FCC requires home router manufacturers to prevent users from modifying transmit settings (primarily to prevent interference with weather systems - which 5G is also going to mess with). While the router manufacturers themselves might not provide features to modify the parameters, allowing third-party open source firmware opens them upto liability, because third-party firmware -- almost all of which are open source, can provide users with features that allow changing the transmit parameters. This is because the radio operation is controlled by the OS (most of these have linux on them), and the parameters are to be included in the same firmware blob as the OS.
FCC is not the problem here either. FCC saw the quick-fix that some manufacturers took, like TP-Link, which is to block any third-party firmware. So they required TP-Link to reverse their decision to prevent installation of third-party firmware. Then what's the solution?
The best way to prevent allowing consumers to change the transmit settings, while allowing open source firmware meant for the rest of the board (where all of the security issues arise), will require having different flash chips - one for most of the firmware, and a separate on for the storage radio parameters. This route is what Linksys is taking.
Personally, I doubt this is a good enough solution. Board designs today use a single SoC that does everything. So I'm not sure how they think storing the transmit settings on a different flash chip will prevent the firmware from using different parameters. Any design that is more complex than the two flash chip solution will require a lot of reworking of designs, because most board designs basically consist of a few components: the SoC, the flash and RAM. Nothing else.
Apart from the re-working of existing designs, there's another problem. The problem is the BOM constraints router makers face, since they are always in a race to the bottom price-wise. Adding additional chips, introduces cost and complexity, which they don't want to go through.
The enforcement comes down to this: If you transmit in an obnoxious way and you annoy someone, you get squashed. If you kill someone, you get squashed harder. That doesn't bring the dead back to life, but sending someone to prison for killing someone else with an axe doesn't bring the dead back to life, either.
Example: https://hackaday.com/2019/09/05/esp8266-and-esp32-wifi-hacke... what if Espressif dropped support for these a while ago? You couldn't securely use these in some scenarios without reverse-engineering the binary blobs and patching the flaws. And I can't imagine how many of IoT devices out there use that chip or a derivative.
Zero, as long as the person:
(1) Knew it was loaded
(2) Voluntarily accepted to receive the gun.
In this analogy the gun going off broke a law. So you voluntarily handed somebody a loaded gun - who then committed a crime with that gun.
Obviously context matter - but you can bet the police will be asking why you gave that gun to them.
Clearly not, the person that knowingly modified it to do something illegal is at fault. Preventing anyone from modifying anything is a backwards response to the real problem: the guy that wants to do the illegal thing.
[0] https://semiengineering.com/a-crisis-in-dods-trusted-foundry...