As such, mathematics doesn't have a solid foundation, and most contemporary mathematicians seem to be ok with that, as long as it works and they can get interesting results.
If this is indeed the case (as it seems to my unprofessional first glance to be) then mathematics does not in fact have a solid foundation, despite its appeal to ZFC.
I'd love to hear a professional logician weigh in on this, if there are any on here.
[1] - https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Costas_Drossos/post/Is_...
Godel's results also show that we cannot use ZFC to prove that ZFC is consistent. However, it is strongly suspected that ZFC is consistent.
In practice, very few of the results independent of ZFC affect day to day mathematical work unless you're a logician or set theorist (which honestly start to blend into each other).
This is why logicians will sometimes talk your ear off about how category theory is so much better as a foundational theory than set theory.
Again though, for the working mathematician, these flaws in ZFC as a foundation rarely matter.
The usual response is that it would be nice if the formal foundations of mathematics corresponded more closely to the informal intuitions of mathematicians, which is arguably not true of set theoretic foundations and perhaps is more true of category theory. Whether or not you agree about the correspondence or whether even if you agree you find it at all convincing is up to you.
The logical foundations of mathematics have always had a much smaller impact on the day to day lives of mathematicians than their foundational nature might suggest.
Nonetheless, it's perhaps surprising for a beginning student of pure mathematics when all they can see is the sky-high demand for rigor that "professional" pure mathematics is seemingly content to hand-wave its foundations. (For the most part this hand-waving is the postrigorous stage described by Terence Tao https://terrytao.wordpress.com/career-advice/theres-more-to-... rather than the pre-rigorous hand-waving of the student).
I'm not an engineer, but I imagine that even most professional electrical/electronic engineers do not understand transistor physics in full details. In engineering, a transistor is essentially treated as a blackbox, and its behavior is described and approximated by various small-signal and large-signal models (i.e. treated as a lumped component), with their parameters characterized empirically by vendors through experiments. How exactly things work at atomic or quantum level is essentially for a transistor to work, yet, a subject of study unrelated to electrical engineering.
On the other hand, I imagine there is no shortage of EEs who have studied a physics major, or EEs with a background of semiconductor physics - they can understand transistor physics really well.
So we can say the relation between EE and transistor physics sounds a lot similar to mathematicians and logicians, it's a good analogy.
As somebody once said, if we ever found a contradiction in the ZFC axioms, we wouldn't throw out math, we'd just throw out ZFC.
Web apps don't depend on transistor physics at all, though. An important consequence of Turing universality is that computer science is not a subfield of electrical engineering.
Also, mathematics underwent very dramatic transformations during the late 1800s and early 1900s alongside the early development of formal logic and set theory. To say that logicians were merely "formalizing the intuitions behind the math that people were already doing" strikes me as misguided at best. The mathematics that rose to prominence in that era was very different from what preceded it, often controversially so.
It's like saying: if we ever found a contradiction in the base case of a mathematical induction, we wouldn't throw out mathematical induction, we'd just throw out the base case. The indudction step remains sound.