Set Theory and Foundations of Mathematics
settheory.net
settheory.net
Also, the author seems more than a bit arrogant and deluded: http://settheory.net/life -- I would _not_ touch any of this stuff with a 40 foot pole.
Unfortunately his prose borders on unreadable. There may very well be excellent ideas here, but until he follows the commandment "omit needless words" nobody is going to wade through it.
But his capacity for logic doesn't seem to be affected. English isn't his first language, but he still writes in full, grammatically correct sentences that are very clear. Wordy and emotional - yes. But not mentally ill.
I think we should be careful not to dismiss/overlook people because we don't share their emotional perspective on the world. In other words, just because he's a unique character doesn't mean his take on set theory should be ignored.
From a very brief click through (and from my own fairly superficial memory of the topic), it doesn't seem to be extremely unconventional. At the very least, it's not standing shoulder to shoulder with Timecube.
one thing I learned is that knowing more doesn't make us happy. knowledge can be the key that opens a door to insanity.
whether he is a lunatic or genius is hard to say without evaluating the quality of his work.
This obsession with I am a genius is bordering on pathological narcissism, excluding oneself from the society because one's too smart to be understood by the world is a very dangerous slippery slope. On the other hand, while in a healthy way, I applaud when one sticks to their own ways. I just wish humility was mode widely practiced. We are not gods, we're just some creatures that have varying degrees of intelligence, but nothing special.
Good luck to you young thinker but remember we are to enjoy this life and the people around us. Don't be lonely and miserable trying to prove everybody wrong, it's pointless.
Here, I read some of what they had to say about "infoliberalism" -- the immediate issue that I have with their position is that they make some kind of claim that a few participants in it would naturally lead to a revolution. They then go on to claim that the system is completely decentralized, but also complain that not one other person is willing to join. If their system were truly decentralized, and also something that would provide significant benefits to participants over the existing social/economic/political order, why is the number of practitioners exactly one? All of this screams quackery.
And he's uspet that it didn't pan out, and he's quite clear on a fairly reasonable, if hyperbolic, explanation of why the ideas didn't work.
I read it as him coming to grips with the common blind spot of "my ideology would work just fine except for all the people who don't hold my ideology". You hear it from proponents of all major ideologies; liberalism "they're on the wrong side of history", conservatism "what happened to common sense?!" and libertarianism "but in a libertarian society..."
His stuff is ranty and tone-deaf, and he probably shouldn't include it on a page on set theory, but he's not delusional.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it doesn't seem like anything like "Infoliberalism" has ever been tested (and the author even _says_ as much). Before jumping on the boat of a radical political ideology, I'm sure that any reasonable person would at least like to have an _idea_ of what it leads to.
And I think for any new idea that is non-trivial, whether it's a new ideology, business plan, or whatever, a reasonable person also has to admit the only practical way to figure out if a thing works is to do it.
This doesn't discount Knuths' major contributions to the field. No one is perfect. Even the most logical, intelligent person could have aspects of himself that are illogical.
If the OP's set theory stuff is good, I wouldn't let his emotional rants affect my judgement of this.
I know there are some type-system based approaches, how do they turn out in practice? How nice are they to work with "on a low level"?
Most computer verified proofs are implemented in systems based on type theory, not set theory. Most of the time you do not need sets of sets of sets… You want types whose elements are the mathematical objects you care about.
In fact, if you want to do set theory, you can do that inside type theory as well. You can define the type of iterative sets and define a membership relation on this. The resulting stucture will satisfy set theoretical axioms. This was first done by Aczel in the 70s.
It's true however that one can do material-set theory inside structural-set theory or type theory, by defining a type of material sets (not necessarily "iterative" however, that's a matter of whether you want to model the axiom of foundation!) and a membership relation on them.
Naïve set theory as practised in say a course in discrete mathematics certainly uses the iterative structure to construct say a pair. You will typically find the definition 〈x,y〉 ≔ {{a},{a,b}} instead of defining it through a universal property.
All the axioms of material set theory take this iterative approach, not just foundation. In fact foundation is not very critical (The Axiom of Anti-foundation is just as workable), as you can always just use the class of well-founded sets and work with those.
However, as you're probably well aware, naïve set theory can quickly lead to disaster because it leads to well-known paradoxes (like Russell's paradox). So if you're going to have foundations for mathematics (and it needs foundations!), it needs to avoid the paradoxes. ZFC does so, and in a way that many people have found satisfying enough.
How do you construct the natural numbers, then ?
Inductive nat: Set
:= | O: nat
| S: nat -> nat
I was not aware of this construction, thanks! The only thing I knew is the construction of natural numbers from the empty set, by iteratively building singletons.
The usual construction of the naturals via set theory has us define...
1. 0 as the empty set ∅
2. succ(n) as n ∪ {n}
So you get...
0 := ∅
1 := {0} = {∅}
2 := {0, 1} = {∅, {∅}}
3 := {0,1,2} = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}
4 := {0,1,2,3} = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}}
... etc. ...
1. The empty set ∅ is a set
2. If T is a set then {T} is also a set
3. If T is a set then T ∪ {T} is a set
4. There exists a set X such that ∅ is in X and T ∪ {T} is in X whenever T is in X
These all follow from the axioms of ZFC and (4) is actually itself one of the axioms — the Axiom of Infinity. It says that an infinite set like X exists.
But you can see that the essence of it is just: "There exists a set X which includes the natural numbers." Note that this set X might contain many things beyond the set-theoretic copy of the natural numbers — the axiom just guarantees that a set containing the natural numbers exists ("some infinite set").
You can then use some of the other axioms to remove the unwanted elements, creating the unique, smallest set that satisfies this property.
In other words, the axioms of ZFC were designed to be Peano-friendly. It wasn't as if we arrived at ZFC and then said, "Oh, look at that, we can represent the natural numbers as sets. What a surprise!":D
Type theories do have that axiom. It takes the form of the axiom that postulates the existence of inductive types of the kind you've shown.
> Type theories, especially dependent type theories a la Martin-Löf, are quite natural to work with (and) are easier to implement on a computer...
Whether or not type theories are "natural" is probably a matter of taste.
But it's hard to argue that they are necessarily "easier to implement on a computer". Metamath is a general-purpose verifier, and its primary database (the Metamath Proof Explorer at http://us.metamath.org/mpeuni/mmset.html ) is based on classical logic and ZFC set theory. A Metamath verifier in Mathematica is only 74 lines, while another in Python is only 350 lines. The Metamath verifier written in Rust is longer (it's written for speed), but it manages to verify about 32,000 proofs in about 0.9 seconds. It's so easy to write one that there's a long list of verifiers (see http://us.metamath.org/other.html#verifiers ). Metamath can handle HOL, too. I don't know of any shorter verifier that can handle the full range of mathematics. So by both code size and speed it's hard to argue that type theory is necessarily "easier" than traditional set theory on a computer. They both simply process symbols given a small set of rules.
There are many possible foundations of mathematics beyond ZFC and type theory, e.g., Quine's "New Foundations" (NF) (see http://us.metamath.org/nfeuni/mmnf.html for a Metamath encoding of that), HOL, etc. And that's not even counting logic systems: Classical logic is the most common in mathematics (by far), but intuitionistic logic is in use (and tools like Coq are built on it), and there are many other logic systems as well (paraconsistent, minimal, etc.).
That said, I believe ZFC (combined with classical logic) is by far the most commonly foundation referenced in mathematics today. Wikipedia claims: "Today, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, with the historically controversial axiom of choice (AC) included, is the standard form of axiomatic set theory and as such is the most common foundation of mathematics." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_t...
That doesn't mean that other systems are "not as good" or "not mathematical" - but when people ask about mathematical foundations, ZFC is typically what people refer to first. It's probably good to at least know a little about ZFC when discussing foundations, even if you decide to do something different.
Actually, Metamath is not tied to ZFC. As the name implies it is a meta-theory where you could implement a lot of different theories. That said, most Metamath developments use ZFC. I haven’t seen anyone doing type theory in Metamath, but from what I understand it may be possible.
Also, this means if you are counting lines you need to include the formalisation of the logic and the axioms of ZFC inside metamath. The kernel of Coq is similarly a quite short program.
Certainly there is a wealth of systems available. But the ones based on type theory, such as Coq, seem to be at least as popular as the set theory based ones (For instance the first formalised proof of the four colour theorem and Gödel’s theorems were in Coq).
That's true. There's a Metamath database that encodes Higher-Order Logic (HOL) aka simple type theory: http://us.metamath.org/holuni/mmhol.html It's very bare-bones, but it shows it's possible.
> Certainly there is a wealth of systems available. But the ones based on type theory, such as Coq, seem to be at least as popular as the set theory based ones...
I suspect we have to ask "popular for whom?" I'd agree that type theory is at least as popular as set theory among computer tools that formalize math. But I think far more mathematicians point to ZFC, not type theory, as the foundations of mathematics. Type theory probably seems "natural" to people who are used to programming languages and compilers, and thus already have a daily familiarity with types (in the computer science sense).
"It's complicated" seems like an accurate summary of affairs :-).
That's true, but it's just as true that those same mathematicians only care about foundations as a proof of concept, not a practical device that you might someday want to do actual math in. ZFC is plenty good enough for the former, but you need type theories - or at least structural-set theories - to enable the latter (with the sorts of sanity checks that we've come to expect in any practical formal endeavor)!
Most mathematicians spend very little time thinking about the foundations of mathematics though, so I'd take that with a grain of salt. ;)
Seriously though, I think the statement that "all of modern mathematics can be formalized in ZFC" is probably wrong. There have been attempts to do just that (e.g., Bourbaki), but they invariably failed and ended up with extensions of ZFC (e.g., for category theory) or just silently started using higher-order logic.
Type theory seems to be a lot more practical. Both because it is explicitly designed to be an open system (a closed system must fail eventually due to Gödel arguments) and because similar formalization efforts go a lot more smoothly. For example, compare the treatment of category theory in the HoTT book with any introductory text using set theory.
I'm not a type theorist, but I imagine the split between set theory and type theory is analogous to the way in which different models of computation appeal to researchers on different sides of the "Theory A/Theory B" split in computer science. Researchers in the "A" group who study the outer limits of what problems are/aren't tractable, how different kinds of computational resource compare in power, etc, tend to use Turing machines and RAM models and circuits, which allow computational resources to be easily measured, bounded, simulated, reduced into things, etc. Researchers in the "B" group who explore programming languages, type systems, program analysis, etc, tend to prefer models like lambda calculus which allow programs to be easily composed and annotated with types and whatnot. I don't think this is just about cultural differences -- if you try to prove time-space trade-offs with the lambda calculus or invent a new type parameterization system with Turing machines then you're going to have a bad time.
Do not, I repeat, DO NOT study nonstandard theories before familiarizing yourself with the standard theory. The standard set theory (ZFC) survived for over a century for very, very good reasons. Without an exposure to the accepted standards, you will not be able to tell what is reasonable and what is not in this set of notes.
It should also be noted that the author's field of concentration (geometric analysis) has nothing to do with set theory. A typical mathematician knows very little about axiomatic set theory and is prone to making imprecise statements about it.
I might immensely enjoy such a wikipedia of mathematics.
Most things aren't explained "down to the elementary level" but anyone who spends significant time on this stuff will reach a higher level and appreciate not having the same elementary explanations repeated over and over.
For example, you can do a lot of math without knowing the definition of real number.
You just need to walk someone through 'sqrt(2) is irrational ' and 'pi is transcendental' and you essentially end up with 'I want all converging sequences in Q to have a limit'. Which gives you the reals.
In some sense, the reals are the most naive number system. Just start with the natural numbers, and allow every sensible opperation.
It is simple only in retrospect. It took a few millennia for mankind to reach the definition of the reals. Meanwhile, Archimedes, Euclid, Pythagoras, al-Kwarizmi, Newton, Fermat, Gauss, Euler, Jacobi, Newton, Galois, Bernoulli, Laplace, Lagrange, Fourier did quite a lot of things (which are very relevant for all fields of math today) without even knowing the definition of limit!
Newton invented limits. Only he did not have a fundamental basis for it. Hence, he saw it is a dirty trick that happened to yield correct and useful results. The formalization of limits came later when the intuitive use of a limit started failing. If I recall, this was with the Weierstrass function.
I think we agree though. You can do most maths just by assuming you can do things with the rational numbers. It takes some really weird stuff before you need to properly define the 'real-numbers'.
(A⇔B⇔C)
((A⇔B)∧(B⇔C))
(A⇔C)
What do you mean by (A⇔B⇔C) then?
Because I’m pretty sure I’ve basically only seen it as shorthand for the conjunction of (A⇔B) and (B⇔C), when it is understood that ⇔ is transitive.
(A⇔B⇔C)
?* edited T to F
Whatever A⇔B⇔C means, surely it shouldn't allow for that.
IFF is a parity counter like XOR.
XOR counts how many bits are true. IFF is NOT of how many bits are false. (This shows why XOR is used much more than IFF, because it is cleaner.)
(a XOR false is a, and a XOR true is NOT a, aka a+1 mod 2; a IFF true is a, and a IFF false is a+1 mod 2)
I've taught and always assume ((A⇔B)⇔C). I've apparently used (A⇔B)&(B⇔C) once.
A⇔B⇔C is usually not a valid expression in any mathematical formalism. But if used informally, A⇔B⇔C is usually meant to mean (A⇔B)∧(B⇔C), just as when you say A=B=C when you actually mean (A=B)∧(B=C).
(A⇔B)⇔C has more in common with the other logical operators: due to it's associativity an interpretation that is, in my opinion, closer than A=B=C.
Edit, removed: Note that (A⇔B)∧(B⇔C)) is not one of the two ambiguous options: either (A⇔B)⇔C or (A∧B∧C)∨(¬A∧¬B∧¬C) this is wrong.
True, given any reasonable well-behaved notion of "set", there is a category Set of all sets. (Its properties will depend on the specific notion of "set" chosen.)
But this observation isn't really relevant to issues of formalization. Mathematics can be formalized in lots of systems, set theory being one, type theory being another, and category theory (more specifically ETCS) providing yet another alternative.
All of these foundations are interesting, enjoy unique features, and are interrelated. In particular, ETCS and set theory are very similar from the point of view of foundations: Basically, ordinary set theory and ETCS are two different flavors of set theory: ordinary set theory rests upon a global membership predicate ∈, while ETCS rests upon the notion of a morphism.
Closest to mathematical practice is probably type theory. (But keep in mind that the points above still stand, and that most mathematicians work informally, not knowing any details about set theory, type theory or ETCS.)