It is odd to consider Nature doing things "for a reason", per se. But there are expressible reasons why such things persist and proliferate.
For example §6.1.3 "Function and Teleology"
If you think it is something that should be accepted without demonstration, then please describe a framework of thought where this is acceptable and which still remains useful. I literally can't think of any.
Unless there's hard evidence to lift it above story-telling, it's just as unlikely to be true as any other comforting story.
The scientific basis for that is something called "narrative pseudo-logic". Brains seem to be something of a story machine. Unfortunately the bar for story plausibility is shockingly low, which is why humans believe all kinds of strange and wildly contradictory things about where the universe came from and what it's for.
The point of empiricism is to break out of narrative pseudo-logic and find stories that are reliably and consistently true when tested - not just stories that sound like they should be true because we want them to be, or we like them, or we're not imaginative enough to consider that they might simply be wrong.
That's not surprising. There is a long and colorful history of conflict between scientists and a panoply of false narratives. This is ongoing and requires an active defense. If you wish to survive that gauntlet you'll need something pretty compelling; an abstraction camouflaged by obscure terms won't suffice.
Just a thought. My first sentence was a question because I’m not sure if my distinction boils down to semantics.
EDIT: if I had to elaborate, I would say that we can readily ascribe functions or reasons for things, but saying 'the reason for x is y' strikes me as treating the case as closed, whereas 'y is the function of x' brings up a whole raft of other questions, opening new territory for inquiry.
Another way to say it is that Nature does not confine itself to reasons. It just does things, and some of them stick. We can find an unlimited number of reasons that contribute to why they stick.
I would tie it in with what Martin Buber called "I and Thou"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_and_Thou
> Buber's main proposition is that we may address existence in two ways:
> 1, The attitude of the "I" towards an "It", towards an object that is separate in itself, which we either use or experience.
> 2. The attitude of the "I" towards "Thou", in a relationship in which the other is not separated by discrete bounds.
> One of the major themes of the book is that human life finds its meaningfulness in relationships. In Buber's view, all of our relationships bring us ultimately into relationship with God, who is the Eternal Thou.
Also, "What Bodies Think About: Bioelectric Computation Outside the Nervous System" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18736698
In a nutshell, the things that neurons do to think happen between non-neural cells all the time.
Consider also the "wood wide web" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mycorrhizal_network
Not to put too fine a point on it, but these things think in just the same way that neurons think. Life is purposeful.
To me it seems clear the scientific attitude pushes us toward a kind of animism.
I'm too excited to put this well, sorry!
That said, given how much the total number of scientists/ engineers/curious people with resources has grown, it feels like, for any work happening in one corner of the world with a particular cognitive blind spot, you can find one in another corner without it.
As such, science should continue to deny that teleology has any place in science, except perhaps (when it produces claims of the second, complex type) as an inspiration for practitioners in generating hypotheses without actual teleological content.
Scientists can—and many do—still embrace teleological beliefs, though teleology is not necessary to avoid nihilism, as purpose can be found within as well as without.
(British comedy series, "Yes, Minister", usual staff response to an appointed gov't minister's barking-mad pronouncement.)
It was a very interesting piece, but what was really interesting was an organic chemistry or biochem class back in the mid 80s where the professor, possibly 90 years old at the time, said something to the effect that there's not a snowball's chance in hell any protein just came into being on its own. That really stuck with me.
What astonishes me is that they must have heard the counter-argument by now, yet they persist in thinking the 747 analogy is a mic drop moment.
In short: it would be a great comeback if evolutionary theory claimed that a modern protein/cell/animal just randomly assemble in one fortunate event. But it doesn't. In fact, the entire point of evolutionary theory explains why one fell swoop isn't necessary.