China Is Drafting Urgent Plan to Resolve Hong Kong Chaos, SCMP Says

Many of the front-line protesters seem to be willing to give up their lives to confront the HK government.

They broke into the LegCo building on 1/July, if the police force hasn't withdrawn, probably lots of blood would have been shed.

Whether one agrees or not, many of the youth do not see much, if any, hope in Hong Kong under the current leadership.

These people would rather go "scorched earth" (well, probably not Syrian-style scorched earth, yet) than to be appeased with empty promises, again.

There's a key difference in that the camps are actually about reeducation/brainwashing (or at least forced conversion away from Islam), as opposed to systematic slaughter of said minorities.

You can read the government's formal justification at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/19/WS5c9033f0a3106c65c... . Their argument is basically that foreign influence is trying to make Uyghurs more extreme in their religious beliefs, causing them to commit acts of terrorism. They argue that if they can completely prevent this foreign influence, and brainwash everybody who's inclined to extreme beliefs into avoiding those beliefs, they'll eliminate terrorism and keep Xinjiang safe for the majority who are not religious or not extremists. Essentially their argument is that if you can stamp out non-mild Islam, you stamp out Islamic extremism, which is a logically consistent argument (although of course whether their approach could actually stamp out extreme Islam, as opposed to just breeding more resistance, is a matter of debate). In this context their justification for preventing travel and separating families is preventing the spread of extremism and preventing communication between extremist groups.

Another way to look at it. Imagine you're an amoral government bureaucrat ruling Xinjiang, and you're getting pressure from above about the terrorist attacks there (especially when Xinjiang residents are committing terrorist attacks in other provinces). Your KPI is to reduce the number of terrorist attacks to zero, and you have near unlimited funding. What's the simplest approach? Lock up anybody who has even the tiniest possibility of committing a terrorist attack, and institute the maximum amount of surveillance and monitoring that's technologically possible to identify any planned attacks. Also prevent your residents from going to other provinces, so even if they do manage to conduct a terrorist attack, it won't piss off anybody important (other province governors). That's the logic behind it.

Taiwan is effectively a different country. Tibet used to be in a different country until China invaded in the 1950s.

Taiwan is de facto independent. It's just that China is sabotaging recognition of its independence through the one China policy. But that could change if a country like the US would openly challenge this.

Taiwan is controlled by the ROC (Republic of China) which has existed since the end of the Xinhai revolution in 1912. The PRC (People's Republic of China) has no claim on Taiwan, has never controlled it, and has no legitimate casus belli for acquiring it.

I understand the point you are trying to get at, and it definitely applies to other countries/dictatorships.

Present-day China, however, actually has a very efficient mechanism (relief valve) for dealing with massive public dissent, which is their largely hierarchical governance model (township -> county -> prefecture -> province -> central government).

When citizens have grievances, it's often against policies perceived to be imposed by local government officials. If the unrest becomes serious enough, many times these grievances are actually brought to the attention of the central government who then have an opportunity to step in to save the day and fire/replace all of the local officials involved (to the satisfaction of the mob). A surprising number of mass protests have been quelled peacefully in China in this way, over the years.

> Hong Kong was popularly pro-China before the extradition bill.

Depends. For economic co-operation or dependency, probably yes. But Hong Kong people has very little faith in the Chinese legal system, most of us know it's a facade, from the grass-root to the super-rich.

That's why, by pushing for the extradition law amendment, which, if passed, would allow the Chinese government to extradite "criminals" from HK based on their laws, the HK government has kicked the hornet's nest.

> Re-integration in a few decades would have gone smoothly.

You over-simplify the integration of a region which has its own strong identity, liberal rules and culture. One can't tell which measures will lead to strong resentment and which will get accepted - among the many that will eventually be needed.

It's probably gonna get worse unless China itself opens up. But in any case, it seems fairly evident that Hong Kong will have to fight this fight alone and the rest of the world will merely watch.

There's no reason to keep her around either. Every time there's a new protest, the first demands are: 1. Full withdrawal of the extradition bill, 2. Carrie Lam resigns. The bill is politically unviable for the foreseeable future, and Lam is its figurehead. If they want to take steam out of the protests, they need to address these sticking points.

If they have a new CE come in, fully drop the bill, and actually set up an independent investigation into police brutality, it would take a lot of wind out of the sails of these protests before people dig their heels in on other issues (abolish the functional constituencies, establish universal suffrage, etc.)

The treaty promises that Hong Kong would keep its separate system of government until 2047, but I don't believe it specifies what happens after that. It's hard to predict what will happen, but I doubt if it will instantly become like any other Chinese city.

As not2b suggests, it's more nuanced than "Hong Kong is just another city by 2047". Firstly, they're supposed to be separate for at least 50 years. The ambiguity comes in with determining how separate the "two systems" really should be. Are they allowed to specify the national curriculum? Are they allowed to extradite criminals?

After the 50 years are up, Hong Kong can potentially continue to act semi-autonomously as an SAR. (It's just not supposed to change until after that date.) Hong Kong's current status is economically advantageous to China, as companies have a place to make inroads to the large Chinese market in a business-friendly environment that typically respects the rule of law. The SAR is also given special economic status by some foreign countries, which would likely be taken away upon 'complete integration'. The integration that you're talking about is going to be a long process, and there won't be a singular point where it's clearly happened. So we shouldn't be surprised that China is making efforts to integrate now, but we also shouldn't be surprised by the resistance.

but they were only valuable to the UK because it was their gateway to China. it has always been about the relationship to China

Thanks for sharing your perspective.

A few disagreements:

> As I mentioned in other comments, the protestors know that the real pressure is from the “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019”, which China cannot ignore.

As a sovereign nation, China can and will completely disregard anything the U.S has to say about what China perceives to be its internal affairs. This is completely consistent with the way China has always externally responded to foreign powers (including the U.S) taking such measures. In my opinion, this will be the case regardless of any sanctions levelled by the U.S. administration against HK or Mainland officials who they deem to be suppressing basic freedoms in HK.

Furthermore, the Act’s ultimate trump card (the suspension of Hong Kong’s special trade status should a national security law harming human rights be enacted in HK) would be a bit of a pyrrhic victory, would it not? I can’t see the termination of HK’s special trade status gaining popular support even from within HK as the damage it would do to HK’s economy would be irreparable.

Outside pressure is more likely to force China to double down on its position rather than concede an inch on what it believes to be a matter of national sovereignty.

> Currently, Hong Kong is extremely important for China in terms of capital flow: more than half of Chinese capital inflow and outflow go through Hong Kong [1].

> If the capital flow is restricted, it severely hurts China, especially when she needs foreign capital where her credit expansion is unsustainable, not to mention the ongoing trade tariffs and the bigger ”new cold war” [2].

> Many protestors understand that China needs Hong Kong much more than Hong Kong needs China (as for food, water, and electricity, Hong Kong may follow Singapore’s example in how she deals with Malaysia).

I think the economic importance of HK to mainland China is overstated here. The importance of HK has for the most part to do with territorial integrity.

First of all, China is not reliant upon foreign capital inflows. China’s public and private external debt is a paltry 15%~ of GDP [1] - one of the lowest in the world for an economy of its size. It is consistently among the world’s top three creditor nations [2]. The majority of its debt is internal, regional government debt, issued in local currency [3]. China has also accumulated massive foreign reserves over the years ($3T USD worth [4]) due largely to its trade surplus with the U.S.

In addition, simply looking at capital inflows and outflows to and from HK can paint a misleading picture on what is actually going on. The only thing the inflow and outflow figures show is that capital is being intermediated through HK as a base for investment into China. This can be partially explained by China’s quid pro quo policy of allowing foreign firms access to the Chinese market in return for partial IP transfers via joint ventures [5]. HK currently provides a safe, stable middle ground where these joint ventures can be domiciled but frankly, this is a precarious position and seems to be more of a product of historical circumstance and geographic/cultural proximity to the Mainland than anything else.

The other major driver of this capital movement is China’s preferential tax treatments of FDI, the most important of which are lower corporate tax rates and tax bases for ‘foreign’ investors. This created a loophole where Chinese businesses and wealthy families can ‘round-trip’ their capital through HK, sending it abroad then bringing it back again as FDI at favourable tax rates [6][7]. There are many other factors involved such as bypassing Chinese currency controls [8] and money laundering [9] -all of which are enabled by HK’s well-oiled financial system which has been facilitating these types of transactions since the very beginning. This has much more to do with Mainlanders evading taxes efficiently and foreign firms wanting to do business in China than China’s need for foreign capital or any kind of dependence on attributes exclusive to HK's financial system.

All of this is not to say that HK doesn’t contribute anything economically to China. But its whole existence is predicated upon the good graces of Chinese economic policies and foreign firms’ eagerness to gain access to the Chinese market. HK is not intrinsically economically significant or self sufficient. Contrast this to a city-state such as Singapore which has major industries other than finance such as electronics and chemical manufacturing, oil drilling/refining [10] and most importantly, proximity and partial control of the Strait of Malacca via the Port of Singapore (the world’s second busiest port).

> In addition to real change in how elections will be done in Hong Kong, the bill specifically targets Hong Kong officials and business people who are restricting the democracy in Hong Kong and will freeze their assets in the US. It is fair to say that many business people who are pro-Beijing do so out of financial interests, so this bill will make them think twice before taking side. When the bill is passed, China also needs to choose: between worse financial access versus democracy for Hong Kong.

Well, the bill will supposedly not be targeting business people since it’s not the business people who propose or enact the laws. Only the lawmakers will be targeted, and the lawmakers are ultimately beholden to the CCP. For the reasons stated above, I’m of the opinion that the passing or non-passing of this particular bill will be of little consequence to China. Tax loopholes can always be closed or moved, new preferential tax zones can be created, etc. It’s the foreign firms who will need to choose between HK or China. If a foreign firm is forced to choose between losing access to the Chinese market via HK versus interacting directly with China from a business hub like Shanghai, it will most definitely choose the latter. From China's perspective, the question of democracy is likely not even on the bargaining table.

> This was similar to my thought last month, that the protest might end like the Umbrella protest, losing support from the public. But judging from recent events, this is unlikely to be the case. One recent survey discovered that people are understanding the need for real disruption to achieve actual change (See [4] in Chinese), and the protestors know how to aim at the government without causing too much trouble for local businesses (unless they showed express support for Beijing over Hong Kong [5]).

I'm not entirely sure this is possible. The very point of protesting is to disrupt the status quo. They're not going to disrupt the status quo and enact change by allowing the city, its businesses and government to simply go on functioning as usual. But none of us can know the future so I guess we will just have to wait and see what happens.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_external_...

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_creditor_nations_by_ne...

[3] http://www.cadtm.org/An-Overview-of-Chinese-Debt

[4] https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/foreign-exchange...

[5] https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/82/3/1154/1...

[6] https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/eppapers/1...

[7] https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2580/70dc632993c44d4f7d6c73...

[8] https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2014/01/18/h...

[9] https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/04/06/how-hong-kong-makes-it...

[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Singapore