Is a Boeing Bailout Taking Shape?
mattstoller.substack.com
mattstoller.substack.com
* this procurement program was initiated in 2016 [1] (prehistory as far as 737-Max is concerned)
* the "finalists", Boeing and Northrop were selected in 2017 (again prehistory)
* the $100 BN (actually wikipedia states $86) contract is for a period of 50 years. That is less than $2BN/year. Even accelerating this program, this would be an increased revenue of the order of $0.5 BN per year (at most), and much less net income (it's a wild guess here, but I believe the Pentagon gives money upon delivery of stuff, or at least upon hitting some milestones; acceleration of cash payments must be accompanied by acceleration of deliverables).
* the actual winner of the program will be announced at the end of 2020. So all the money we are talking here must be multiplied with a probability of winning the contract, which is nowhere close to 1 (you think Northrop does not have their own lobbyists?)
* as someone correctly pointed out in the comments here, Boeing already took a charge of $5BN. That is real dollars, today dollars. Not probabilistic dollars extended over a period of 50 years.
Also, here's my own little speculation. The Minuteman missile that is being replaced was built by Boeing, but the first stage (i.e. largest part of the missile) was build by Thiokol, later acquired by Northrop [2]. I think there is a very high likelihood that in the end the money will be split between Boeing and Northrop, and not go entirely to only one of them. Another bit of supporting evidence is that in 2017 the Pentagon granted both about the same amount of money for the Phase 1 of the project (about $300 MM) (see [1] again).
[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_Based_Strategic_Deterre...
[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-30_Minuteman#Replacement
If, for example, people started circulating this whole MAX travesty enough as evidence that Boeing in it's current form is toxic; any political goodwill to grant contracts may legitimately dry up. The company may end up getting disintegrated, essentially rolling back the McDonnell Douglas merger. Regardless of the fact that pretty much does nothing to undo the toxicity inherent to government procurement.
Boeing honestly had to do only one thing to stay healthy. Don't screw up civilian aviation. A flub up anywhere else could be efficiently hidden. Not so, however, in Civil Aviation.
Fascinating stuff. This also applies to software project (mis)management
(via "view source" on the page)