Fast Iterations: How Napoleon Managed the French Army
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Prior to the invention of the radio, lower level commanders always had to use their initiative when commanding their troops, because there was no reliable way to quickly communicate with their commanders during a battle.
It's disappointing this was missed, because it's an important point: Control needs to be proportional to communication.
Also:
They also were taught to live off the land by hunting and foraging. This decoupled the soldiers from the slow supply caravans and allowed them to remain independent for long periods of time.
The author probably should have pointed out that this tactic led to his armies in the Iberian peninsular being bled by attacks form the local population sick of having the crops stolen by "foraging" soldiers. It also led to the Russian disaster - the Russians left nothing for the French armies to forage, and so when winter came they ~all died.
First time I've heard of this, and I'm pretty sure there's good insight here somewhere (I don't think I've heard it mentioned anywhere), would be great if you can expand on it.
Control should only be exerted over things where you have sufficient knowledge. In a rapidly changing environment - be it business or battle - knowledge can only come via communication.
Strong centralized control can only work well in environments where communication is strong too. Otherwise decisions must be made with less knowledge than other parts of the organisation closer to the action the decision affects.
It's a nice phrase and concept. If you could fluff it up a few hundred pages, you could get a business book of your own out of it...
Business is not war.
Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then, Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day.
Remembering Napoleon for Waterloo rather than Austerlitz, Ulm and Jena would be like remembering Hannibal for Zama. The fact that his name has become synonymous with his unremarkable defeat on that day, and that Wellington, a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, is somehow looked upon with favor in this country (America), even more so than his adversary who was an ally of America, who doubled the size of our country with the Louisiana Purchase and who actually planned on settling here after his second abdication, is a testament to the lasting power of the British anti-Bonapartist propaganda industry. More books were written about Napoleon in the 19th century than about any other man, living or dead, and most English languages books on him were written by Brits, and most of those books vilified him as the Corsican Ogre, the Great Usurper and so on. Were it not for this cottage industry that sprang up during the Napoleonic Era and lingered long after, most Americans would probably still have a favorable view of Napoleon as they did during his lifetime.
That's true, but Wellington defeated French armies numerous times. Indeed, I think this is why the quote is famous - instead of Napoleon being some magical fairy dust that made the French army invulnerable, Wellington was making the point that he'd defeated them before and the actual fighting at Waterloo unfolded much like it had in all of the other battles Wellington fought (eg, in the Peninsular campaign).
It also ignore just how close the battle was - indeed, most commentators think it is likely the French would have won if Napoleon had attacked Wellington earlier in the morning, instead of parading his army in an attempt to intimidate the British. (The argument is that he could have beaten the British before the Prussians arrived instead of having to split his forces). True or not, it does seem likely this was a mistake by Napoleon.
Wellington was a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, but in many ways he was a better manager of his army than Napoleon was. For example, he always made sure his armies were supplied with food without having to steal from the local population. It was Wellington's logistical innovations in India that allowed the British to subdue the sub-continent - despite French attempts to stop them.
But prior to his European campaigns, Wellington served as Chief Secretary for Ireland and in that position was responsible for policies that would be considered very oppressive these days.
There is some evidence that he didn't agree with at least some of these policies (in particular I believe he tried to moderate the treatment on Irish tenants by English landholders).
But yeah.. attitudes really were different then, and you can't just interpret things the same way.
Of course, there's more to it than just saying "do what you think is best" and calling it a day. Napoleon still needed to make high-level strategic decisions, he needed ensure his subordinates' individual initiative was in line with those strategic objectives (even harder if the officers are French aristocrats), and as usual he needed to completely re-invent logistics for his army to be able to take advantage of their flexibility (see also: Kanban). In a very real sense, he wasn't just a great general but invented an entirely new way of waging war.
Napoleon repeatedly defeated larger coalitions.
Battle of Austerlitz (1805): defeated the combined armies of the Austrian and Russian empire, which led to the collapse of the Third Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Coalition)
Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806): defeated the Prussians, which led to the collapse of the Fourth Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fourth_Coalition)
Battle of Wagram (1809): defeated the Austrian army, which collapsed the Fifth Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fifth_Coalition)
In conclusion, it wasn't larger coalitions improving on Napoleon's tactics that beat him. It was firstly the Russian winter, and secondly the superbly trained and professional British army (which used very different tactics)which first defeated his Marshals in the Peninsular campaign and then joined with the Prussians to beat him at Waterloo.
[1] I guess they didn't get defeated, and the "bad Russian weather" was much better than the Mongolian weather they were used to
[2] And to some extent, the Rus tribe which founded Russia. Being Vikings, they probably found the "bad Russian weather" quite reasonable, too.
The current startup culture of fast iteration is a very weak version of what Boyd produced. I'd advise anyone starting or running a business to read up on the subject Boyds' work will tell you what you can and cannot achieve and how to go about doing it.
http://radio-weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/02/08/oodaAndB...
Charles Joseph Minard created and published a flow map of "Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign of 1812"[1]. This graphic is way ahead of it's time. It provides so much information in such a concise and clear form that it's hard to imagine that it was published in 1869.
Also see more information on Tufte's website[2][3]. That is how I originally found out about it.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Joseph_Minard and http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Minard.pn...
But as business publications go, it's above average.
All of Europe got smacked around for a while by this great disrupter, but eventually, they learned from Napoleon, found some weaknesses, and then broke him in the two key battles ending the Napoleonic Wars. He couldn't maintain his 'first mover' advantage.