The protocol seems to be designed to require clients to send all of their DNS traffic to a single upstream provider. This may be similar to your current DNS configuration, and your network may even be limiting your ability to use the internet with bad policies on broken middleboxen. That's unfortunate for you, but please don't presume everyone has similar limitations.
>> "But we need to overload port 443 to hide our DNS traffic!"
It's unfortunate your ISP or national infrastructure requires such obfuscation. In those situations, the current DOH protocol could be a good workaround.
However, protecting against a malicious upstream server sending bad results is very different than protecting against large institutions being able to eavesdrop on your DNS traffic to build a model of your pattern-of-life. The latter is only stopped by not giving a single entity all of your DNS traffic, which DOH explicitly requires.
If you recursively resolve DNS queries locally - ideally in a future where traffic to authoritative servers is encrypted (DoT?) - only the first request goes to a centralized server. Most traffic goes to the domain's authoritative server, which is probably the same controlled by the same entity you are about to connect to with HTTPS.