Sorry but it will take more than a blogpost for me to believe it.
When P0 recruits two prominent Chrome hackers (Ned Williamson & Samuel Gross) and make them work directly on iOS, it look like a hit team to me.
When P0 recruits two prominent Chrome hackers (Ned Williamson & Samuel Gross) and make them work directly on iOS, it look like a hit team to me.
Apple gets attention from them because a lot of people have apple hardware and software. That means problems there have a higher impact than on some less used product.
Apple is more than welcome to respond with its own researchers finding Android and other software bugs, and we'd all be better off if they did.
The better term is "coordinated" (or "uncoordinated") disclosure.
Out of personal curiosity, how is "coordinated" mitigating the issue you mentioned? It eliminates the vagueness of "responsible" but seems a lot more strict for the researchers:
> The primary tenet of coordinated disclosure is that nobody should be informed about a vulnerability until the software vendor gives their permission
Those words all focus on the fact that 'bad guys' also get notified and ignore that users get notified.
Doing something "responsibly" isn't just the prerogative or duty of security researchers. It's a general term which means "putting thought into it".
Telling users that their device or software is vulnerable is not really useful to them unless it comes with a patch. Very few users have the knowledge, skill, or access to directly alter their technology to secure it, based on a vulnerability report. Most don't even know how to be aware of such reports, or even that they should be.
"Cyber bad guys" are more likely to be aware of and able to act upon a vulnerability report, as they have more knowledge than most users, and their entire mode of operation is that they don't wait for access or permission.
This is why "coordinated" disclosure is sometimes better. By announcing the vulnerability with the patch, the asymmetry between users and bad guys is better balanced. Users can be reasonably expected to install patches when notified to do so.
Of course there are all sorts of exceptions, such as when data is actively being leaked or exfiltrated, which users could delete or remove. Or when the security vulnerability affects systems managed by people sophisticated enough to take direct mitigating action, like changing server configuration or cycling keys.
You're making the assumption that the disclosure in question is the first discovery of the vulnerability.
If people really can't be bothered to follow through with what's going on, then they'll offload that responsibility to someone else if it's important enough. We already do that with IT for companies, and Anti-virus for a lot of people at home (as much as I think most those companies focus on the wrong thing)[1]. Adding information to the system allows that market to be more efficient and useful.
1: I would love to live in a world where most the protection was a combination of the OS and application vendors patching their own software, and protection consultant/anti-virus companies that knew what software you ran giving you good information on what you should and should not do on a regular basis of for short periods until something is fixed, etc. I think that's a much more valuable service than "we scan all your incoming and outgoing mail and make your computer so slow and unresponsive you think you need to buy a new one".
It's not clear at all that this is reasonable, and IMO, this seems to highlight the lack of incentive (or even perverse incentive) for vendors to secure their systems.
EDIT: breach, not beach