Pa$$Word Doesn't Matter

Right? I’m tired of ridiculous-still-inadequate hoops some websites try to make you jump through such as “add a number”, or “add an uppercase letter”, etc. - it really doesn’t matter. If this is an account I need to protect, I’ll use a password manager.

This article is weird and contradicts itself.

Having a strong password reduces the likelihood that your password can be brute forced if the hash is purchased online. This helps with "Credential Stuffing", "Password spray" and "Brute force" on their list.

Not re-using passwords means that if one account is successfully compromised it doesn't then mean that others are too. This helps with basically the entire list.

(Maybe it's addressed further down, but the first item in the first table contradicts the premise so I didn't spend any time reading any further.)

> So, as far as password spray is concerned – your password doesn’t matter – as long as it isn’t in the “most common passwords” top 50 list!

That's a matter of point of view. Microsoft may not care that users have passwords in the top 1000 list because, say, only 99.9% of the attacks were made with passwords in the top 50 list, but this .01% of users is still at a higher risk of being victim of password spraying than others. I'm worried that this line could be misinterpreted : banning common passwords is still important (and not just the top 50).

Also, the line saying that password managers should be used "if you are really nervous" is very weird. Password managers are a good way to apply the given recommendations (except for MFA, of course), and on top of that, they allow you to not have to remember all of these unique passwords. It's even more weird since the major point of the article is that the complexity of the password doesn't matter as much as its uniqueness.

I didn't see anything in there that XKCD-936 wouldn't fix. Combine such a password generation system (note: words MUST be chosen randomly for it to have value), with a password manager, and finally, don't use the most commonly used operating system (hint, hint) - and you'll likely be "safe".

Perfectly safe? No. If the attackers are trying to get at you specifically, and know you use TempleOS - then they can target for that.

Practically safe? Yes.

Most attackers aren't going at specific targets, and most people aren't going to become or be "specific targets". Most attackers are going for the lower hanging fruit, who use the most common software stacks, because they comprise the largest attack surface.

Get out of that "rut" - and your odds of being a victim will go down drastically. Of course, you'll have to guard against potential phishing attacks and such, but most of those even will be trying exploits against the "common stack".

What I find funny, though, is every time there is some kind of breach, the only time the software on the system is mentioned - if at all - is when it -isn't- running on the "common stack". I think this does a real disservice, and I wonder why it seems like this is what is happening. Maybe it's just confirmation bias on my part?

But - if every time there was a ransomware attack, or some other kind of breach via phishing or whatnot - if the reporting said something to the effect that it occured on a system running the "common stack" - maybe those affected by the breach would think to themselves, "Hmm - maybe we should be using this stack of software, it seems to get breached multiple times all over the world every year now for 25+ years running - maybe we should try something different?"

But that wouldn't bode well for that "common stack", would it?

And certainly, I'm glad that the focus of the attackers is over there, and not on the software stack that I use daily at home, and less so on the stack I use for work. It means I am safer (except again, against a directed attack - and I am a nobody, so unlikely to be targeted). Not perfectly safe (after all, there have been the odd-duck attacks directed at these other platforms) - but safe enough.

Ultimately - especially on the level of the world as an "attack surface" - the greatest threat has come from this virtual mono-culture of the "common stack" of software. It has been a boon otherwise, but like any monoculture, it is subject to massive failures should an invader/attacker succeed against its defenses. We see this kind of thing nearly every day. If your system is a part of a large enough such monoculture "attack surface", you can expect to potentially become a victim.

But even on such system(s), using an XKCD-936 password generation scheme, coupled with a password manager - and then following other security "best practices" - you can ultimately limit your exposure. Not as great as coupling that with a lesser used software stack, but probably good enough for the common user.

The one area though (which is growing at a fast rate, and is being more frequently targeted) that a lot of this breaks down is that of "walled gardens". While in theory such systems, with app stores and whatnot, should be able to keep issues to a minimum, in practice we have seen there are still vulnerabilities. With people more and more using these kinds of systems, mainly with their phones, it is proving to be a very ripe target for attackers. People don't generally think of their phones as computers, and their attitudes and education (if they had any at all) from the PC world doesn't translate or carry over. So their security on that front is lagging.

What I imagine we'll see in the future (likely it already exists) is an underground market for "popular apps" - where programmers create certain apps that everyone wants (imagine if "flappy bird" had been this way?), downloaded millions of times, then the developer sells it on a black market list (code and everything) for others to continue to update with malware, etc - but the reputation on the app store is already established. If these updates to the code base are done slowly enough and stealthily enough (piecemeal), a large malware base attack surface could be realized; by the time it is found out and removed from the store, tons of users would already have it on their devices. Even if some uninstall it because they heard about it being such an issue, many if not most won't - especially if it is very useful software otherwise. Alternatively, the software might exploit other weaknesses to install other bits in places that won't be removed by an uninstall...

The problem is multi-faceted of course, but I have to disagree with the conclusion of the article that passwords are worthless.

Weak passwords are worthless. Easily guessable passwords are worthless. Reused passwords are worthless. But passwords, with a great enough length (XKCD-936), combined with a password manager, and ideally de-coupled from the "common stack" of software - and use of commonly known other security techniques (mainly, be wary of phishing attacks) - and you will greatly reduce your level of vulnerability, likely into the sub-single digit range.

Of course, the authors of this piece would not likely want to tell people that, for obvious reasons.