You are deluding yourself if you think cryptography can be the solution to an attacker with access to the physical machine. No crypto in the world can help you if I simply bug the fricking physical keyboard!
Of course it can be part of a solution. Responses like yours, which display zero consideration of threat scenarios, time/info/resource costs, or any potential improvements are somewhat tiresome these days.
>No crypto in the world can help you if I simply bug the fricking physical keyboard!
I'm sorry, can you point to that "fricking physical keyboard" on my iPhone? I'll wait.
And even if you want to talk purely about PCs and attached keyboards, there is no inherent reason those couldn't be locked down too were it a general problem, and have a system refuse to trust any peripheral by default. HSMs can also be part of an overall plan that can mitigate some damage even from a keyboard bug. Furthermore, breaking into a private residence or business is a significantly more time/information/resource intensive problem then subverting a centralized repair place through which lots of hardware passes and is left unattended, and which will not in fact generally include peripherals (if my computer is broken, I bring just the computer in, not the keyboard/mouse/monitor).
If you've looked through any number of the NSA or CIA leaks (Vault 7, for example) you'll have seen a device that looks like a standard Ethernet magjackn+ USB connector that has a little tiny processor embedded inside of it (it leaches power from the USB power rails, IIRC) that can be used to exfiltrate packets and the like.
It's not impossible to get bugged when you send your PC in for repair. It's also probably unlikely considering that there's many other easier ways to grab your data.
I don't see how that's related? PCs right now don't make use of the kind of cryptographic lockdown iPhones do. In the case of desktops that's likely because it's assumed physical security can be taken as more of a baseline, though in the case of notebooks it's probably more just inertia. The whole "right to repair" movement is precisely because this has been changing. I mean, what you wrote directly argues the case for locking down of hardware, encrypting everything along the busses between chips or having destructive tripwires or both, and so on.
>It's not impossible to get bugged when you send your PC in for repair. It's also probably unlikely considering that there's many other easier ways to grab your data.
The nature of security though is that it's worth being forward looking to what will come down the line in the future. Particularly if we're talking about legislating it and putting the force of law behind making one decision or another, which tends to then be quite difficult to change. Isn't it worth being cautious about?
Well, you have the digitizer, but since the buttons are highlighted when pressed, the display would work as well.