I have a hard time believing many aren't abusing this, just out of human nature ("did she mention me to any of her friends?").
I have a hard time believing many aren't abusing this, just out of human nature ("did she mention me to any of her friends?").
Given they have 2000+ employees this is just a process that is looking to be constantly abused. I surely don't expect people aren't talking about it, but I'm nearly as confident that it is happening in a way that most people aren't aware of. No evidence, but again, I've seen people do worse, with less access.
I'm gathering that this will never change.
Otherwise we might get to know each other, and become friends, and I'd never be sure that they weren't looking me up. My strategy for avoiding the prying eyes of facebook engineers is to be personally uninteresting to any facebook engineers.
This might not work so well if I were a chick.
On Reddit, someone mentioned that 'becoming someone', which I presume means making the software think you've logged in as that person, is unusual and must be justified and closely tracked when it happens. So I'm guessing that you can't just pull up records for some person from the database; you need to 'be' that person to get their data. The free access is probably just for stuff that is shared via the privacy controls.
What the hell? why not?
No, we don't. We have test instances of everything. There are a privileged few who have access to sensitive production data, and their access is carefully monitored.
How do you transfer the data? rsync through external network is too slow.
The most convenient way would be to mount physical drive on one of database server and copy things directly. But that would require cage access, which I assume not many employees have.
It would have to be code rarely seen by others, e.g. Apache's mod_rewrite.
"Thousands of random users' data has been downloaded from Facebook and published on Wikileaks" would be enough for a good media scare story.
I think he'll be losing some of his libertarian fans if he publishes information of people who simply want to be more free.
I understand that in some cases redacting names weakens the impact of the leak and its political statement. However, releasing the name of some random informant working on the ground in Iraq has no substantial effect on the impact of the whole leak, but can have an enormous effect on that person's life, especially if he's killed.
* Read-only all the time. * Access through a special shell which logs your actions remotely. * Seemingly in keeping with the aggressive name & shame culture, if you join across all tables or forget a limit or something else which affects live operation, you get called out.
I'm fairly certain if you give me the schema, I can be very inconspicuous over a given amount of time.