If this style algorithm does indeed have an intentional backdoor: That's some crazy mathematic chops and I'd love to read the theory behind how it (the intentionally weak algorithm) was found (since hopefully that leads to a natural way to generate stronger algorithms, or at least check for weak ones). That'd be a valuable takeaway for the security community once the secret's spoiled, if it is the case.
It should be noted that we should be very wary of these types of "nothing up my sleeve" numbers. djb showed[1] that with enough effort you could come up with more than a million "obviously not backdoored" numbers (this was done in the context of elliptic curves) -- enough to exploit a million-to-one unknown-by-the-public vulnerability.
My point is that "the values come from pi" is not necessarily proof that the constants really are "nothing up my sleeve". Bernstein was discussing this in the context of NIST curves (which could be backdoored), but the same one-in-a-million maths works for any constants (so long as you happen to know a weak-constants vulnerability that isn't known by the public).
No, it doesn't.
EDIT: To whoever downvoted - developing cryptography is hard. The idea that developing one broken cipher implies mathematical incompetence is laughable. You can't draw any conclusion from it except that it's hard to develop ciphers which aren't broken.
That's not how you want to conduct cryptography as a science.