The Hazards of Nerd Supremacy: The Case of WikiLeaks

I agree with a lot of what the author said, but some parts read like the worst sort of pseudo-intellectual post-modernist pap.

The Internet as it is, which supports the abilities of Anonymous and Wikileaks, is an outgrowth of a particular design history which was influenced in equal degrees by 1960s romanticism and cold war paranoia. It aligned the two poles of the bit to these two archetypal dramas. But the poles of the bit can be aligned with other things. The Internet can and must be redesigned to reflect a more moderate and realistically human-centered philosophy.

That paragraph attempts to say so much, it says almost nothing at all. What does the author mean by "equal parts 1960s romanticism and cold war paranoia"? Does he have any evidence that these ideological considerations actually influenced the design of the Internet, or is this fanciful thinking that draws patterns where none exist?

One problem is that information in oceanic magnitudes can confuse and confound as easily as it can clarify and empower, even when the information is correct. There is vastly more financial data set down in the world's computers than there ever has been before, including publically accessible data, and yet the economy is a mess. How can this be, if information is the solution?

The emphasis on small visible harms caused by greater information serves to obscure the larger, less visible good that information technology has brought us. The increased flows of information brought about by widespread computer networks have made life much, much easier for both consumers and producers. Goods, both in commodity and finished form can be compared nearly effortlessly. What's easier, going to four different physical stores, or opening four different shopping sites in your browser? Focusing on the edge cases of network overreach obscures the much larger benefits that access to information brings us.

They are, however, potentially consequential to American diplomacy, which is often, if we are to believe the cables, both trickier and better intentioned then we might have feared. The contents might be extremely consequential, even deadly, to a hapless individual on the ground -- and we'll once again invoke the canonical unfortunate fellow in Afghanistan who translated for a US diplomat and counted on the USA to keep it secret. I don't know if he exists, but it seems to me that there must be analogs to him, at least.

That's awfully weak language to support an awfully strong conclusion - that Wikileaks is bad for releasing this data. Most people accept some version of "no harm - no foul". That is to say, if an action doesn't cause demonstrable harm, then the action isn't bad, even if the benefits are dubious. I'd say that rule, rather than any precautionary principle applies in this case.

But it did use all of the cables for blackmail. Encrypted copies were sent around the world, creating what is known as a "dead man switch." It was claimed that the encrypted cables contained genuinely dangerous information.

How does the author know? Has he managed to break the 256-bit AES encryption on the insurance file? If not, any speculation as to the files contents is speculation and should be stated as such, rather than know fact.

I'm disappointed in the article. I like its conclusion. I do believe that Julian Assange's actions harmed the United States, and were counterproductive towards his stated aims. However, the structure of this article is so rambling and its arguments so weak, I can't support the author's reasoning process.