Can you please explain this sentence? I hope that doesn't mean "we now treat https just like http." Thank you.
Of course, you could always cache-control this behavior away on the server, but not if you don't know about it. I, for one, am glad I found out.
IIRC, most browsers have cached HTTPS resources in memory (if not on disk) for a long time, so these kinds of side channel attacks have always been possible.
More generally, TLS is not good at handling side-channel (timing, caching, size measurement) attacks. If you want to mitigate side channel attacks then you need to do a lot of tedious work (that is practically impossible with current mainstream tools) at the application/HTTP layer on the server.
For what it's worth, in-memory caching is a totally different animal. You can expect the in-memory cache to keep a typical object for minutes or hours, depending on usage patterns. You can expect the disk cache to keep a typical object for days or weeks, across browser restarts and even system reboots.
Given that poorly run websites are considerably less likely to be worried about scaling issues, the caching is mostly inconsequential. So, would we prefer to give the poorly-run website a mostly inconsequential security benefit or a mostly inconsequential scaling benefit?
Writing every https response to the disk is just wrong.
Are you aware how many banks don't have "ideal" developers? Is it easier to "change the whole world" or to use a browser with sane defaults?
Consider:
https://foo/a.txt != http://foo/a.txt
just like the obvious case of https://foo/b.txt != http://bar/c.txt
All of those are considered unique URIs.I suspect there will be quite a range of behaviours, especially if you consider IE6 (which unfortunately I have to, as do many others) so a bit more consideration is needed before jumping to change expectations of static content access speeds.
Another bit of my research to add to the list of things that'll get looked into when I have some free time (i.e. when hell freezes over)...