This is due to his "bigger and bigger crowds, same exits" analogy: individuals easily move through doors at will; but if a crowd rushes out through the same door, injuries happen.
His premise is that many stocks that index funds invest in have low liquidity (small door): half of stocks in SP500 trades less than $150M a day. This is tiny (he quotes total market cap of indices of $150 trillion). What happens if there is a small, but synchronized outflow for any reason? If customers ask for 1% of index funds to be sold, index funds have to sell 1% of their holdings in the exact ratios defined by the index, including stocks with low trading volumes. Which is a problem, as there may be no one to sell them to, so prices of those stocks may crash and create a big panic causing additional sales of index funds bringing down bigger chunks of the market.
That is the gist of it I think.
I share your understanding of the article, it’s not about “index bad active good”, it’s about, “is there a problem when a lot of investors have to move quickly”. I wonder if there is some analysis of this during the last crash.
Flash crash gets resolved quickly and is transparent to non-participants because there is a lot of money willing to buy on dips. But fast trading money only buys and sells what they perceive to be highly liquid assets -- there are few things that scare them more than being stuck with an open trade.
The scenario Burry describes is akin to CDO crash. Naively, most CDO assets were not problematic and many/most of the problem ones had an underlying asset of some value guaranteeing the debt. What caused the crash was lack of liquidity that started a vicious circle.
Index fund scenario could be similar: less liquid stocks that are big components of major indices would crash with unknown systematic consequences. Even if only 10% of passive index investors heads for the exits we could see broad, long term damage. And they could: pension funds have been investing huge sums into indices and a targeted PR / a few headlines of the type "look what those financiers doing with worker's money" may nudge a lot of money out of stocks.
On the other side, it is easy to make conspiracy theories on any subject.
And of course, that company can, subject only to it's own chosen limitations, "print" SPY shares and sell them. So there's never any shortage of those.
When people transact in SPY, the trades are satisfied from those buckets. The cash bucket for investors selling SPY, the reserve shares bucket for investors buying. Those buckets are then refilled by the firm behind SPY buying and selling shares so that their share reserve and cash reserve remain at useful levels.
But let's now say there's heavy selling, for whatever reason. Sells really exceed buys and ... the cash bucket runs dry. Well, now sales stop, potentially indefinitely. The company will try to refill that bucket quickly, but there's absolutely no guarantee they will succeed, and there's no timeframe. Because the price for redemptions is only determined when they refill the bucket, you have no control over when this price is determined. It could be days after your order went through. Most index funds also technically have the right to just suspend redemptions entirely, indefinitely. Because of the amount of money in index funds, this will exhaust liquidity on actual shares relatively quickly and the whole market will freeze (because: no buyers)
Burry's claim is that if this ever happens, and investors find themselves stuck in index funds with no way out, there is nothing that will resolve that situation. Buyers won't want in, because once in, no way out. Sellers will panic and REALLY want out. This situation will self-reinforce until the market is driven into the ground.
0. some random situation causes that sellers exceed buyers for an index fund enough to initially exhaust the liquidity buffer of that fund
1. liquidity buffer in an index fund is empty
2. because of this transactions in the index fund stop
3. this causes panic, meaning less buyers, more sellers
4. goto 1, with situation getting worse every iteration
It won't be a "flash" crash, you'll just be locked in your index funds until the crash is complete.
It's hard to argue that this situation is impossible, that it cannot develop. It also seems to me that his conclusion that if this ever happens, it'll self-reinforce is correct. That said, we are pretty far from this happening.
Or, for that matter, a bank run?
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/24/when-do-circuit-breakers-kic...
Even if one of the underlying stocks becomes illiquid, a big enough price divergence on all of the other liquid stocks would make it profitable to eat the loss or hold the illiquid ones (risky, but remember, there are many authorized participants competing with each other so if there is some way to make an easy arbitrage profit, they will find a way). You'd basically need the entire market to become illiquid.
[0]: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/authorizedparticipant.a...
That's pretty interesting.
In 2019, the average daily trading volume of Berkshire Hathaway (class A) was 0.04% of the total shares outstanding. If all people that held this stock were forced to sell 1% of the total shares outstanding, look out!
On the other hand, Roku has averaged 15.6% this year, with a standard deviation of 10. 1% of total shares isn't even going to be noticed.
The SP500 has a long tail 150M on a 20B dollar company, which is the median, is 0.75% per day that’s quite a bit of motion normally but you expect volatility to go up on a major sell off.
Anyway, if 1% of all money is removed from index funds on the same day whatever caused that is also going to cause the market is going to crash and crash hard. It would take something like an outbreak of Ebola in NYC to get that kind of a reaction.
Or maybe he's counting on their low volume? :-)
In the example you give, this should result in Berkshire Hathaway Class A to have a very small weight in an index fund weighted this way.
Looking at the holdings of VOO, as of July 31, 2019, It holds 806 shares of Berkshire Hathaway (Class A) (worth ~$249 million), but about 37 million shares of Class B, worth ~$7.6 billion.
https://investor.vanguard.com/etf/profile/portfolio/VOO/port...
But, granting that Burry is right and you're interpreting him correctly, what is the average person with a couple bucks to invest supposed to do instead of passive investments?
Surely we can't recommend actively managed funds, funds that don't even earn back their fees. And, if not passive investing, and not actively managed funds, then…what, exactly?
No strategy/advice last forever
There is no such thing as passive investing per se.
So instead of recommending fund, it's better to recommend them to learn of the fundamentals of investing instead.
Every study has shown that people do not get rewarded appropriately for the risk they take on when they move away from diversification.
As to institutionalizing this stability, it would be nice if index funds offered fund choices that prohibited selling or trading for one, two, three decades. Since you as the investor would be adding information to the market ("I'm not an index fund band-wagoner, I understand buy-and-hold and I will practice what I preach") you would be rewarded with better returns in exchange for signaling your intentions and acting as a cushion when everyone else is panicking.
In 2008, the crash happened because suddenly Wyle E. Coyote realized there was gravity when he ran off the cliff. Mortgages were actually defaulting on a very high rate, but people put blindfolds on and didn't want to see. It wasn't just a "psychological overreaction" but real fear and panic as those same investors were trying to squeeze through the same exit door as everyone else.
There is still some reasonable fear in 2019 that large financial institutions will choose to make money at the expense of the economy.
Panic is quite literally a psychological overreaction.
Unfortunately it's not clear how to tell which fund managers would actually be able to succeed at this.
Day 1: (before crash) price : 200$ S&P 500 weight : 2%
Day 2 :next day market crashes. Acme is very low volume so price crashes to 1$ .
what happens next ? do all the EFT that follow S&P have to sell all ACME for 1$ because it is not in the S&P 500 anymore.
Day 5 : ACME jump back to 200 $ and is back in the S&P 500.
So my question is what would have happen to a passive investor. if he bought 1000$ worth of ETF right before the crash. Will he still have a 1000$ dollars at the end of it .
Please show me a one day 99% drop on a stock. Trading would be halted well before that to prevent manipulation or errors.
LULD is the one that applies to single stocks. It only results in a five minute halt, as I said.
The market-wide circuit breaker can halt the entire market for a full day, but only in response to a 20% move in S&P500, not a single stock.
More info on the 10% trading halt rule: https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=TradeHalts
His point is that the index funds don't own the stocks at all; they trade derivatives like futures and CDO's that mimic the movement of the stocks in leveraged fashion, and the more people who dump their money into index funds without doing their own research, the more leveraged the funds become.
He's warning that in the next serious downturn, over-leverage may cause cascading collapse of index funds and the economy with them, like it did in the mortgage finance crisis.
What? Where did you see that? Not only do the index ETF issuers own the stock but I believe they are legally obligated to do so.
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239710/ishares-russell-2...
This is misleading, I think. Depends on the fund. Some seek to match the benchmark through a certain exposure to derivatives and synthetic things. Others hold the stocks in proportion.
The vanguard funds I'm invested in don't have much synthetics - they own the stocks
SP500 is a market cap weighted index. That would alleviate some of this hypothetical problem, no?
Index funds generally aren't super rigidly defined in terms of 1% Company A to 1 % Company B to 3% Company C, etc. which grants them leeway to precisely not have to sell off their assets in precise ratios to maintain a certain portfolio composition.
Index funds do not seek to perfectly replicate whatever sector/market they're seeking to index, but rather they are trying to approximately track the overall change. You can ignore portions of the market while still tracking it to a very close degree (i.e. sampling a distribution).
Indexes typically don't have a fixed set of underlying securities. CDOs do. Your index fund typically won't tank because one of it's holdings become unprofitable, the fund will adjust reducing shares of said fund and thus reducing risk.
That doesn't happen with a CDO. If you're AAA mortgage holder starts having financial troubles, you can't readjust the CDO to reduce exposure.
Take an S&P 500 index as an example. If company 500 starts having a crappy quarter and falls out, what happens to your index? You dump the old 500 for the new one.
This isn't too say they aren't without risk. Just that it is a completely different financial vehicle than a CDO. So different that trying to make comparisons isn't really prudent.
I'd like to point out that while this may be the case for traditional mutual funds, it is not for ETFs. ETFs don't redeem shares for cash they redeem them for equities in the underlying index. So ETFs don't actually buy or sell any securities unless they rebalance.
A) the standard lock-up period of a fund, or
B) an ETF under strong selling pressure can be halted by the exchange. Some contracts presumably allow an ETF manager to halt sales if high outflows and low liquidity? Certainly can occur with funds.
In both cases the actual buyer is an intermediary, who is managing many people's money. Those people don't even know or care what is being invested in. If for some reason many of them decide to disinvest around the same time (say a recession) they may be hurting themselves due to the asymmetrical nature of the action.
At that point, an active investor can say that any losses by holding the stock an additional month would be eclipsed by selling immediately. A passive investment does not have that ability.
I'm thinking specifically of attempts to artificially inflate crypto coin valuations for members, then quickly sell off before anyone catches on. Should be, I would think, impossible to do that across a large area of the market, but if everyone is investing in index funds, it might be, I would guess.
Nonetheless, for my situation, index funds are the best rational solution. That or hiding all my money under my mattress.
Except that there’s a lot of money to be made by figuring out which cookies are winners, and buying them cheaply to sell to the passive investors.
All the passive investors want is for their cookies (and new-cookie acquisitions) to be properly priced. No matter what, they have an average distribution of cookie-quality in their holdings.
The passive investors are not buying cookies at any price other than the market price. Whatever the clever-cookie-buyer is paying for cookies, they're paying the same. If a clever-cookie-buyer buys low, takes out an ad in Cookie Magazine, and sells high to a bunch of tasty-cookie aficionados, the passive investors win, too. If a too-clever-cookie buyer buys low and discovers that the apparently-tasty cookies have spoiled, the passive investors lose a little, too.
It is hard to bilk a passive investor. The first people to really figure out how will accumulate a lot of money (and ire).
> All the passive investors want is for their cookies (and new-cookie acquisitions) to be properly priced.
No, they want the cookies they purchase to be under-priced, and consumed once their price has gone up. The cookie analogy fails here, but passive investors are exclusively seeking return, not an efficient market.
> No matter what, they have an average distribution of cookie-quality in their holdings.
That's not how passive investing works. The classic model is investment in an index -- say the FTSE 100 -- which attempts instead to maximize the quality of holdings, not the most accurately priced.
> It is hard to bilk a passive investor
Yes, but that doesn't mean it's hard to make money off one.
It just won't happen, because there's a negative feedback loop against it, leading to a kind of homeostasis.
> At some point, no one is left to figure out which cookies are tasty vs meh, so the price of all cookies converge to a single price.
Five minutes later someone says: "Holy shit, I can make a ton of money by buying loads of cookies, sorting them, and re-selling them -- except with the definitely-tasty ones at a higher price."
Jack Bogle's view was that if the market is 50%+ passive indexed that would be bad news.
Some folks argue that the number is even more extreme, that passive indexing generally increases efficiency, and that as long as there are even a handful of active investors, the market will still be efficient: http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2016/05/passive/
The same author had another thought-provoking argument that the popularity of indexing has probably driven up stock valuations: http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2017/04/diversificatio...
According to this source, it already is [0]. HN discussion at the time [1].
[0]: https://qz.com/1623418/index-funds-now-account-for-half-the-...
The evidence shows that most of us suck at investing. Further, I think Burry's critique is more limited:
> One reason he likes small-cap value stocks: they tend to be under-represented in passive funds.
IMHO, the problem he's stating is that people are focusing on large-cap companies. Basically the S&P500. And the S&P500 index funds probably do hold most of the passively invested money. But to solve this (small- vs large-cap focus), the solution is not to throw away passive investing, but to change the focus.
For example, instead of buying Vanguard's S&P500 fund (VOO), to buy their Total Market fund (VTI) which uses the CRSP U.S. Total Market Index:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Research_in_Securit...
Or perhaps a fund that uses the the Russell 3000 or Wilshire 5000.
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell_3000_Index
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilshire_5000
It's just that the S&P (and DOW) have more name recognition.
But generally speaking, these decisions are micro-optimizations. Just put away a little every month and re-invest and dividends, and over the long-term you'll do well.
By this reasoning indexes focussing on small caps would be even worse than the more popular funds.
Bottom line - they look low risk until they’re absolutely not low risk because of these properties.
As an average investor I’d say diversify is still a good strategy. Don’t just do US Market index funds. Global stocks, bonds, and other small-cap stock collections might help hedge risk of large-caps going bust. Most passive-style funds also have these options. Not an active investor. Just a dude playing a dude disguised as another dude. This is not investment advice.
But when all the financial gurus are recommending investing in traditional securities (stocks and bonds), and millions of people wishing to get a leg up in life obey their advice, doesn't that turn the securities market in general into an "overhyped bubble"?
The market behavior and health of any investment, no matter how theoretically sound it is, will be strongly affected by investors' behavior around it. So the fact that index funds are popular (and thus perhaps inflated/overpriced) isn't a knock on the fundamental idea. It's merely an indication of a particular market situation at present.
Are there other factors like in the housing market of a decade+ ago? Is there a lot of risk for Joe Six-Pack? Are there people out there borrowing money from banks with poor underwriting practices getting into index funds when they should not be doing so?
I'd think if this is most peoples' 401k and surplus income at risk that there may be a huge market correction but it won't devastate the economy. If people take the long term view and if investors sit tight and wait for the cycle to move into recovery again they'll be OK. If however they need to live off returns on their investments in the present (like homeowners needed a place to live during the crash) then they're in trouble.
Most "age-based" or "target-date" Active Funds that 401k providers sell are built precisely around managing this gradual multi-decade progression from mixtures high in stocks to those higher in bonds.
(You probably don't want to divest from the account before you retire because you'll pay heavy taxes on it. You simply want to manage the asset mix inside it. You generally want to avoid divesting as much as possible [and want to try to keep it as slow as possible] after you retire simply because passive income is more sustainable than asset liquidation in the long term.)
The reality though is that 401ks are individual accounts for better and (mostly, much) worse. Even when people follow the best advice, they rarely hit the right passive income numbers for a living wage. 401ks also wind up with more people gambling with such savings without thinking about the long term. Then there's simply the fact in the horribly messy transition between group pensions and individual 401ks that there are a lot of "short timer" 401k accounts out there among "Baby Boomers" and "GenX", that people will just cash out when the right retirement age happens to avoid tax penalties, or when the need is greatest (or anything in between), because there's no chance they'll ever make enough passive income and the account itself at that points for most purposes is merely a tax shelf.
Reality is full of a lot a 401k accounts that are managed only so well as the account owner and maybe the interests of the bank involved in holding the account. Which is also why the world is full of a lot of bad 401k advice and advice managers, because we've distributed that cognitive load across almost the entire populace. (As opposed to classic group pensions that could afford full time managers with CPA degrees.)
A lot of the possible "mismanagement" advice lately is a Boomers in particular were sent a lot of advertising / clickbait / thoughtpieces on how much Index ETFs are generally better than Active Funds for the simple reason of Fees. An Active Fund, especially one such as the age-based or target-date funds, charges higher fees than a passive fund like an Index ETF. In the same magic that creates passive income, compound interest, whatever you save on fees multiplies greatly over time. Unfortunately for the Boomers, while this is potentially great early career advice [1] when the age-based/target-date active funds are most active (higher stock mixes), passive funds are still a higher risk late career than the usual bonds and similar securities such funds push to late career.
(Which returns to the topic of the article at hand, this is why Burry, as at least one investor, is worried about this over-sale of Index ETFs. Index funds in the last few years have generally done better than both traditional securities [not really a surprise] and active funds [possibly a surprise; Burry describes it as an unstable bubble, but may be hyperbolic], so there's been a lot of short term investors in that game. There probably are enough Boomer 401ks alone that are in "short time" mode ticking time bombs full of Index ETFs that should they all start coming due and trying to liquidate/divest, we might see if passive Index ETFs can handle the trade volume the hard way, which is what Burry is worried about.)
[1] Depending on your investment management time, of course. The majority of people with 401ks already have at least one full time job and likely don't have time to also become their own personal pension fund manager.
I don't get this at all. So why aren't active fund managers investing in the same stocks the index funds are buying in order to take advantage of the price increase for their investors? Isn't that their job? And what do you mean by "better liquidity?"
My analogy would be if we are all buying tickets to the big game and sit in the stands until it's over, there's no one to yell and shout and drive the energy of the crown or possibly no one to even compete on the field therefore why are we even showing up?
It's definitely the extreme - active trading isn't going away any time soon but fears of a only a limited group playing the market and managing or controlling stock prices for their gain isn't 100% unrealistic.
For the top 500 stocks there are enough people (and algos) going over every bit released by the corresponding companies.
And the active market is very sensitive. Especially if someone is so confident that they are willing to use drastically leveraged positions.
The consequence would be near total avoidance of the S&P 500 as a good strategy for the long run. There would be exceptions for those stocks that are quite undervalued, or so overvalued that they are worth shorting (despite the tailwind of index funds).
Don’t worry, strategies like these have predicted 12 out of the last 5 asset bubbles.
And if they're not overvalued, are index funds really a bubble?
Currently, I would argue that some large caps are clearly overvalued but others are also clearly undervalued, based on my own valuation model. The indexes are almost always a mixed bag but I buy individual large caps so that doesn't concern me much. It is rare for the entire market to become overvalued, in which case the smart move is not to buy in.
If you can come up with a clever valuation mechanism that can reliably outperform the well-understood mechanisms, then enjoy pocketing the profits!
That's not how that works... Sell-side analysts have a systematic bullish bias, that's what they are paid for.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-01-20/wall-s...
Not saying I agree but, if he's right it makes complete sense that passive would outperform active right now, just that in the next downturn it would dramatically underperform.
You want to help? Pull some, not all but some assets out of index funds and put them into individual companies you understand and believe have long term profitability. Sell those assets when you think they're overvalued by the market.
Trading less often is correlated with better performance (you are not an HFT)
There is some responsibility you have. Your money isn't going to just magically work for you, you have some obligation to research and understand what you are investing in. When nobody does it, the market is in trouble.
If anyone was able to do this, they'd be a successful money manager themselves. Yet few professionals actually manage to do this at all, let alone sufficiently to justify their fees, which is why index-fund investing is so popular in the first place.
The only real way to reduce the reliance on index funds is for professional investment services to become sufficiently competent that it makes sense to use their services. Asking the average person to "take one for the team" and throw their dart at the same dartboard the pros can't even hit isn't a great solution.
[EDIT: phrasing]
Gathering this kind of information may be too labor-intensive to justify doing it as a profession but rewarding enough for an interested amateur.
The problem with bubbles is that everyone’s a winner and every indicator is confirming the everlasting increase.. on the way up.
The CNBC article I linked claims that actively managed funds have been beaten by the S&P 500 for _nine straight years_. How long do the investors in actively managed funds have to wait for their big celebration?