Pot, meet kettle.
Despite this, I'll do you the kindness of actually addressing the point you made by giving you a big, "so what?"
Activists and dissidents often go up against nation states. That's the nature of the business. And they knowingly take risks to do so.
The question is, are they simply going to use bare encryption, thereby virtually guaranteeing to draw attention to themselves in a state like China? Or are they going to wrap their encrypted message in a layer of steganography, thus giving themselves at least a chance to avoid detection in the first place?
Got any suggestions? Because I know the millions of Chinese who attempt to circumvent China's firewall daily would love to hear about it.
The point is that probably 90% of the time, these people aren't using anything better than bare encryption (if that), and they're drawing attention to themselves anyway. If they're going to do that anyway, I think it makes much more sense to hide the communication via stego.
But if you've got a better idea, let's hear it.
How in-depth do you want me to get with you? I gave you an actual (high-level, easy-to-read, summarized) academic source. You clearly haven't read it. Why not go take some time with it and come back not sounding like a crank?