Value Is Dead, Long Live Value
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It is particularly foolhardy to place the ending point at 1941. If you didn't know, the period directly after this saw high equity returns because the savings of almost everyone was funnelled by the govt into govt bonds.
If you look at how companies were being priced, it is clear why value outperformed.You had profitable companies with $10 of cash trading for $5. You have companies buying back stock at $10 whilst earning $10. Is this comparable to today?
It is kind of surprising that someone taking the cycle view of history (this is the "hardcore" historian approach) appears to have not looked at any contemporaneous evidence. A theory has been created in hindsight, no evidence from the period has been produced. This is history at its worst, and investment research at its worst. This post should be called: all the things you don't learn in the CFA program.
Value is still out there. Then as now there are many reasons why people won’t pay more at the present time for these stocks.
More to the point though: value is only determined in hindsight. A company trading on 30x earnings can be cheap. The only "value factor" that is closely correlated to returns is 5yr forward earnings. If you think a computer can predict earnings five years forward...great, but they can't.
Also, if you aren't managing $10bn+ you shouldn't be looking at Ford. Don't make it difficult.
The markets right now are filled with uninvestable garbage. It's not a value-only thing.
Any viable investment strategy is either a broad based passive investment, or one where you'll have to pick your stocks carefully.
Right now the market is saying one of two things with a 1.0 price/book:
1) Ford's ongoing business is currently worth $0
OR
2) Ford's capital assets are currently worth $0
It's much easier to make a judgement call on those predicates which are based in the present rather than predict the future.
In the past some businesses perhaps depended strongly on capital (e.g. machinery plus cash).
Most modern businesses are simply not dependent on the value of hard capital goods, they depend on the value of their services. The book value of large businesses often contains so many instruments or contracts marked to market, that the book value is largely dependent on market value in disguise.
Examples: TSMC, ARM, a local restaurant, PWC, etc.
Perhaps an exception is real estate companies?
The current market cap of TSMC is 210B - related to the value of its future expected earnings compared with other companies.
Seems a perfectly logical point since after that the gov't took control of the economy to fuel the war effort and dictated what was produced.
Also, how may Axis citizens saw high equity returns on their government bonds?
To be totally clear, and this isn't 100% related with the topic: that period is a terrible example because it is reproducible. The assumption with all these studies of long-term returns is that past returns are reproducible. They are not. If you were a normal citizen around 1941, you were forced to invest in govt bonds (banks were forced to buy govt bonds, if you had a deposit you owned govt bonds).
You ought to write a paper. Eugene Fama and Kenneth French have always been pretty upfront about not understanding why value outperforms.
So value investing doesn't mean great investing as much as several people wants us to believe. Every stock purchase is necessarily a speculation and there is no escape from that.
More and more, you see alien companies successfully colonizing established sectors and stripping them of their revenue. Few value companies are prepared to handle the scenario when these alien companies show up because historically it has never been a realistic threat. I've seen this play out across several industrial sectors over the last decade and almost without exception, companies retreat to niches that the predator hasn't turned its eyes to yet. That's a strategy for being eaten last. The threat is so far outside their experience that they struggle to see a path forward.
If I was going to invest in "value" these days, I'd invest in the revenue predators. They are going to capture much of the best value revenue eventually but this will give them the appearance of "growth" companies in the short term due to the scale of organic revenue growth this business model creates for them.
An extreme case of "software eating the world," basically.
That is what makes them so difficult to defend against. They don't behave like market incumbents and they compete with a very different set of skills than are seen in the markets they enter. They also tend to narrowly target the most profitable parts of the sector first instead of the entire value chain and expand from there, which rapidly reduces the profit incumbents could use to invest in a defense.
And in fairness, a lot of sectors are gravy trains for the incumbents. They haven't had to work hard for profits, never mind survival, in a very long time. They also spend the first few years in a state of total denial about the threat when one of these companies shows up.
This is an invisible part of Amazon's business. They've built all manner of manufacturing and production facilities that are further and further up the supply chain. At no point is a business required to retail on Amazon but once you are in their workflow it sure makes things easy for the vendor, and over time Amazon replaces more and more of the supply chain you use.
I've watched this from the inside for the entire lifecycle of Amazon entering a couple different "boring" industries and the process has been as impressive as it has been unstoppable. Amazon is not the only company doing this by any means, they are just the most obvious and there are a few different versions of this strategy.
- Apple, Samsung, LG, and Google have supplanted a wide range of consumer products with modern cell phones. Point-and-shoot cameras, some prosumer cameras, low-end document scanners, household telephones, PDAs, small flashlights, small voice recorders, portable tape and CD players, car CD players (via wired or BT connectivity), portable DVD players, boom boxes (via Bluetooth speakers), car GPS navigation systems, compasses (to some extent), pocket notebooks, planners (to some extent), a large segment of the wristwatch and pocket watch market, pocket calculators, professional scientific and graphing calculators, walkie-talkies and handheld radios (not completely though), portable electronic games and some game consoles... those are a few of the big ones.
- There is no type of brick-and-mortar store in any branch of retail or auction that hasn’t been hit hard by Amazon and eBay. Additionally, all the B2B businesses in the retail supply/service chain have been hit hard as either their clients suffer or they themselves lose business to Amazon.
I could go on. The world is a completely different place than what it was 20 years ago.
Lots of expansion within the realms they're in, though.
>They are not a conglomerate combining unrelated businesses
But they don't and they are. Amazon is monitoring sales of all categories of articles, identifies items that sell well and are easy to knock off, then knocks them off. They held more than 70 private brands in April 2018.
[1] https://www.vox.com/2018/4/7/17208804/amazon-private-label-b...
Because Amazon is such a powerful force in retail, for businesses that sell on Amazon using Amazon's supply chain to also manufacture their product is the path of least effort. Amazon may not be the cheapest or the best supply chain possible but it is reliable, consistent, and their customer service is good if there is a production problem. Being "hassle-free" is a compelling selling point for many companies, completely independent of the retail considerations.
AWS can be viewed as just a particularly large instance of this but Amazon has been building traditional manufacturing supply chains for their retail vendors for a long time.
I hadn't heard about this. Where can i read more?
That’s not the “appearance” of growth, that seems the definition of growth! I also find your reference to “value revenue” somewhat confusing in the context of the usual growth/value classification of stocks.
Edit: For the benefit of those not familiar with the growth/value classification:
Top positions in S&P 500 Value index only (over 1%):
APPLE INC
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO
BANK OF AMERICA CORP
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC
AT&T INC
CHEVRON CORP
WELLS FARGO
CITIGROUP INC
WALMART INC
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CO
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP
Top positions in S&P 500 Growth index only (over 1%): MICROSOFT CORP
AMAZON COM INC
ALPHABET INC CLASS A/C
FACEBOOK CLASS A INC
VISA INC CLASS A
MASTERCARD INC CLASS A
CISCO SYSTEMS INC
PFIZER INC
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC
MERCK & CO INC
BOEING
NETFLIX INC
MCDONALDS CORP
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
ADOBE INC
PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC
WALT DISNEY
MEDTRONIC PLC
Top positions present in both (over 1% combined): BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC CLASS B
JOHNSON & JOHNSON
EXXON MOBIL CORP
PROCTER & GAMBLE
WALT DISNEY
HOME DEPOT INC
INTEL CORP
COMCAST CORP CLASS A
COCA-COLA
PEPSICO INC
ORACLE CORP
PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL INC
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC
ACCENTURE PLC CLASS A1. It’s just a risk premium. The efficient market hypothesis says that all risk adjusted returns are the same. i.e there is only one Sharpe ratio. Or put another way, there is no excess return without commensurate risk. Using this model, value out performs because of the increased riskiness of the investment. Reward for bearing risk is absolutely persistent so if this first reason is true, it should be persistent forever.
2. Behavioral bias. If this is true, people will wise up and the eventual equilibrium will price value fairly at some point.
Either way, value shouldn’t be able to juice your Sharpe ratio forever. Either the first one is true and the Sharpe ratio is unaffected (just the mean returns, which don’t really matter unless you are unable to access leverage), or value is in fact not persistent, because no behavioral bias can ever be persistent, a priori.
I’m not sure what the answer is, but value alone isn’t worth very much. AQR and other funds usually pair it with factors that have a negative correlation, such as momentum. This allows them to capture significant excess returns, compared to value alone.
Of course it can. Tripping twice over the same stone, etc.
Casinos are full of people playing games with negative expected return after all. And if the stock market is like gambling, it’s mostly on the side of “glamour” (as opposed to “boring”) stocks.
Eventually, the pool of suckers will disappear and the market will move onto some other bias to stamp out. You can see this very thing happening in capital markets. I work as a quant and many very simple strategies like value, momentum, quality, etc used to work remarkably well, just 15-40 years ago. Nowadays, you need more sophisticated factors, or combine these simple factors together in unique and interesting ways.
There might be a sucker born every minute, but the sucker will never accumulate enough capital for anyone to ever care about him.
Looking at the Fama/French HmL series value strongly underperformed growth in the late nineties (the HmL series had a 40% drawdown). The current drawdown is not as large yet (but it's true that it has been going on for over a decade).
"Are Growth and Value Dead?
"1999 was the sixth consecutive year in which the S&P BARRA Growth Index outperformed the Value Index. Some investors have questioned whether Value will ever again be a successful investment approach. Some of them believe this is a “New Era” in which technology stocks are revolutionizing the way business is done: “New Economy” stocks will survive while “Old Economy” stocks (mostly Value stocks) will become extinct."
https://www.northinfo.com/documents/111.pdf
Edit: see also pages 7/8 in https://www.yardeni.com/pub/style.pdf Those charts confirm what I wrote above, growth crushed value 20 years ago but didn't quite kill it...
I don't think anyone really knows whether value is a real risk premia, and if it's reason is structural or not. I think it's possible that many of the classic factors (value, momentum, carry, reversal, quality) are structural and do exist, but it's going to take a little bit more work than just creating a dollar neutral L/S portfolio exposed to E/P or whatever.
If I had to guess, I would say that value is a real risk premia. That's not to say I would have put my money in it for the last 10 years, though..
I'm lost. HmL is the classic "value" factor (as in the 3-factor model of Fama and French: market, size and value). I don't say that's the best definition possible (clearly it's not) and I know other definitions exist (but HmL has the advantage of being available for a century). For what it's worth, I prefer cash-flow-based metrics and total shareholder yield (dividends + buybacks + debt reduction).
AQR use an improved definition (using data as current as possible) but I don't think it's terribly different: "The bottom line is that while the standard approach to value was a reasonable and conservative choice that has served the field well, it is not the best possible choice."
https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Research/Journal-Article/The-De...
In their latest publication ("Factor Premia and Factor Timing: A Century of Evidence", that I've not yet read) they say:
"We follow simple value measures used in the literature to capture “cheap” versus “expensive” securities within an asset class. For individual equities, we use the book-to-market ratio following Fama and French (1992, 2012) and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013). For global equity indices, we use the aggregate 10-year cyclically-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio CAPE (value-weighted average P/E ratio for all constituent firms in the index)."
3) A rational actor with $1 to their name can't eliminate mispricings because it takes more money than that to move prices. Just because you aren't the first person to show up with knowledge of a mispricing doesn't mean that it has been completely eliminated by the time you get there - those genius hedgefund managers that no mortal can beat may not have enough capital to price every stock in the entire market at exactly what they think it should be.
>unless you are unable to access leverage
It's also worth mentioning that you have to pay for loans. "Organic" risk that comes from buying risky securities doesn't have interest, while "synthetic" risk does.
This is some pretty fishy math right here
The 100% number is kind of more useful because it is the extra return on the decision to switch to Y back then.
My initial guess is that value stocks are underpriced, while growth stocks are priced correctly for current value, but has significant growth potential How close is that?
Growth investing: buy whatever grows (earnings, revenue, even DAU are all flavors of growth investing). VC investing/startup investing is classic growth investing. PG on the topic: http://www.paulgraham.com/growth.html
Growth stocks are usually overpriced because of hype (looking through rose glasses), but can still be good, as the last 10 years shows.
https://www.portfoliovisualizer.com/backtest-asset-class-all...
A value company is the exact opposite, a stock with low ratios. As you might have suspected, value has been clobbered in the last 10 years, and a bunch of Chicago school economists are pissing their pants (Fama, French, etc).
V
If we ranked companies by P/E nowadays, and look at the cheapest stuff, it's often not worth buying. We're talking about the garbage companies that no longer can compete anymore. I think this is partially why value in underperforming. It's picking up all of this garbage that is actually fairly valued, and not cheap because people forgot about it.
Funds like AQR do use value, but then often combine it with a factor that has a negative correlation with it, like momentum. Obviously you wouldn't want to combine value and growth (as they should have a close to -1 correlation, depending on how you define it), but adding a factor that has some negative correlation is very powerful. An example of using the combination of these two factors might work like this:
I see a company that looks relatively cheap, but not cheap enough for a value strategy. I think find it has an upward momentum (the price is rising), though only moderately. Alone, neither of these signals would be strong enough for a buy. But together, I might infer that the company is turning itself around and things are going to get better.
"The foundation of value investing is the notion that cheaply priced stocks outperform pricier stocks in the long term."
"Value has several dimensions: the stock price as a multiple of company earnings, price as a multiple of dividends paid, price as a multiple of book value, and other such “ratio descriptors.”
The idea is that investors in aggregate are too optimistic about the stocks with positive outlook (everybody wants them, they get overvalued) and too pesimistic about the stocks with negative outlook (nobody wants them, they get undervalued). In principle, by investing on the stocks that are currently "cheap" (and undervalued in average) you get better returns as they won't do (in average) as bad as discounted by their stock price.
What I described above is the "value factor" (used to classify stocks in the value/growth axis). You can also do "value investing" looking at the fundamentals for a company and making sure that that particular company is undervalued. The factor approach is a systematic way to do that without a detailed analysis for each company: you try to identify the measures that allow you to capture undervalued stocks in average.
the way I think of this is that the price of any stock is related to the value of its expected future earnings. For value stocks, the bulk of that value is in the near term earnings. For growth, the value is in the long term earnings.
The reason that value stocks outperforms growth stocks in the long term is that people think the distress on value is worse than it is, and overestimate how good it will be for a growth stock.
The reason this is different for now, and in 1926-41, is that the growth stocks executed their business model. And value stocks didn’t revert back from distress.
Hope this helps, Chris
https://www.gmo.com/americas/research-library/value-investin...
Direct link to PDF: https://www.gmo.com/globalassets/articles/insights/asset-all...
CAPE is a good case in point here: https://mebfaber.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/capeys.jpg
Patrick O'Shag's podcast is pretty good too: http://investorfieldguide.com/podcast/
> One should not underestimate the role of regulation in how the Age of Technology plays out.
Yes. The US government needs to step in and enhance privacy and the right to be forgotten... following in the footsteps of our EU brothers.
I imagine after the next economic cycle Buffet will again be lauded as a genius.
https://www.portfoliovisualizer.com/backtest-portfolio?s=y&t...
Part of my growing up has been to realize that sometimes that person picking up the $20 can be yourself. That perfect competition is a theory, and that the world is in fact always far away from that theory. Businesses can survive despite large in-perfections.
Trying to apply efficient market thesis to justify ignoring fundamentals while implicitly claiming growth is not efficiently priced is itself silly. To assume growth is being under priced during an era when all the hype and public attention goes to growth companies is silly.
Boring companies with strong fundamentals and good prices are the vehicles which will preserve wealth and return it to shareholders year in year out. The silly pumps into silly growth companies is the exact behavior marking the end times of a boom cycle.
An alternative explanation is that they are simply mispriced.