These days WireGuard is just as easy to set up, and has lots of benefits over sshuttle (it's UDP based, supports roaming a-la Mosh, has a much more solid cryptographic design, and so on).
"Generate a private and public key pair for the WireGuard server:"
"umask 077 wg genkey | tee privatekey | wg pubkey > publickey"
"This will save both the private and public keys to your home directory; they can be viewed with cat privatekey and cat publickey respectively."
"Create the file /etc/wireguard/wg0.conf and add the contents indicated below. You’ll need to enter your server’s private key in the PrivateKey field, and its IP addresses in the Address field."
That's not within reach of your average computer user.
Same for sshutle.
Given that WireGuard is headed for inclusion into Linux mainline soon, it probably would be a good idea for folks to take a few minutes to learn how to use a technology that is going to be part of core Linux.
[1]: https://github.com/cyphar/dotfiles/blob/master/.local/bin/wg...
But you're quite right that if you already have a config that you know works, WireGuard has no significant advantage in this area (in terms of ease-of-configuration -- though the keys being quite short is nice for SSH-like key distribution). But if you're starting from scratch then you need to first figure out what is the right configuration to use (or you need to pick from the many dozens of "set up OpenVPN quickly" scripts) and then you need to hope that your configuration is not insecure.
WireGuard can be set up and work just as well as any other configuration without a script in a couple of minutes (or less than a minute with a script). The script that was linked in a sister comment to "set up OpenVPN quickly" also sets up Apache for god's sake...
https://www.terminalbytes.com/sshuttle-vpn-over-ssh-vpn-alte...
sshuttle uses ssh, which in turn is not wedded to any one cipher. How does wiregaurd improve on this?
The "agility is bad" crew have a decade or two to wait before they can show anything at all meaningful beyond "my new thing is newer than your old thing".
That doesn't make them wrong, but it makes their position unproven in practice.
By having cipher agility, both clients and servers are incentivised to support the widest possible set of ciphers (because nobody can agree on what cipher to use). This means that it's hard for a known-bad cipher to stop being used (see: the entire history of RC4 usage in TLS) and any downgrade attacks become catastrophic (see: the entire history of SSL/TLS). It also ends up adding complexity to the protocol -- which is always a good thing to have in cryptographic protocols (see again: SSL/TLS)!
Most importantly, if all currently-known ciphers are broken tomorrow, then all servers and clients will have to be upgraded in order to be secure. So cipher agility doesn't help you with the doomsday scenario (everyone needs to upgrade anyway) instead it just ensures that older (completely insecure) clients will still be able to communicate with servers. Why is that seen as a feature? If you really want an insecure fallback mechanism you can implement it with non-agile systems by supporting the two most recent versions of the protocol (I expect this is what WireGuard will do once it's upstreamed). But not everyone wants the "feature" that some clients will silently become insecure.
I don't understand what you're saying with this point:
> The "agility is bad" crew have a decade or two to wait before they can show anything at all meaningful beyond "my new thing is newer than your old thing".
How can the "agility is bad crew" prove their point in a few decades if you're arguing that we shouldn't use such protocols? If they followed your advice, there wouldn't be any zero-agility protocols to compare against in a few decades...
I'm arguing that the case for them is weaker than is often put, but that's not the same as nobody should use them. If a flag day is fine for your use case there's very little reason not to choose this design approach, it is simpler and simpler is good. But you'll notice that the example cited (including by you) for why agility is bad is almost invariably TLS and clearly a flag day isn't practical for TLS because it's far too broadly used.
TLS illustrates my other main thrust of concern on "agility is bad". You describe RC4 as "known bad" and the downgrade attacks as "catastrophic" and this sort of apocalyptic thinking is very popular in the "agility is bad" crowd, but it doesn't truly reflect the ground reality for actual users which is that things went from "It's definitely fine" to "It's probably fine but to be sure we should upgrade". Grey areas are a real thing.
There were protocols that didn't exhibit any cipher agility before by the way. Lots of them. What happened was that they broke, and so agility was added to them retrospectively in new versions that fixed the brokenness. The arguably new thing in the latest round of "no agility" protocols is a supposed determination never to do this. To see how that works out, as I said, you'll have to wait a decade or two.
Among many other things, you cannot do a port scan for WireGuard servers. You can do a port scan for SSH. This is because the WireGuard handshake was designed such that there is no response to unauthenticated packets (the first packet is authenticated by the client knowing the server's public key -- something port scanners won't know).
Jason Donenfeld has a few talks[1] that explain why the cryptographic design is the way it is, and it has several very clear improvements over SSH (as a VPN protocol).
I really can't overstate how awesome WireGuard is. I really would suggest you take a look at it.