The first underlying driver of U.S. infrastructure costs is that the U.S. has felt so rich as a country that, for decades, we spent freely on infrastructure and never asked serious questions about the return on that investment
And then lists some of the things we spend freely on that aren't really necessary. The second reason is The second underlying driver of U.S. infrastructure costs is how deeply embedded infrastructure spending is within our model of economic growth.
both of those essentially boil down to we spend so much because the market is set up to encourage us to spend a lot. Probably not the answer you were looking for, but at the end of the day we spend so much money because we have set up the market to enable high prices.It fails rather obviously because (a) the article is comparing costs across countries, and other countries haven't found some magic system to increase accountability of politicians and beaurocrats that goes beyond not re-electing them.
And, (b), there are plenty of incentives for decision-makers to keep costs down. Don't you think the governor or Mayor of New York would crow endlessly if they managed to build subway <x> or tunnel <y> for a fraction of the usual costs? Have you noticed how California's high-speed rail project and its cost overruns have been terrible for three governors in a row?
Sure, so why doesn't this happen more often? The simplest explanation is that elected politician's influence is small compared to the collective bureaucracy's power to do what it was going to do anyway.
And yes, everyone who is handed a pile of third-party cash to spend on other people does not usually have very good incentives to make the most efficient choices, and doubly so when their personal agency is further restricted by a mass of regulation.
The citizens are the only ones who would have such incentives. They're paying for it & they're using it. They aren't supposed to be piggy banks to jiggle to pay for things, they should also be involved in what gets paid for and how. Expecting a bureaucracy to be efficient is like expecting a monopoly to be fair, so the citizenry needs to be more engaged.
The second reason seems flat out wrong especially when you compare e.g. the large scale infrastructure investments China is making to fuel its economic growth and compare that to the US where economic growth seems to be largely based on quantitative easing.
It seems to me that could mean a whole lot of different things, or maybe nothing at all. It's not really specific advice. IDK. Maybe the book has the details.
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/07/why-we-cant-figure-ou...
This is a pretty good article, along with his response to comments:
https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/02/17/highlights-from-the-co...
It's less good at explaining the vast outlier (larger outlier on cost than gdp) that is US construction costs.
This sort of thinking gets in the way of a lot of projects. I read at the time that Acela was proposed as a 180mph train, but the difficulty acquiring and building more right of way to smooth out turns, and the requirements for heavier parts to meet some safety regulations, meant that it could not approximate the speed of TGV. Instead, it goes 150 on some relatively straight sections and usually goes somewhat less. The special trainsets also cost more than European HSR trainsets.
Why do government software systems cost so much? Many of the same reasons, and as the article points out for infrastructure, the players have a desire to fund big projects and act like they're "done" instead of funding little improvements all the time.
* Higher intrinsic costs (i.e., labor costs, eminent domain costs, litigation costs)
* Outright corruption (this one in particular I'd disagree with for US costs, but I have heard people discuss it).
* Price gouging, either via corporate cost-plus contracts raking in money, or via union featherbedding, or some other way in which a lot of money within the contracts are for things that don't really serve any "legitimate" purpose.
* Political consideration forcing all projects to become "megaprojects" that are prone to sunk cost fallacies or scope creep and are not amenable to effective cost-control.
* Antigovernment trends shifting design and engineering work from public agencies, causing the agencies to be unable to effectively manage the construction of projects.