Russia's strategic submarine fleet is not the same as the US FBM force. USN boomers are deploying
constantly, to the point where they have literally two different crews (Blue and Gold) to minimize the time the actual hulls stay in port (allowing them to spend roughly 2/3 of their service life at sea, an incredibly high utilization rate for a warship). Russian ballistic missile submarines generally average 1-2 sorties
a year.
Now, the Soviet (and then Russian) solution to this was to eventually develop missiles that could reach the US from port, but guess what? That means that instead of a survivable, highly dispersed and hidden missile force, the vast majority of your missiles are massed together where a single warhead could take them out.
Russian strategic bombing forces are also pretty small (36 Tu-160's built, maybe half operational, and something like 60 Tu-95MS operational), so most of their nuclear deterrent comes from land based ICBMs. Note, however, that Soviets understood this and so built the SS-25 Topol, and there are about 100 of these road-mobile ICBMs operational today. (Along with ~130 silo launched missiles.)
The Bulletin kinda glosses over the road-mobile survivability. It isn't what America did, so people who are experts in American systems often don't pay sufficient attention to the advantages of such systems, in my experience.