WeWork Parent Weighs Slashing Its Valuation in Half
wsj.com
wsj.com
"Slashing its valuation in half" means reverting to X, the price around which WeWork last bought back shares. Even this reduced value is likely twice as high as it should be.
[1] https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/18/wework-ceo-adam-neumann-ha...
Damn, I know someone who got screwed over by the IPO lockup there.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wework-m-a-softbank/softb...
Automatic conversion clauses typically force convertible pref to convert to common in the event of an IPO. This makes liquidation preferences generally irrelevant to public offerings.
In the case of Square's IPO, Series E preferred had a provision giving them extra free common stock to make up the gap if it IPO'd below $18.55 (which it did).
Maybe a $2B round is tiny in the face of annual losses of $1.9B which was 2x the loss from the year before.
Who really knows anymore, maybe doubling your losses is just another metric VCs can spin as positive growth. After all the Unicorn IPO mantra seems to be, but we can stop our billion dollar losses whenever we want and then its all profits.
Softbank is a Japanese holding company.
Organizations making large investments in US companies and US markets are absolutely subject to US securities laws.
Softbank have been transparent from the start. When Uber did its split round, even on HN, a number of commenters were convinced the spread was legitimate. That the top-of-the-stack pref was actually worth 2x the next-in-line pref. The media fetishised the post-money valuation, and the details got lost in the conversation amongst uninformed investors.
It should be possible to figure out the formula for how much an investor needs to invest in a given round, given a previous investment into the company, such that the downside of investing at an increased valuation exceeds the upside of the existing shares being valued higher than before.
In other words: How much would SoftBank need to invest such that it wouldn’t benefit from bluffing on the valuation?
So are they better off supporting the IPO price by exposing themselves another $3b (20%), writing down the IPO by 50% which likely is at least $3b in losses, or delay?
And muddying their view, as I commented yesterday, is the fact that there is a huge debt contingency surrounding this IPO.
EG if WeWork does NOT raise at least $3billion in this IPO they will be in default of a contingency with lenders that will WITHHOLD a committed $6billion credit line. This huge credit facility is their growth engine forward (b).
(a) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wework-m-a-softbank/wewor....
(b) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-01/wework-se....
* Bear Sterns had healthy assets, Lehman Brothers did not. AIG had enough healthy insurance premiums to guarantee the loan to fix the unhealthy insurance products. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned the home mortgages assets.
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1) WeWork doesn't have a substantial enough real estate position to bring down the entire real estate system.
2) WeWork doesn't have any assets to guarantee a fed loan.
Far larger players like SoftBank, Blackstone or KKR would be all over scooping up the bones of WeWork. There's certainly no scenario where WeWork doesn't end up in the belly of a private equity company, or a large real-estate holding company. The next recession will destroy them. They'll be lucky if they survive even outside of a recessionary environment.
This analysis looks very different if you do it not in dollars but in sq ft, or in desks. IWG is much bigger than WeWork, but realistically valued.
So not likely IWG could absorb significant percentages of WeWork customers on short notice.
Giant rate hike.
This is a real mess.
What I mean is, they thought they were going to get away with it.
Nor their dumb dog![1]
[1] The parent reference is to the catch line in Scooby Doo, for those that aren't familiar. And quite well fitting to the situation. https://youtu.be/mbXxgQLlF08
https://thisweekinstartups.com/e969
One part that really resonated is when Calacanis is arguing that, once you become super rich, you need to rely on your authentic, pre-rich friends to give you candid advice (because after you become super rich, you can't really trust new friends when so many folks want a piece of your wealth). Calacanis' idea, which makes sense to me, is that Neumann didn't have a strong enough social base, so that he didn't have anyone candidly telling him stuff like "Umm, you know, this We trademark licensing deal is completely batshit insane and analysts will see this as a giant, bedazzled red flag" before he went ahead and did it.
Insightfully, Calacanis predicted Neumann would walk back the licensing deal, and actually talks about Masayoshi Son being one of the only people that can give Neumann the harsh dose of reality he needs.
I think this is all kind of a moot point, though. It's like WeWork jumped out of an airplane without a parachute and is now going "How do we fix this??" I'd put money down on some form of either (a) a restructuring or (b) essentially being taken over by the major lenders/investors as inevitable.
They're on the extreme end of "startup realizes public markets will call them on their shit" but you can see why they'd be confident they could pull it off.
Yes, and it caught up to them just a bit too soon for the IPO. Had the CEO been a little less brazen in his self-dealing, they might have pulled it off with more success.
With all the financial strangeness with WeWork and inside deals and etc I would think it doesn't look like a great investment anymore ... is SoftBank just "in too deep" and as far as they're concerned they have to double down?
If their end goal is having the profit margins of an electric company, then these valuations are pretty hard to justify...
PS: not too fond of WeWork myself, but that's how I could see it.
Basically: 1) if remote work continues to grow, they become an easy magnet because every company will pay for WeWork reimbursements more readily than some random local expenditure. 2) like AWS, they allow a big financial change: real estate moves from CapEx to OpEx, which is desirable for companies.
Edit: one tweet https://twitter.com/patio11/status/1161796809741627392
To be fair, most of the remote people I work with are relatively senior and that may make a difference. They probably care less about having the social aspect of an office and they probably tend to have more room at home for, e.g., a dedicated office.
There is also just the contingency aspect of it- I had a scheduled power outage in my building when I was working remotely, I could either take off that day, or just find a coworking or other space, but I chose to try a coworking space. Power outages may not be common, but there were also days when I had family in town and such, and just didn't want the distraction.
I went a few times when it was novel, but after that I really only use it less than 1 in 5 of my work from home days. And on some of those WFH days, I'll walk to the coffee shop accross from the wework to get an espresso and then go back and work at my house.
Point being, I don't find wework to be a compelling remote work offering when it's free. So it seems unlikely to me that there's very much room to grow in that market.
But why would they? Even wealthy companies now insist that most business travel is done in economy class. Big airlines can’t sell business-class seats just by making expense claims easy to file. So why does WeWork think it can sell flashy office space?
One of the points of uncertainty though is whether they can keep up the flashiness, ie, they might be selling business seats at economy prices.
At no time in those examples did I have to exchange funds, pass my corporate card, etc.
Speaking as a home remote worker (Salesforce/Heroku not IBM or WeWork) that likes to visit offices sometimes and travels quite a bit, having the option of on-demand access to working spaces with other humans, and a facility-access processes I can rely on, and a facility I can mostly assume will work would be a pretty great upgrade to my work experience.
Expense reports suck. It’s not just the process burden, but making that the norm rather than an exceptional process means that today’s automated-scanning systems will probably put more false-positive-powered issues onto your already full plate.
Removing the process makes it a tool that more people will use. That’s the value prop I see.
Office space seems a bit more eclectic.
As a side note: The airline analogy isn't correct. Business and Premium Economy products are doing quite well with growth of those two offerings having been quite robust over the last 20 years. I'd say belt tightening did happen, but with respect to first class fares. Easy fix...just rebrand your old first as business!
BA’s first class is on a par with Emirates business class, actually...
The problem is that wework is just some combination of shady and awful at business, and there's no reason to think they'll get any better with scale.
Their offices are also more professional, because they're designed for people to do actual work and not just be look like they're working.
[1]: Which leads to insane decisions like restaurants that make "Bloody Marys" with beer...
>> Didn't wework have to switch to kombucha after someone realized that a place where you pay money to hang out all day and drink is in fact a bar and you need a liquor license?
A "liquor" license and a "beer and wine" license are 2 different things. A beer and wine license is a few hundred bucks (depending on your location), and just requires some paperwork. A liquor license can be over $100k depending on your location.
Meanwhile, Regis has quiet facilities, with dedicated offices, cubicles, and conference rooms. It may not be sexy, but it's not trying to be.
For Regus, the opposite is true--most of their spaces are cubicles/offices with only a handful of locations offering "open-office" style spaces.
I don't know what WeWork you're seeing, but the startup employee experience in WeWorks is generally better, from a professionalism and productivity perspective, than typical startup offices --- if only because they've found a way to scale up cost-effective small private offices.
We ultimately moved to a fairly large private office in Chicago (Chicago commercial space is cheap), and I like it more than I like WeWork, and I don't like WeWork the company at all. But the notion that WeWork isn't providing professional office space is just false; the space they provide is, by a wide margin, more professional than tech industry norms provide.
Unless WeWork outside of NY and Chicago is starkly different than WeWork everywhere else, I don't see how this is even a viable argument. I'm eager to see the counterexample you'll provide.
† (I'm not talking about the WeWork conference rooms, which are excellent and highly professional, so much so that people I knew in Chicago would borrow our WeWork conference credits to hold client meetings in even though they had their own non-WW offices)
What is being missed though: WeWork have actually built out a fairly comparable level of capacity to Regus. The difference is that WeWork are heavily concentrated in major cities, whereas Regus is diversified (they have locations in Mongolia and Nepal, I believe).
The reason why is simple: Regus made the mistake of overbuilding in major cities last time round. The US business went into BK, they aren't making that mistake again. In fact, even taking this very capital investment strategy, you can see that they still have substantial swings in their business.
WeWork have built out massive capacity which cannot be filled (in London, they actually have a meaningful market share of new office space). They did this because you can show great short-term results. BK is inevitable.
I would go as far to say: anyone who believes this isn't bullshit has identified themselves as an idiot too (at least, in terms of investment knowledge). This isn't remotely difficult.
Not really surprising. Some uses--like a conference room for a big customer meeting--are pretty much business necessities. But things like an office for remote employees who mostly just prefer to get out of the house but not work out of free space somewhere are the sort of discretionary expense that companies will chop pretty quickly if they're tightening their belts.
I’m skeptical that’s a moat that will defend WeWork but it’s certainly a handy feature.
https://www.iasplus.com/en/publications/global/thinking-allo...
I was curious and looked them up a while back, it was EXPENSIVE compared to other options.
I'm not at all sure how many companies filter "We'll pay for an office for you to work at WeWork... but not elsewhere." In fact most remote work that I've seen isn't interested in paying for any local office space... they want to save on that, not spend more / manage it.
That type of premium felt irresponsible as compared to the possibility of increasing FTEs.
My own gut is they can price at a 1.25x-1.75x vs. market.
This implies that yes, they have to double down.
The only issue is that SoftBank appears to be unaware they need an angle. They are unaware that geometry exists. They are unaware that maths exists. They just seem totally unaware.
In my experience, it is often a complete waste of time to look at someone doing something stupid and think: "They probably know what they are doing".
In 95% of cases, near 100% in financial markets, that person is just an idiot.
Son's record as a VC is horrible. He raised something like 6 VC funds before 2001. None produced anything but busts. And he actually invested more capital on the way down.
His only quality is zealotry. This the absolute worst possible trait for an investor (he isn't an investor, he is a salesman).
SoftBank accounts for half the outstanding Japanese corporate bonds. https://www.ft.com/content/24c4a8a8-7885-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0...
I think it's premature to predict collapse yet, but it does point toward that possibility of a house of cards falling. It would also help explain why its CEO is so eager to publicly & brazenly self-deal to extract as much value into his own pockets as he can before the collapse. Which ironically, playing into the concerns about corporate governance, could be the tipping point that causes or hastens collapse.
WeWork highlights why I am still skeptical of pure index investing. This company seems rotten, and I would not deliberately buy their stock. But there's a big pool of index fund money that will be thrown at this company's stock no matter how poor their governance is or how much self-dealing they do... just because it's public.
You probably saw that yesterday but yes I am beginning to feel the same.
Question is, where to put money? Factor funds?
[1] - https://www.wsj.com/articles/wave-of-index-money-is-about-to...
And I've been telling my economist spouse for over a year that passive investing boom is going to distort things (and they roll my eyes at me, b/c they hate it when I dabble in armchair economics).
That said, I believe much of tech is crazy over valued, but I think we are in a new paradigm since SO MUCH capital has flowed in private markets (NY Times article about "More Money Than We Ever Imagined" really shows this well). But I am far far from being proven right on that.
What the comment says: "But there's a big pool of index fund money that will be thrown at this company's stock no matter how poor their governance is or how much self-dealing they do... just because it's public."
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SNAP/holders/
AFAIK, most "target date" retirement funds use total market passive investing. Maybe instead of "index investing", I should have said "passive investing".
Vanguard must own a significant share in so many companies right now. I'm starting to believe the narrative that the next crisis is passive investing.
Someone with index funds has no choice: has to dump the good and the bad.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disposition_effect
Regardless, my point is smart stock pickers will come in and bid up companies that get oversold. No damage done unless you tried to time the market in your IRA and sold at the bottom. People who continue automatic purchases of broad indexes will be happy (at some point!) for the discount.
But they can be rebalancing instead of going to cash as well; Such as moving from SPY (S&P 500) to SPYD (S&P 500 dividend stocks)
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/01/snapchat-excluded-from-sp-50...
Index funds pick every success story. Every one without fail.
I have been favoring funds over ETFs the last few years because they have a bit more leeway in what they choose to hold and the friction in getting in/out of them should lead to less chance of pricing dislocation that could cause a lot of unnecessary drama and price volatility.
In the end though, I tend to believe that passive investing may continue to grow until it gets to the point that there is so much "dumb" money out there chasing the same companies that active investing can show real returns above passive.
Apparently, no.
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[a] I'm not sure it can be called a "business." Judging by the financial details in the S-1, if the We Co. doesn't raise gobs of capital soon, via the IPO or otherwise, it will quickly run out of cash: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1533523/000119312519...
If I lied to a bank that I had assets worth $x as collateral for a loan and it was later revealed to be a lie, I would be headed to the slammer in no time. These guys had every intention of dumping this garbage onto the public markets for the rest of us to be left holding the bag.
They certainly didn't win in their Uber investment.
...And the CEO is going to walk away with $700m cash.
With regard to Neumann walking away with $700m, I've got to say if you are going to make a bunch of money off schmuck investors, it would be hard to find a list of investors I have less sympathy for than the Vision fund investors.
Granted it is hard to measure investor interest but I'm not sure it was viable to just go along with the IPO, meeting leak or not.
Disclaimer: I don't have any inside or expert knowledge about Saudi Arabia or Softbank. But they seem to have been stuffing billions of dollars into companies that can pretend to be "tech", but aren't really.
Why not give the money back?
"Yeah but look at Amazon, they had x unprofitable years"
"We're still in the growth phase, our business model relies on scale and market share."
It's succeeded for others in the past, but this is very clearly a high-risk field, with the inherent downsides that involved in it.
https://www.venturecompany.com/blog/2009/08/the-silicon-vall... ^ Voiced the same concerns as the famous Kaufmann Foundation report, but earlier.
At best venture capital seems to be a sexier, private way to fund R&D, which is often so unprofitable it requires public funding. I think there is social benefit, most obviously when venture-backed startups offer a useful service below cost to the public, but financially there are better investments.
>> Over the past year, SoftBank committed to invest $4 billion in We at a valuation of around $47 billion. It also spent $1 billion to buy existing shares from We employees and investors at a valuation of around $23 billion.
It makes it seems like SoftBank believed the company is worth owning at a value of $47B. I don't know for sure, but I strongly suspect that they have a liquidation preference for their investment so that they get all their money back even if the company is much less valuable than $47B. That is unlike common share investors who may think they are getting the same thing at the same price. When they actually bought shares from employees they only paid half as much.
Yes, "we"; that is exactly what I mean, and We, therefore, shall be the title of my records.'
'We', by Yevgeny Zamyatin - https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/We_2.pdf
A _lot_ of Softbanks’ money comes from Saudi Arabia and Iran, etc
Then again, what sort of investment would one suggest for a hated enemy? Maybe Softbank?
The board of directors at WeWork is crazy dysfunctional as well... Im guessing no one has a questioner tendency, they all just went along with whatever BS they were told by the management team and nodded in order to maintain group cohesion and avoid being labeled as "difficult".
My favorite: At $47 billion, We would be more valuable than all the cash raised by every IPO in 2018.
Relevant: https://stratechery.com/2019/what-is-a-tech-company/
Well except the employees