Be very wary if pilot training is not part of the "fix" to getting the Max back up in the air. If MCAS is being "rolled back" then certain situations such as "The Max wasn’t handling well when nearing stalls at low speeds." come back.
This probably won't happen of course, all they seem to want to do is fix as little as possible as quickly as possible while denying they ever knew anything.
If I were someone powerful like a pilot union leader I would start throwing conniption fits in public and refuse to let my people fly on Max's at all.
Can you cite the basis for this often-expressed sentiment? There's absolutely no reason why a properly-designed and -vetted MCAS system wouldn't have been a perfectly acceptable solution to any handling irregularities caused by the engine configuration.
The idea was fine. The fault was 100% in the implementation.
And no, downvotes are not a valid citation.
But you have to recognize the whole engine hack is just a convoluted workaround to avoid as much pilot training as possible. The entire goal of the project seems to be to avoid ever training pilots for as long as possible. It's a brand new plane, the newest plane on the market, and the first thing you need to do to take off is turn off the cabin air conditioning. Why? Because that's what we had to do 50 years ago in the first 737.
God forbid this plane startup any way besides turning off the cabin air conditioning. If we changed that, we'd have to... gasp retrain pilots!
I don't know what is the correct answer to the problem, but clearly good safety regulations are trapping some carriers and Boeing. Sooner or later Boeing will have to build a true successor to the 737 (and I guess, they now wish they had sooner)
Citation needed. I've never heard this before, except for some other person on a message board, and I've been involved with aviation and known pilots with multiple type ratings.
Surely that was exactly the MCAS that was installed in both of the planes that crashed.
But the fact it failed so badly suggest it might in fact be a rather difficult system to get right.
Boeing's implementation will be a mainstay in engineering ethics classes for the next 100 years, right next to the Therac-25 and the Kansas City Hyatt.