroutine entangled with the vision routine [1]
Oh and the hardware is the same deal: we can examine existing working "processors", but each one was "grown", not designed.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_perception#Eye_movements_...
Hey, it's hard to refactor API's constantly because requirements keep changing. Commit more, or commit 'better': choose one for evolution. ;-)
Joke aside, epigenetics in our funny imagery here stand out as "interface" to me —how a particular (DNA) codebase reacts and presents itself differently to different environments, different i/o and somehow manages to share this on-the-fly engineering with descendents.
Biology truly is fascinating from an engineer's standpoint.
If it were easy to rewrite the code, we would create winged babies for shits and grins.
https://phys.org/news/2019-09-dna-held-hydrophobic.html
I'm using golf theory here, but if you're off a half a degree, the further it goes, the more errant the shot.
With so much missing/incomplete/invalid information about DNA, writing junk code sounds about right.
Finally, unlike code, none of this has any meaningful process control, its all random things influenced by random fluctations in the environment!