(In other words, let's not do with cybersecurity policy what we did with counter-terrorism policy in the weeks after 9/11.)
(In other words, let's not do with cybersecurity policy what we did with counter-terrorism policy in the weeks after 9/11.)
But... we do have a plan, which is to just not do it in spite of any crisis or whatever. He is misleadingly framing it here like we don't have the ability to backdoor encryption which has never been the problem.
He clearly states that what we need to be weary about is public opinion changing, which is basically like saying that we should just get ready to compromise our standards in preparation for the day where reactionary desire is able to overcome our "sober" thinking of the present, or else fear the government coming in and doing it sloppily and by force.
Clearly that's irrational. We should resist it now and we should resist it then too, for just the same reasons we resist it now. There's no technology issue here, just an ethical/political one.
From my perspective life would not have been any meaningfully different either way if that phone stayed locked. I also can't image some future scenario where it makes such a big deal. What type of information is going to be on some laptop or smartphone that is so important it's worth compromising our general civil rights? There is almost always a hundred human errors around the crime already that they can piece it all together without godmode on every electronic device. A smartphone is rarely an all encompassing security mechanism for any big evil plot.
There is no 'backdoor' technology solution here that makes sense and they need to get used to it.
9/11 is an example of what hes proposing, not a counter example.
Barr's point is that it's better to have that argument now, in a level-headed moment and with opportunities for all the relevant stakeholders to provide input, than it would be to have it in the middle of some dire emergency.
If you oppose back doors, I would think you would agree with him on this -- government tends to be delegated sweeping powers in emergencies, so it would be much harder to stop gov-friendly proposals like "back door all the things" in that kind of moment than it would be to stop them now.
"We must do something now, it's clear that we need backdoors because of X!" <- That's a much worse position to be in during a debate.
And, by the way, we have had the debate--even, arguably, in the midst of a crisis. This was all over the news for weeks after the shooting in San Bernardino when the FBI told us it was vitally important to gain access to the perpetrator's phone. They didn't get their back door. Legislation was proposed that would have required it, but it was never adopted. (Though, in fairness, FBI did supposedly get a private company to break the encryption. But this was only after a very long delay and after all the public debate had largely dies down.)