>A cynical man could be inclined to think that with this change, they casually removed a possibility of pilots/airlines realizing the existence of MCAS: "we have thrown off the right switch to unlink the autopilot from the trim motor and there is still something making automated stabilizer inputs, what could it be?"

It's worse actually. They've taken a procedure, and are raising it on a pedestal as if to say "See, this is how a 737 flies! It's all right there! You can stop looking now!"

It's as if they don't want anyone to realize that this plane simply does not fly like a 737. Which is what has been getting shouted from the rooftops since the first disaster.

What I find wickedly ironic was it was exactly Boeing's insistence to "not inundate" flight pilot's with technical information, and give an accurate accounting of the vast differences in the minute details of the aircraft that created the problem.

Someone looked at the checklist item of "both stab trim switches to cutout", didn't look into what that actually meant, and changed the plane to fit the procedure. This change cost extra effort. Instead of using the same switches and wiring they were using before, they actually degraded the granularity of control of the plane to hide the differences.

I can't imagine the thought process at the time. Be nice to see what the documentation turns up.