We don't ask lawyers to do surgery. We don't ask them to design bridges. And we don't ask them to do root cause analysis. We leave all of those things to those who actually know what they're doing in those areas.
So ... I wish it worked like you described.
When we medicalise pregnancy and childbirth, then fill hospitals with profit driven policy, and surgeons who fear malpractice accusations, is it any wonder c-sections can become over used?
Fear of malpractice alone can’t explain it all, as it some other lawyer could demonstrate c-sections are over used and lead to complications.
No, but when they're in a court debating about e.g. doctor's negligence, we do expect them to have a rudimentary understanding of what's going on.
The great thing is, if you pay enough, you'll find an expert being willing to argue anything you want.
The expert more capable of conveying their message will be the one who gets the most credibility, and this often (though unfortunately not always) aligns with the expert telling the factual truth.
That's silly, but if I were playing that game, I'd say the single, simple cause was a failure of Boeing and the CIA to keep abreast of A320new development.
Boeing were caught flat-footed by the launch of he A320neo and, facing a loss of potentially thousands of sales, were forced to quickly develop and release a modified 737 rather than create a new plane altogether.
Corporate espionage would have prevented all this.
I believe Boeing knew exactly what was going on with Airbus. US does corporate espionage to favor domestic companies, and creating a new plane is such a big project that there's no way to miss that.
Pardon my ignorance but I thought the Chinese government was the one doing this sort of thing. Surely the US government does not engage in espionage on behalf of it's companies
Scientific facts aren't the same animal as legal facts. And I'll add not the same as political and engineering facts either. Root cause analysis facts are social and engineering facts.
In real life a incident may be the emergent behaviour enabled by complex circumstances and a certain culture, all culminating in one crystalized point of failure. Think of causal chains: Managment pressures engineers and fires experienced older engineers, engineers are clearly not up to task, do something. Qualitt control might catch it but is circumvented by other managers who fake documents. The thing is not up to speck but wouldn’t have failed if the pilots... etc.
This is what I mean by systemic emergent behaviour. All of these things were wrong or wreckless, but pinning it to one cause isn’t doing reality a favour here.
It is the job of regulators to figure out how to prevent future incidents, and it seems that the EASA will be taking the hardline lead on that as there seems to be a general mistrust of the FAA this side of the pond.