Liquidation preference of 1x (or lower) is just sensible alignment of investor and founder incentives. The investor wants to make sure that if they buy 20% of the company for $5M, the founders aren't now incented to take advantage of them (in an extreme example: the day after the fundraising, liquidating the company for its assets, taking home $4M themselves and handing the investor back $1M. In a less extreme example, selling the company (in toto) for $10M a year or two later).
Liquidation preference of higher than 1x is a whole different thing. It's, at its most benign, something kind of like a financial instrument a little more like debt than stock, trading a more-guaranteed return for a lower price, or at its most pernicious, basically an attempt to create false impressions of a company's value. If you sell stock with a x3 liquidation preference, that is deeply different, and conveys considerably less investor confidence, than selling the same stock at the same price with x1 liquidation preference, but the press releases get to not mention the preference.
Rationally, this leads to many of the best people ignoring the startup world
That's one reason I didn't have trouble bailing on a startup I helped start. We took in $1.5mm, did some things poorly (such is life but learned good lessons from them) and even with a path forward we would have still required some more investment (since we weren't profitable). Therefore I knew what the current liquidation preference was, I computed what another round's liquidation preference would add, and it became clear we'd have to sell at $30-50m just for me to start getting money.
The likelihood of that happening was small, and the feeling of being un-incentivized from selling at a respectable $20m made me realize the whole game was stupid and rigged. Now I work at a bank making almost 3x of what I made in hard cash (plus better benefits which equals hardware) and that extra money is giving me much better returns in my retirement and stock accounts, and a better quality of life (and less stress).
A company in the space (but doing something different) called and made me an offer for twice what I was making. I was the lead developer by that point, had my hands in every significant piece of code, understood how everything fit together and such, and was appalled when I found out that I had such a small piece of the total pie. I demanded more, like 20x more, and they made it sound like I was asking to sleep with their wives. Then they absolutely howled that I was screwing them over by leaving right at launch- they asked me to stay for 3 months, which I said sure- if you match my new salary plus a little more as a retention bonus and to make up for some of the paycut, and again they howled at how could I do this to them...
It was a painful lesson, but I learned something very important- Do not work like you are an owner if you are just an employee! I still to this day (this was 10 years ago now) feel very taken advantage of. I was working tons of late nights and weekends, was a super fanboy of the company, at one point I was going to buy us a company logo made out of Legos to hang on our wall, and now I just cringe at the thought.
There are so many ways to lose in the startup game, just so many, its really not worth playing anymore IMHO unless you are a founder or very early stage employee with material access to the financials and such.
For a while I was confused and unsure why they weren't also pulling long hours, but I eventually learned the lesson. I was working hard to protect my baby, while my staff were just seeking to gain some experience in a cool niche. I would either have to realign incentives for them to also feel compelled to pull long hours, or I'd have to recalibrate my expectations.
In retrospect, I'm not sure what took me so long to realize this, but I'm glad it happened relatively early on in my life. The first job I took out of college, I made sure to keep my effort in line with my compensation and investment in the company.
I can only reason that it depends on whether the founder still has voting control of the company, but that's implied with "greenlighting".
WeWork is a similar situation where the founder is effectively getting a carve-out to greenlight the deal. That's only one example, though.
Equity compensation is about owning part of the COMPANY. If the company has destroyed value -- if it is now worth less than its bank account, with no company attached, was worth before any revenue -- then your equity is valueless.
Asking for the reward of equity with no risk is weird.
However, I've seen equity pitched as a way to "make up" for the lower cash comp a startup might offer.
This is probably the wrong way to look at equity. The expected value of the equity might make up for lower cash comp, but that's with a large sample size. Employees don't get that benefit at all.
It's definitely up to the employee to understand the risks, but frequently they don't, and employers don't actively educate their employees.
Yes, if the employees' future paychecks for the next few months is being funded by that VC check. If the options are (a) VC money - but can only get it with liquidation preference ... or (b) insist on no liquidation preference - and therefore no VC agrees which leads to bankruptcy ... the "sensible for employees" is a moot point because the constraints of limited runway mean the employees care more about steady paychecks rather than owning worthless stock of a bankrupt company. (E.g. Google's first employees' salaries were funded by $25 million VC money from Sequioa and KPCB because Google had near zero revenue. Yes, Sequioa & KPCB had liquidation preference but it was irrelevant to employees since they needed the paychecks.)
On the other hand, if payroll expenses can be funded by revenue and the VC check is optional, maybe not.
The only warrant for preferences is for fueling carry and information arbitrage within the VC circle. There is zero benefit to employees, who thankfully know more today.